Essays on Health Inequality in Low- and Middle-income Countries in Asia by Aizawa, Toshiaki
Essays on Health Inequality in Low- and







The main objectives of this PhD thesis are to investigate health inequality in low- and middle-
income countries in Asia. The thesis consists of four independent chapters. The first two chapters
explore the inequality of opportunity in health and the last two chapters evaluate the conditional
cash transfer programmes.
Chapter 1 explores the inequality of opportunity in child health in ten developing countries
in Asia, i.e. Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Maldives, India, Cambodia, Myanmar, East Timor,
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. We quantify the degree of inequality in child nutritional status
between children with advantaged parental socio-economic backgrounds and those with disad-
vantaged parental socio-economic backgrounds. We then investigate the factors contributing to
the observed disparities. The results provide strong evidence that priority should be given to
protecting children from marginalised households in order to mitigate the inequality in child
health.
Chapter 2 proposes a new approach to measuring the inequality of opportunity with copulas
to overcome some of the shortcomings of the existing methods. The proposed approach is ap-
plied to the inequality in body mass associated with its intergenerational transmission from
parents to children in Indonesia.
Chapter 3 evaluates the conditional cash transfer programme in Indonesia, the Program Kelu-
arga Harapan (PKH). We estimate its impacts on the entire distributions of child health and
household expenditure. We explore the mechanism by which the PKH affects child nutritional
status by decomposing the treatment effect on health into the part that can be explained by
the change in household expenditure and the remaining part that is due to behavioural changes.
An improvement in height among children aged 24-36 months is observed. Its improvement is
explained not by the increase in household expenditure but by the behavioural changes of the
beneficiaries.
Chapter 4 re-visits the conditional cash transfer programme in India, the Janani Suraksha Yo-
jana (JSY) and examines the existing non-experimental evidence of its impact on maternal
healthcare use through the partial identification approach. We find that the average treatment
effects estimated in the previous studies are outside of the average treatment effect bounds esti-
mated under weaker but more credible assumptions, thereby suggesting that average treatment
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The study into health inequality has played an important role in health economics. In recent
decades, many health economics scholars have studied the inequality in health and healthcare
service (van Doorslaer et al., 2000, 2004; van Doorslaer and Jones, 2004; van Doorslaer and Kool-
man, 2004; van Doorslaer et al., 2006; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2000). The majority of this
literature focuses on developed countries; research on health inequality in developing countries,
where substantial demographic changes and remarkable improvement in living conditions are
occurring, has started only recently. This PhD thesis investigates health inequality in low- and
middle-income countries in Asia.
Strong economic growth in Asian countries, without doubt, provides wider opportunities for
better health. In the case of child health, for example, the number of stunted children in Asia,
which was 134.6 million in 2000, declined to 83.6 million in 2017 (UNICEF, 2017). Despite
the strong economic growth, its health benefits are not necessarily equally distributed. A large
volume of the literature has shown that children whose parents have lower socio-economic back-
grounds tend to experience worse health conditions than those with parents who have more
advantaged socio-economic backgrounds (Case and Paxson, 2002; Bradley and Corwyn, 2002).
Children’s health is thus heavily influenced by the characteristics of the families into which they
are born, which causes the intergenerational transmission of socio-economic status and health,
making it even harder for poor households to find a way to get out of poverty (Case et al., 2002).
But for appropriate social policies to ensure reasonable fairness, the economic growth itself brings
little benefit to health equity (Marmot et al., 2008). Given that health is one of the most impor-
tant elements of human capital (Johnson and Schoeni, 2011; Bleakley, 2010), inequality in this
regard can be an obstacle for sound and inclusive development. Investigating health inequality
and effective policies to mitigate it, should contribute to assisting the sustainable and resilient
development of the low- and middle-income countries in the region.
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The thesis consists of four independent chapters. The first two chapters explore the inequal-
ity of opportunity (IOp) in health. The IOp is an illegitimate form of inequality whereby causes
are not attributable to individual choices. In both studies, we regard the environmental circum-
stances where children grew up as factors beyond children’s control and estimate how much of
the overall inequality is explained by these circumstances.
Chapter 1 explores the IOp in child malnutrition in ten developing countries in Asia, where
a high proportion of children still remain vulnerable to food insecurity. This study takes account
of multi-dimensional aspects of household and parental socio-economic status, and partitions
children into distinct types through a data-driven clustering method. This is followed by a com-
parison of the malnutrition rates between types. Next, we decompose the observed between-type
disparity in malnutrition rates into the factors that are associated with the observed disparity
through a non-linear decomposition method. The results indicate that in all ten countries, sig-
nificant between-type disparities are found. We find the largest difference in Pakistan as 21.7
percentage points and the smallest difference in Maldives as 5.9 percentage points. In five of
the ten countries, the difference in household affluence explains the largest part of the observed
between-type disparity. All the results suggest that priority should be given to protecting chil-
dren from marginalised households in order to mitigate the inequality in child health.
Chapter 2 measures inequality of opportunity using copulas within the framework developed
by Roemer (1998). Non-parametric and parametric methods have been widely used to measure
IOp, but each of them tends to have a significant technical concern when the sources of inequality
are not categorical and multi-dimensional, and when a severe specification error is suspected re-
spectively. Chapter 2 introduces an alternative approach to measuring ex-post IOp using copulas
which model various structures of dependence between efforts, factors for which individuals are
responsible, and circumstances, factors beyond the individual’s control. Semi-parametric esti-
mation of the outcome distribution and flexible modelling of the dependence structure between
efforts and circumstances help to overcome the concerns in the existing methods. The method
is applied to measuring inequality in the body mass index (BMI), attributable to its intergener-
ational transmission from parents to their adult offspring in Indonesia. A 21-year gap between
the first wave and the last wave of the Indonesian Family Life Survey is exploited to estimate
the effect of parental BMI when offspring are below 15 years old on the BMI of grown-up off-
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spring. The results show that 16.2 per cent of the overall variance in grown-up children’s BMI
is associated with intergenerational BMI transmission.
The last two chapters investigate the effectiveness of conditional cash transfer programmes, which
are one of the most widely adopted programmes in the world in the last two decades after their
success in Latin American countries. Progresa/Oportunidades in Mexico and Bolsa Escola in
Brazil are well known as the most successful programmes. Conditional cash transfer programmes
transfer money to low-income households with pregnant mothers and/or children contingent on
investments in human capital. The cash transfer combined with multiple conditionalities en-
courages poor households to invest in long-term human capital development. Conditional cash
transfer programmes are justified by social equity concerns as they redistribute resources from
richer to poorer households. Recently, conditional cash transfer programmes have been launched
in several countries beyond Latin America; Asian countries began to introduce the programmes.
We evaluate the impacts of conditional cash transfer programmes conducted in Indonesia and
India on health and healthcare use in chapter 3 and chapter 4 respectively.
Chapter 3 investigates the impact of a conditional cash transfer programme in Indonesia, the Pro-
gram Keluarga Harapan (PKH), on the marginal and joint distributions of child nutritional status
and household expenditure 26-30 months after its implementation. The cluster-randomised con-
trol trial project conducted in Indonesia provides an opportunity to semi-parametrically estimate
the causal impacts on the dependence between them. The results show that the PKH increases
the higher quantiles of weight-for-age z-score among children aged between 25-36 months. Its
improvement is explained not by the rise in the household expenditure due to the PKH but by
the change in the association between nutritional status and household expenditure. Further-
more, the PKH strengthens the positive association between nutritional status and household
expenditure among them. For the other younger age groups, the improvement in nutritional
status is not observed.
Chapter 4 re-estimates the causal impacts of a conditional cash transfer programme in India,
the Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY), on maternal and child healthcare use. The main goal is
to provide new evidence and assess the validity of the identification assumptions employed in
previous studies on the JSY, through the conservative partial identification approach. We find
13
that the average treatment effects estimated under the conditional independence assumption lie
outside the bound of the treatment effects that are estimated under weaker but more credible
assumptions, thereby suggesting that the selection bias could not have been fully controlled for
by the observable characteristics and that the average treatment effects estimated in the previous
studies may have been over- or under-estimated.
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Ex-ante Inequality of Opportunity in Child Malnutrition: New
Evidence from Ten Developing Countries in Asia
Abstract
This study explores the inequality of opportunity in child malnutrition in ten developing countries in
Asia, where a high proportion of children still remain vulnerable to food insecurity. This study takes
account of multidimensional aspects of household and parental socio-economic status, and partitions
children into distinct types through a data-driven clustering method. This is followed by a comparison of
the malnutrition rates between types. Next, we decompose the observed disparity into the factors that
are associated with the between-type disparity in malnutrition rates through a non-linear decomposition
method. The results indicate that in all ten countries, significant between-type disparities are found. We
find the largest difference in Pakistan as 21.7 percentage points and the smallest difference in Maldives
as 5.9 percentage points. In five of the ten countries, the difference in household affluence explains the
largest part of the observed between-type disparity. All the results suggest that priority should be given
to protecting children from marginalised households in order to mitigate the inequality in child health.
JEL code: D63, I12, I14, I15
Keywords: Inequality of opportunity; Clustering; Malnutrition; Decomposition; Asia
19
1.1 Introduction
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted by all United Nations Member States in
2015, call for action to end all forms of malnutrition among children under five years of age
and to protect them from preventable deaths (United Nations, 2015). Malnutrition triggers a
potentially lethal cycle of worsening illness and further deterioration in nutritional status. Nu-
merous studies have revealed that malnutrition in the early stages of life increases the risk of poor
child development, resulting in a greater likelihood of death from infectious diseases in childhood
(Pelletier et al., 1995; Caulfield et al., 2004). According to UNICEF (2017), nearly half of all
deaths in children under five are attributable to malnutrition. Moreover, the negative impact of
restricted development due to malnutrition in childhood is persistent and its long-term effects
are not limited to the health domain.1 Ill health in childhood has persistent adverse impacts on
the development of both cognitive and non-cognitive skills (Sánchez, 2017; Walker et al., 2011;
Grantham-McGregor et al., 2007; Victora et al., 2008), motor development, educational outcomes
(Glewwe et al., 2001) and future earnings (Smith, 2009; Johnson and Schoeni, 2011). Not taking
action at the very early stages of life will have lifelong, irreversible adverse consequences for the
future health of children, and even for the subsequent generation and the welfare of societies
(Walker et al., 2011).
The stunting rate is gradually declining globally; in 2016, 22.9 per cent of children under the age
of five had stunted growth, compared with 32.7 per cent in 2000 (UNICEF, 2017). Despite this
enormous progress, more than six million children still die before their fifth birthday every year.
Moreover, there is a large regional disparity in the prevalence of malnutrition. In 2016, two out
of five stunted children in the world lived in Southern Asia, where the prevalence rate of stunting
exceeds 30 per cent (UNICEF, 2017). Certainly, developing countries in Asia are experiencing
strong economic growth, which has led to a number of children under five being able to escape the
misery caused by poverty and malnutrition. However, the benefits of economic growth have not
necessarily been enjoyed equally by all people within a country, and therefore health inequality
has not disappeared. The malnutrition rate is persistently higher among poor children in rural
areas. Numerous studies have revealed significant relationships between parental socio-economic
status and child health. For example, children whose parents come from lower socio-economic
1See for example, Strauss and Thomas (2007); Almond and Mazumder (2013); Almond and Currie (2011); Case
et al. (2005); Alderman et al. (2006); Smith et al. (2012); Blackwell et al. (2001); Portrait et al. (2017); Victora
et al. (2008).
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backgrounds tend to have worse health compared with those parents who have higher socio-
economic backgrounds (Case et al., 2002; Currie and Moretti, 2003; Currie and Vogl, 2013).
Achieving equity and equality in child health would be an essential public policy objective to
ensure sustainable and resilient economic growth. Addressing health inequality among children
is as important, or potentially more important, as mitigating it among adults. First, in contrast
to adults, health disparity among children cannot generally be attributed to their own lifestyles
for which they should be held responsible. Clearly, children cannot choose their parents and they
have no control over the environments in which they grow up. In this sense, health disparity
among children may well be considered inequitable. Second, the first few years of life are of
huge importance because vital development occurs in all domains at this stage, including the
structural and functional capacity development of the brain (Grantham-McGregor et al., 2007).
Mitigating health inequality by improving the nutritional status of impoverished children would
help to bring about long-term benefits for the children themselves, as well as for society in general.
In this paper, we examine the existence of inequality of opportunity in child health in ten
developing countries in Asia; namely Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Maldives, India, Cambodia,
Myanmar, East Timor, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. We first partition the children in each coun-
try into a few types, namely, a set of people with the same circumstances in which children grow
up (Roemer, 1998). Then, we compare the nutritional status across different types. In particular,
we test for the existence of inequality of opportunity by comparing the nutritional status between
the least advantaged type and the most advantaged type. If a significant difference is detected,
this is a sign of the existence of inequality of opportunity (Peragine and Serlenga, 2007; Lefranc
et al., 2008, 2009; Aaberge et al., 2011; Lefranc and Trannoy, 2017; Ramos and Van de gaer, 2016).
Next, in order to better understand the factors that are related to health inequality in child
development, we decompose the observed between-type difference in health status into the fac-
tors that are associated with the observed difference by the non-linear decomposition approach
developed by Fairlie (2005). The decomposition analysis would be helpful for policymakers who
seek to design effective policies to mitigate health inequality. The results show that significant
between-type disparities are found in all ten countries. The largest difference is observed in
Pakistan and the smallest difference is found in Maldives. In five of the ten countries, the dif-
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ference in household affluence explains the largest part of the observed between-type disparity.
Exploiting the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) in which data collection procedures and
interviewer training are standardised across countries, this paper ensures the comparability of
the results across different countries.
1.2 Related literature
The existing literature on health inequality can be roughly categorised into two types (Wagstaff
and van Doorslaer, 2004). The first type explores how health differs across various socio-economic
dimensions. This variation of the literature typically analyses the difference in health across dif-
ferent segments of the population with regression-based approaches (Kamal, 2011; Pathak and
Singh, 2011; Van de Poel and Speybroeck, 2009) or explores income-related or wealth-related
health inequality with the concentration index (Wagstaff et al., 1991). Socio-economic health
inequality rests on the normative idea that everyone should have an equal opportunity to enjoy
better health regardless of their socio-economic status. The majority of the existing literature
on child health inequality focuses mainly on a single country (e.g. Zere and McIntyre, 2003;
Subramanyam et al., 2010; Hong and Mishra, 2006; Hong et al., 2006; Hong, 2007; Thang and
Popkin, 2003). On both a regional and global level, for example, Wagstaff and Watanabe (2000);
Houweling et al. (2003) and Van de Poel et al. (2008) analyse the socio-economic inequality in
child nutritional status and Van de Poel et al. (2007) and Smith et al. (2005) analyse the urban-
rural inequality across various developing countries.
The second type of literature focuses on inequality in health itself, rather than on the cor-
relations between health and socio-economic status. This variation of the literature analyses
the distribution of health with the techniques commonly applied to income inequality research
(Le Grand, 1987; Gakidou et al., 2000). For example, Pradhan et al. (2003) explore global in-
equality in child nutritional status and decompose it into within- and between-country inequality.
Castillo-Salgado et al. (2001) apply the Gini index to measuring infant mortality rates across
South American countries and Fang et al. (2010) analyse the regional differences in inequality in
health in China. This type of literature usually does not clearly distinguish between legitimate
and illegitimate inequality.
The approach utilised by this paper does not belong to either strand of research in the strictest
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sense; rather, it can be regarded as a mixture of both or an extension of the first type. The
inequality of opportunity is an illegitimate inequality whereby causes are not attributable to
individual choices (Roemer, 1998). Equality is achieved when the same opportunities to secure
better health are shared by all children, irrespective of the circumstances in which they grow
up. This goal is often referred to as the ex-ante approach, which promotes equality of out-
comes among those facing the same circumstances by making their average outcomes as equal
as possible (Pignataro, 2012; Ferreira and Gignoux, 2011). Inequality of opportunity is a more
general concept of inequality than income- or wealth-related health inequality in the sense that
household income or wealth is just a subset of unjustifiable sources of inequality (Fleurbaey and
Schokkaert, 2012; Schokkaert, 2015). In fact, in the literature on income-related health inequal-
ity, other parental and household factors, such as parental educational backgrounds, tend not to
be recognised as illegitimate inequality sources unless they are captured by income.
In contrast to the existing research, this paper takes account of multidimensional circumstances–
a set of factors over which individuals have no control. In the real world, unjustifiable sources of
health inequality are wide-ranging (Cutler et al., 2008) and income and wealth are just subsets
of circumstance factors. From children’s perspective, parental educational backgrounds and lo-
cation of domicile may well be regarded as important factors that can be sources of unfair health
inequality. Consideration of the multidimensionality of circumstances allows us to explore the
in-depth health inequality which could not be captured by just a single index such as income or
wealth. Taking account of various aspects of inequality source is especially important as there
is a general consensus that composite factors, including affluence, education and occupation,
together represent various aspects of socio-economic status better than any of these elements
alone does (White, 1982).
1.3 Data
1.3.1 The Demographic and Health Survey
The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) project is an ongoing collaboration between the
United States Agency for International Development and country-specific agencies. They con-
duct nationally representative household sample surveys covering a range of population health
indicators in low- and middle-income countries (Corsi et al., 2012). The DHS data has been
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Table 1.1: Country and year
Country Region Year N Malnutrition rate
Bangladesh South 2014 6,988 0.483
Nepal South 2016 3,759 0.414
Pakistan South 2012/13 4,807 0.536
Maldives South 2009 3,521 0.323
India South 2015/16 40,200 0.548
Cambodia South East 2014 4,332 0.431
Myanmar South East 2015/16 5,616 0.361
East Timor South East 2009/10 10,968 0.718
Tajikistan Central 2012 8,800 0.355
Kyrgyzstan Central 2012 5,483 0.212
gathered on the basis of comparable nationally representative household surveys that have been
conducted in more than 85 countries worldwide since 1984. The DHS respondents are selected
using a two-stage sampling process stratified by urban and rural location. Populations selected
in the DHS are representative of the entire country or region of interest. Key advantages of the
DHS include the national coverage and high participation rates (response rates typically exceed
90 per cent). In addition, the DHS questionnaire has been standardised and pre-tested to en-
sure comparability across populations and over time. Standard data collection procedures and
interviewer training in the DHS ensure that the data is both reliable and comparable.
This study uses the latest DHS conducted in ten Asian countries listed in Table 1.1.2 In each
country, selected households are visited by a trained interviewer who conducts a brief house-
hold interview, completes a household roster and identifies eligible women (aged 15-49) for an
individual interview. In this study, we use the data concerning children aged under five.
1.3.2 Variables
Nutritional status
We measure child nutritional status by a height-for-age z-score (HAZ score), a weight-for-age
z-score (WAZ score) and a weight-for-height z-score (WHZ score) of children under five. From
the actual measurements of the heights and weights of the children, the HAZ, WAZ and WHZ
scores were calculated. The HAZ/WAZ scores measure the difference between the height/weight
of an individual and the medial value of the “healthy” reference population for the same sex
2Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uzbekistan and Vietnam are excluded
from this study because their DHS data does not contain recent child nutritional information that has been
surveyed post-2005.
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and age, divided by the standard deviation of the reference population (O’Donnell et al., 2008).3
The HAZ score measures the long-term cumulative nutritional conditions and a low HAZ score
is associated with chronic under-nutrition caused by poor nutrition (Walker et al., 2007). The
WAZ score, on the other hand, measures the short-term nutritional conditions. A low WAZ score
is associated with the condition of being underweight. Finally, the WHZ score measures current
nutritional status and is used to screen children at risk and to measure short-term changes in
nutritional status. A low WHZ score is associated with the condition of wasting. Low HAZ, WAZ,
and WHZ scores are mainly caused by poor diet and often compounded by recurrent infectious
diseases including diarrhoea. The risk of death increases with descending scores (Black et al.,
2008). For details of the computations of these scores, see World Health Organization (2006).
A HAZ score, WAZ score and WHZ score below −2, i.e. two standard deviations below the
international reference median, are often indicators of being stunted, underweight and wasting,
respectively. In this study, children with malnutrition are defined as those who have any of these
three malnutrition conditions. Of the ten countries analysed in this study, East Timor shows
the highest malnutrition rate, followed by India and Pakistan. Kyrgyzstan shows the lowest
malnutrition rate.
Circumstance factors
In this study, we consider the nine circumstance factors that are assumed to capture multidi-
mensional circumstances, on the basis of which we partition the observations into a few clusters.
They are (I) Maternal health, (II) Maternal education, (III) Paternal education, (IV) Demogra-
phy, (V) Housing condition, (VI) Affluence, (VII) Sanitation, (VIII) Parental occupation, and
(IX) Media exposure (Table 1.2). Certainly, these nine circumstance factors are just a subset
of conceivable circumstances, and each country typically may have a country-specific circum-
stance factor, such as the Caste system in India. However, in this research, we consider the
circumstance variables that are surveyed in all ten countries. Considering only the common cir-
cumstance variables allows us to compare the results across countries. First, as a measurement
of maternal health, following Smith et al. (2005), we use maternal body mass index (BMI).4 BMI
3In the standard that the World Health Organization issued in 2006, the reference population is healthy
and well-nourished children in the United States. This standard captures the growth and development process
of children from widely diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds (O’Donnell et al., 2008). Their rationales are
discussed in de Onis and Lobstein (2010).
4Certainly, paternal BMI could also be an important circumstance factor. In most countries, however, infor-
mation about heights and weights of fathers is not surveyed in the DHS dataset. In this paper we consider only
maternal BMI to achieve international comparability of the results.
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Table 1.2: Circumstance factors and their composition elements
Factor Composition element
(I) Maternal health Maternal body mass index (kg/m2)
(II) Maternal education Maternal education years
(III) Paternal education Paternal education years
(IV) Demography Maternal age at birth, Family size, Number of children,
Living in urban cities
(V) Housing condition Natural/rudimentary/finished floors,
Natural/rudimentary/finished walls,
Natural/rudimentary/finished roofs
(VI) Affluence Radio, TV, Refrigerator, Bicycle, Motorcycle, Car, Mobile phone,
Electricity, Safe fuel
(VII) Sanitation Piped water, Flushing toilet, Water treatment for drinking
(VIII) Parental occupation Farmer, Professional worker, Non-manual worker, Manual worker
(IX) Media exposure Frequency of TV watching, Frequency of radio listening,
Frequency of newspaper reading
is defined as an individual’s weight divided by their height squared and then expressed in units
of kg/m2. Information on heights and weights in the DHS was based on actual measurements
and therefore was less likely to be subject to measurement errors such as under-reporting of
weight and over-reporting of height (Gorber et al., 2007). The effects of maternal health on
child health are reported in both developed and developing countries (Bhalotra and Rawlings,
2013; Özaltin et al., 2010; Ahsan and Maharaj, 2018; Ferreira et al., 2009; Li et al., 2009). For
example, malnourished women are more likely to deliver smaller babies and less successful at
breastfeeding their children (Beard, 2001; Gillespie, 1997).
Second, we use the maternal and paternal educational backgrounds, which are measured by the
number of years of education completed by a mother and a father. This is motivated by a number
of empirical research papers on the relationship between parental educational backgrounds and
child development (Chen and Li, 2009; Currie and Moretti, 2003; Ahsan and Maharaj, 2018;
Appoh and Krekling, 2005). For example, it is argued that more educated mothers are capable
of better processing information, using effectively healthcare facilities and communicating with
healthcare providers for children (Smith et al., 2005; Levin et al., 2000).
Next, for the circumstance factors (IV)-(IX), we create continuous summary indices from con-
tinuous and binary variables by the principal component analysis.5 Individual covariates in each
5Certainly the principal component analysis is designed primarily for continuous variables, but it also works
with binary variables as well, although the derived score may not be as numerically meaningful as the one derived
from continuous variables. In this study, the score is used only in the clustering process and the difficulty of
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factor are summarised in Table 1.2. We create a demographic circumstance index from maternal
age at birth, family size, number of children in the household, location of living (urban/rural).
Family size affects child health not only because there are more mouths to feed for a given in-
come but also because of the likelihood of crowding and the spread of infection (Hatton et al.,
2018). Becker (1960), Becker and Lewis (1973) and Becker and Tomes (1986) formulated the link
between family size and child outcomes (the quantity and quality trade-offs). The detrimental
effects of family size on child health are reported in several countries (Hatton et al., 2018; Liu,
2014; Alderman, 1990; Glick et al., 2007; Blake, 1981). With regard to location of living, urban
children generally have a better nutritional status than those in rural areas (Van de Poel et al.,
2007).
As a measurement of household affluence, we create its index from the following nine asset-
ownership variables (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001; Rutstein and Staveteig, 2014; Montgomery
et al., 2000): (i) owning a radio, (ii) owning a television, (iii) having a refrigerator, (iv) having
a bicycle, (v) having a motorcycle (vi) having a car, (vii) having a mobile phone, (viii) access
to electricity, and (ix) the availability of safe cooking fuel (i.e. electricity, LPG, natural gas).
The higher value of affluence index is associated with the better-off living standards. Household
affluence is one of the important socio-economic factors that create inequality in health (Cha-
lasani, 2012; Huda et al., 2017; Aizawa and Helble, 2017).
The index for housing characteristics is derived from the materials of floors, walls, roofs, and
number of rooms in a household. The housing condition is closely related to child health. Di-
lapidated, poor and crowded housing has been regarded as one of the important causes of child
illness (Marmot, 1999; Bradley et al., 2001). Household sanitary condition is an equally im-
portant factor for child health. As a measurement of household sanitary condition levels, we
create its index from the following dummy variables: (i) access to drinking water, (ii) having a
flushing toilet in a house, and (iii) whether water has a treatment for drinking. It is known that
sanitary conditions have a substantial influence on health (Ahsan et al., 2017; Caulfield et al.,
2004; Checkley et al., 2004). For example, poor water condition is known as a leading cause of
diarrhoea (Konteh, 2009).
numerical interpretation is of less concern herein.
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In respect of parental occupation, four occupation types for each mother and father are used in
constructing its index: (i) professional/technical/managerial work, (ii) clerical, sales or employ-
ment in the service sector, (iii) farming6, and (iv) manual work.7 Not currently participating in
the labour force is a benchmark category.8 The association between parental employment status
and child health is reported by Ruhm (2004); Blau et al. (1996) and McGuire and Popkin (1990).
The last category, media exposure, includes the mother’s frequency of watching TV, listen-
ing to the radio and reading newspapers. Frequencies of exposure to the respective media are
divided into three levels: (i) not at all/less than once a week, (ii) at least once a week, and (iii)
almost every day (benchmark category). As the mass media often disseminate information that
could lead to children receiving better nutrition or avoiding an illness or disease, the degree of
maternal media exposure is an important factor to take into consideration (Olken, 2009). The




When we define types, considering multidimensional circumstance factors is important to reflect
the various circumstances that children may face. However, defining the types is not always easy
in cases where we have multidimensional circumstance variables. As we consider more and more
circumstance factors, we are likely to suffer the curse of dimensionality (Ferreira and Gignoux,
2011). The precision of the analysis deteriorates as the number of circumstance factors increases,
because the exponentially growing number of types often leads to very few observations in each
type. The situation becomes even worse when circumstance variables are continuous; here, dis-
crete types can still be defined, but the choice of cut-off point to make a continuous variable
discrete tends to be arbitrary. Li Donni et al. (2015) proposed a way of defining endogenously fi-
nite types with a latent class approach to deal with the multidimensionality of circumstances, and
O’Neill et al. (1999) proposed a method of dealing with the continuity of circumstance variables
with kernel estimation. In this paper, we deal with the multidimensionality of circumstances
using the clustering approach, which is a data-driven technique of clustering to find distinctive
6Either as an employee or as an owner.
7Including both skilled and non-skilled manual work.
8This includes those not seeking employment, such as homemakers.
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subgroups among the observations. Clustering is one of the unsupervised machine learning ap-
proaches that partition the observations into a pre-specified number of non-overlapping clusters
so that the observations within each group become similar to each other, while at the same time
the observations in different groups differ from one another. We use the K-means clustering
method, which is one of the most popular clustering methods due to its tractable algorithm and
high computational speed.
K-means clustering requires us to firstly specify a desired number of clusters K. Then, the
K-means algorithm will assign each observation to exactly one of the K clusters so that the
within-cluster variation, summed over all clusters, becomes as small as possible. In the K-means
clustering, the within-cluster variation for the Kth cluster is measured by the sum of all of the
pairwise squared Euclidean distances between the observations in the Kth cluster, divided by
the total number of observations in the Kth cluster. Before applying the K-means clustering,
we normalise the circumstance factors so that they will range from 0 to 1, which allows us to
calculate the Euclidean distances between the observations.
Determining the optimal number of clusters, K∗, in a data set is a fundamental issue in clus-
tering. If the optimal number of clusters were known a priori, we would be able to use that
number, but such information is seldom available in advance. In most cases, the selection of
a number of clusters tends to be a later consideration, and so it is important to try several
numbers of clusters and compare their performances measured by some objective criteria. One
of the methods commonly used in the literature to choose the optimal number of clusters is
the elbow method. This method first calculates the total within-cluster sum of square variation
(WSS) and plots the total WSS as a function of the number of clusters. In the plot, we should
choose a number of clusters so that adding another cluster does not improve the total WSS very
much. In the plotted WSS, the location of a bend/knee in the plot is generally considered to be
an indicator of the appropriate number of clusters. However, spotting a bend/knee in the plot
usually requires our subjective judgement and hence the choice of the optimal number of clusters
is often non-unanimous. Different people may choose a different number of clusters from the
same plot. Therefore, we consider an alternative approach called the average silhouette method
(Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 1990).
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The average silhouette method computes the average silhouette of observations for different
numbers of K. The average silhouette determines how well each observation lies within its clus-
ter, so a high average silhouette indicates a good clustering. The optimal number of clusters K∗
is the one that maximises the average silhouette over a range of the cluster numbers K (Kaufman
and Rousseeuw, 1990). When we plot the curve of the average silhouette against the number
of clusters K, the location of the maximum is considered to be the optimal number of clusters
(Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 1990).
After the K-means algorithm assigns each observation to one of the K∗ clusters, we compare
the child malnutrition rates between clusters. If we find a significant difference across clusters,
it is a sign of the existence of inequality in child nutritional status that is associated with the
circumstances. We define the most advantaged type as the better-off class with the lowest mal-
nutrition rate, and the least advantaged type as the worse-off class with the highest malnutrition
rate (Roemer, 1998).9
1.4.2 Non-linear Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
Overall decomposition
Next, we decompose the observed between-type differences regarding the malnutrition rates be-
tween the least advantaged type and the most advantaged type to better understand what aspects
of circumstances are strongly associated with the observed difference in malnutrition rate. We
decompose the between-type difference into the part which is attributable to the difference in
the distribution of circumstance variables (the explained part) and the part which is not (the
unexplained part).
We employ the non-linear decomposition method (Fairlie, 1999, 2005), which is an extension
of the linear Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973) to the parametric
non-linear case. We use the following notations and the explanations of the decomposition
method follows Aizawa (2018a). g = {L,M} represents the group to which individuals belong.
In this study, g = L is the least advantaged type, while g = M is the most advantaged type.
Ng denotes the observation size of the group g. Y denotes a binary child malnutrition status
9It is worth noting that the most advantaged type does not necessarily have better circumstance variables than
the other types because in this paper the distinction between the most advantaged type and the least advantaged
type is based on the malnutrition rate of each type, not on the circumstance variables themselves.
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variable. Y becomes one if a child has any of the malnutrition conditions, and X = {X1, ..., Xk}





i=1 Yi denotes the proportion of children in group g whose value of Y equals
1.
The predicted probability of individual i in group g is expressed as
Ŷ gi = F (X
g
i β̂
g), g = {L,M} (1.1)
where F (.) denotes a logistic distribution and β̂g is a vector of coefficients which are estimated
separately for group g. In the spirit of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder,
1973), we decompose the between-type difference in the average predicted probabilities as follows:
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is an average of counterfactual predicted probability that would be ob-
served if the children in the most advantaged type had the coefficient vector that the least
advantaged type has. The first bracket in equation (1.3) relates to the part of the gap which
can be due to the between-type differences in the distribution of X. We call this the explained
part. Another interpretation of the explained part is that it shows how much we could make the
observed difference smaller, if we were able to nullify the between-type difference in the distribu-
tions of circumstance variables. The second bracket represents the term due to the between-type
differences in the function determining levels of Y , which we call the unexplained part. The
unexplained part is the remaining part of the observed difference that cannot be explained by
the between-type difference in the distribution of X. The unexplained part reflects the difference
due to not only parental efforts but also circumstance factors that are not considered in this study.
Basically, the explained part is the average differences in the predicted probabilities of the least
advantaged type and the most advantaged type samples with the same coefficient vector. How-
ever, the decomposition in equation (1.3) is dependent on the choice of reference group (Oaxaca
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and Ransom, 1994). Namely, equation (1.3) is based on the reference coefficient vector, β̂L, and
the decomposition result varies if we use β̂M as a reference coefficient vector instead. To deal
with this problem, we use the coefficients estimated with the pooled sample (β̂P ) as the reference
coefficient vector (Fairlie, 2005). So equation (1.2) can be rewritten as
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The first bracket in equation (1.4) is interpreted as the explained part, while the second bracket
is interpreted as the unexplained part.
Detailed decomposition
The next step is to further decompose the explained part into its contributions made by indi-
vidual covariates. Identifying the contributing factors would help policymakers understand the
underlying mechanism that drives the disparity between types. However, in contrast to the linear
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method, the procedure of the detailed decomposition of the non-
linear model is not simple. The approach of sequentially switching the covariate distributions is
proposed by Fairlie (2005).
The fundamental idea of the detailed decomposition is to first find one-to-one matching of the
observations of each type and sequentially switch each marginal distribution of X. When the
observation sizes of each type are identical (NM = NL), finding one-to-one matching pairs
is straightforward. However, when the sample sizes are different, we cannot find one-to-one
matched pairs, and in general K-means clustering generally does not partition observations into
equal-sized clusters. To deal with such a common situation, the following algorithm is proposed
(Fairlie, 2005).
First, we estimate the coefficients using the pooled samples (β̂P ) and calculate predicted prob-
abilities for each population, namely Ŷ gi = F (X
g
i β̂
P ). Next, we draw the random samples with
size NL from the observations of the most advantaged type with a replacement. Then, each
observation in the least and most advantaged types is separately ranked by the predicted proba-
bilities and matched by their respective rankings. This procedure allows us to find a one-to-one
pair of observations from each type. The contribution made by each covariate is then calculated
as a marginal contribution made by a respective covariate to the explained disparity. The con-
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tribution made by each covariate to the disparity is equal to the change in the average predicted
probability that is observed when we replace the covariate distribution of the least advantaged
type with that of the most advantaged type while holding the distribution of the other variables
constant.








































































where X̃Mi = {X̃M1i , ..., X̃Mki } is a vector of covariates of the drawn sample of the most advantaged
type. Similarly, we can sequentially estimate the marginal contributions for every covariate.
Although the sum of contributions of each covariate equals the explained part, the individual
contributions can vary depending on the order of the switching procedure, which is widely known
as the path dependency problem. To deal with this problem, we randomise the order of the
covariate switching in each replication, which approximates average results over all possible
orderings. We implement 5,000 decompositions for each country.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Clustering
First, we choose the optimal number of clusters, K∗, for each country. Figure 1.1 plots the
average silhouette width against the number of clusters. The number of clusters which max-
imises the average silhouette is the optimal number of clusters. The average silhouette width
method chooses two clusters for Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, India, Cambodia, East Timor and
Tajikistan. This method chooses three clusters for Maldives, four clusters for Myanmar, and
six clusters for Kyrgyzstan.10 Figure 1.2 illustrates the mean values of nine circumstance fac-
tors for each cluster in the respective countries, which reveals that K-means clustering succeeds
in partitioning the observations into clusters with a distinctive difference in the characteristic
of circumstance factors. For example, the clusters in Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Cambodia,
10As a robustness check, we repeated the implementation of the K-means algorithm with different initial cluster
assignments, and obtained very stable results.
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Figure 1.1: Average silhouette width plot
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Table 1.3: Malnutrition rates and between-type difference
Least advantaged type Most advantaged type Difference
Cluster N Percentage Cluster N Percentage Percentage
Bangladesh 2 3665 56.7 1 3323 39.0 17.7
Nepal 1 2172 44.6 2 1587 37.1 7.5
Pakistan 2 2657 63.3 1 2150 41.6 21.7
Maldives 3 960 35.4 1 1361 29.5 5.9
India 2 19782 64.8 1 20418 45.1 19.6
Cambodia 2 2077 48.9 1 2255 37.7 11.2
Myanmar 1 1525 42.6 3 763 22.5 20.1
East Timor 2 6708 75.6 1 4260 65.7 9.9
Tajikistan 1 4663 38.5 2 4137 32.2 6.3
Kyrgyzstan 4 475 26.5 2 737 14.7 11.9
Myanmar and East Timor have large between-cluster differences of affluence. In Cambodia and
East Timor, the first cluster has larger mean values for all the circumstance factors than the sec-
ond cluster. Figure 1.3 illustrates the malnutrition rates with their 95 per cent level confidence
intervals across clusters in each country. Comparing the malnutrition rates for each cluster in
each country, we define the most advantaged clusters and the least advantaged clusters. Table 1.3
shows the pairs of these two clusters and their malnutrition rates. We find the largest difference
in the rate in Pakistan as 21.7 percentage points, and the smallest difference in Maldives as 5.9
percentage points. The descriptive statistics stratified by the types are provided in Tables 1.A.3
and 1.A.4 in the Appendix. In the following decomposition analysis, we explore the factors that
are strongly associated with these observed between-type disparities in the malnutrition rates.
1.5.2 Decomposition results
In this subsection, we examine the decomposition results for each country one by one. To
facilitate the interpretation of the detailed decomposition results, the results are aggregated
across the category which was used in the K-means clustering (Table 1.2). Full results without
this aggregation are provided in Table 1.A.2 in the Appendix.
Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Maldives
Table 1.4 shows the decomposition results for Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Maldives. First,
in Bangladesh, the malnutrition rate of the least advantaged type is 56.7 per cent and that of
the most advantaged type is 39.0 per cent. The between-type difference in the malnutrition
rate is 17.7 percentage points (p < 0.01). When we decompose this observed difference into the
explained part and the unexplained part, we find that the explained part explains the 102.1 per
35
Figure 1.2: Mean values of circumstances across clusters
Note: Each circumstance variable is normalised so that each has a value from 0 to 1.
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Figure 1.3: Malnutrition rates across clusters
Note: 95% confidence intervals are illustrated.
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cent (=18.0 percentage points) of the observed difference, which is partly offset by the negative
contribution made by the unexplained part.
The observation that the relative contribution of the explained part is over 100 per cent suggests
that if children among the least advantaged type had the covariate distribution that children
in the most advantaged type have, children in the least advantaged type would have a smaller
malnutrition rate than children in the most advantaged type. The finding that the relative
contribution of the unexplained part is negative suggests that the between-type difference in
the functional form in equation (1.1) buffers the observed disparity in malnutrition rate that
is associated with the difference in covariates. For example, the unexplained part can become
negative, if the negative relationship between affluence and malnutrition is weaker among the
most advantaged type than that among the least advantaged group. Also, the negative relative
contribution of the unexplained part suggests that there might exist some unobservable factors
that substantially contribute to mitigating the gap in malnutrition rate.
Among the explained part, the difference in household affluence shows the largest contribu-
tion, explaining the 48.8 per cent (=8.8 percentage points) of the explained difference (p < 0.01).
The difference in maternal health also shows a large contribution and this explains the 17.8 per
cent (=3.2 percentage points) of the explained difference (p < 0.01). A significant effect is also
found for paternal educational background (p < 0.01).
Second, in Nepal, the malnutrition rates for the least advantaged type and the most advan-
taged type are 44.6 per cent and 37.1 per cent, respectively. The difference, 7.5 percentage
points, is significant (p < 0.01). The decomposition analysis reveals that the 95.6 per cent of
the observed difference, i.e. 7.2 percentage points, is explained by the between-type difference
in the observed covariate distributions (p < 0.01). Among all the categories, maternal education
and sanitary condition (p < 0.01) show the large contributions to the observed difference. They
explain 28.5 per cent (=2.1 percentage points) and 20.1 per cent (=1.4 percentage points) of the
explained difference, respectively. However maternal education shows a higher standard error,
making its contribution statistically insignificant. We also find significant contributions made
by the differences in maternal health, demography, affluence and maternal media exposure (all
p < 0.01).
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Third, in Pakistan, 63.3 per cent of children in the least advantaged type have a nutritional
problem, compared with 41.6 per cent of children in the most advantaged type. The difference is
21.7 percentage points (p < 0.01). The difference in the observed covariate distributions accounts
for the 92.0 per cent (=20.0 percentage points) of the observed difference in malnutrition rate
(p < 0.01). Maternal education (p < 0.01) is the largest contributor to the observed difference,
explaining the 25.5 per cent (=5.1 percentage points) of the explained difference. The differences
in maternal health, paternal education, housing and media exposure also show significant con-
tributions to the observed difference (all p < 0.01).
Finally, in Maldives, the malnutrition rate of the least advantaged type is 35.4 per cent and
that of the most advantaged type is 29.5 per cent. The difference is 5.9 percentage points
(p < 0.05) and this difference is the smallest among all the countries analysed in this paper.
The 86.2 per cent (=5.1 percentage points) of the difference is associated with the difference in
the observed covariate distributions between the types (p < 0.01). The differences in parental
occupation and demography show large contributions to the observed difference, but the contri-
bution of parental occupation is not statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. Demography
shows the largest significant contribution to the observed difference, and it explains the 25.8 per
cent (=1.3 percentage points) of the explained difference (p < 0.05). The differences in housing
characteristics and affluence also show significant contributions (both p < 0.01).
India, Cambodia, Myanmar and East Timor
Table 1.5 shows the decomposition results for India, Cambodia, Myanmar and East Timor. First,
in India, 64.8 per cent of children in the least advantaged type suffer nutritional problems, while
45.1 per cent of children in the most advantaged type do. The difference, 19.6 percentage points,
is statistically significant (p < 0.01). The 19.0 percentage points are explained by the between-
type difference in the covariate distributions. A detailed decomposition result shows that the
differences in household affluence (p < 0.01), maternal health (p < 0.01) and maternal education
(p < 0.01) exhibit large contributions to the observed difference. They account for the explained
part by 28.7 per cent (=5.4 percentage points), 17.8 per cent (=3.4 percentage points) and
14.8 per cent (=2.8 percentage points), respectively. The differences in paternal education, sani-
tation, parental occupation and media exposure also show significant contributions (all p < 0.01).
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Table 1.4: Decomposition results: Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Maldives
Bangladesh Nepal
Estimates SEs Contr (%) Estimates SEs Contr (%)
Probability
Least advantaged type 0.567*** 0.008 0.446*** 0.010
Most advantaged type 0.390*** 0.008 0.371*** 0.012
Overall decomposition
Observed difference 0.177*** 0.011 0.075*** 0.016
Explained part 0.180*** 0.010 102.063 0.072*** 0.015 95.643
Unexplained part -0.004 0.006 -2.063 0.003 0.006 4.357
Detailed decomposition
Maternal health 0.032*** 0.003 17.787 0.005*** 0.001 6.883
Maternal education 0.005 0.005 2.511 0.021 0.016 28.525
Paternal education 0.023*** 0.006 12.824 0.002 0.005 2.787
Demography -0.002 0.005 -1.065 0.012*** 0.005 16.283
Housing 0.007 0.009 3.908 0.001 0.002 0.919
Affluence 0.088*** 0.014 48.820 0.008*** 0.003 11.488
Sanitation 0.009 0.006 5.114 0.014*** 0.003 20.145
Parental occupation 0.004 0.008 2.072 0.002 0.002 2.620
Media exposure 0.014 0.011 8.028 0.008*** 0.003 10.525
Pakistan Maldives
Estimates SEs Contr (%) Estimates SEs Contr (%)
Probability
Least advantaged type 0.633*** 0.009 0.354*** 0.016
Most advantaged type 0.416*** 0.010 0.295*** 0.013
Overall decomposition
Observed difference 0.217*** 0.014 0.059*** 0.021
Explained part 0.200*** 0.012 92.013 0.051*** 0.019 86.232
Unexplained part 0.017*** 0.007 7.987 0.008 0.009 13.768
Detailed decomposition
Maternal health 0.014*** 0.003 6.758 -0.003*** 0.001 -5.505
Maternal education 0.051*** 0.015 25.490 0.010 0.011 19.688
Paternal education 0.026*** 0.007 12.979 -0.002 0.002 -3.743
Demography 0.005 0.007 2.488 0.013** 0.006 25.826
Housing 0.030*** 0.012 15.236 0.007*** 0.003 13.892
Affluence 0.028* 0.015 13.884 0.012*** 0.005 23.851
Sanitation 0.013 0.008 6.520 -0.001 0.003 -2.808
Parental occupation 0.006 0.006 3.112 0.017 0.015 32.927
Media exposure 0.027*** 0.011 13.531 -0.002 0.003 -4.380
Contribution (Contr) of the explained and unexplained part is the one to the observed difference.
Contribution (Contr) of the individual category is the one to the explained part.
Standard errors (SEs) are obtained by bootstrap with 5,000 repetitions.
*p < 0.10,**p < 0.05,***p < 0.01.
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Next, the malnutrition rate in Cambodia among the least advantaged type is 48.9 per cent,
and among the most advantaged type it is 37.7 per cent. The difference, 11.2 percentage points,
is statistically significant (p < 0.01). We find that the difference in covariates makes a larger
contribution to the between-type disparity than is actually observed. It explains the 117.7 per
cent (=13.2 percentage points) of the observed difference (p < 0.01). This suggests that if the
children in the least advantaged type had the covariate distribution that the children in the
most advantaged type have, the children belonging to the least advantaged type would have a
smaller malnutrition rate than the children in the most advantaged type. The differences in
household affluence and sanitation explain larger parts of the observed difference. The difference
in household affluence explains 43.5 per cent (=5.7 percentage points) of the explained difference
(p < 0.01). The difference in sanitation explains the 32.2 per cent (=4.2 percentage points) of the
explained difference (p < 0.01). We also find a significant contribution made by the difference in
maternal health (p < 0.01).
In Myanmar, the malnutrition rate of the least advantaged type is 42.6 per cent, whilst that
of the most advantaged type is 22.5 per cent. The observed between-type difference is 20.1
percentage points and it is statistically significant (p < 0.01). The explained part accounts for
the 88.7 per cent (=17.8 percentage points) of the observed difference (p < 0.01). A detailed
decomposition result shows that the difference in household affluence explains the 46.1 per cent
(=8.2 percentage points) (p < 0.01) and paternal education explains the 12.9 per cent (=2.3
percentage points) (p < 0.01) of the explained difference. We also find significant contributions
made by the differences in maternal health (p < 0.01) and maternal media exposure (p < 0.05).
In East Timor, 75.6 per cent of children belonging to the least advantaged type have some
conditions of malnutrition, and 65.7 per cent of children belonging to the most advantaged type
suffer from malnutrition. The difference is 9.9 percentage points and this difference is statis-
tically significant (p < 0.01). The between-type difference in covariates explains the 93.6 per
cent (=9.3 percentage points) of the observed disparity in malnutrition rate (p < 0.01). Looking
at the result of the detailed decomposition, we observe that the difference in household afflu-
ence shows the largest contribution, explaining the 28.6 per cent (=2.6 percentage points) of
the explained difference (p < 0.01). The second largest significant contributor is the difference
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in sanitary condition, explaining the 21.6 per cent (=2.0 percentage points) of the explained
difference (p < 0.01). We also find that the differences in maternal health (p < 0.01), maternal
education (p < 0.05) and demographic characteristics (p < 0.05) show significant contributions.
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan
Table 1.6 shows the decomposition results for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In Tajikistan, the mal-
nutrition rate of the least advantaged type is 38.5 per cent, while the rate of the most advantaged
type is 32.2 per cent. The difference is 6.3 percentage points (p < 0.01). The observed difference
in covariate accounts for the 100.7 per cent (=6.3 percentage points) of the observed disparity
(p < 0.01), which suggests that if the children in the least advantaged type had the covariate
distributions that the children in the most advantaged type have, the disparity in malnutrition
rate would disappear. The detailed decomposition reveals that the difference in parental occu-
pation types shows the largest contribution to the disparity, explaining the 75.1 per cent (=4.7
percentage points) of the explained part (p < 0.01). The difference in affluence also contributes
to the explained difference by 15.3 per cent (=1.0 percentage points) (p < 0.01). Although they
are small, the differences in maternal health (p < 0.05) and maternal educational attainment
(p < 0.01) show significant contributions.
Last of all, in Kyrgyzstan, among the least advantaged type, the malnutrition rate is 26.5 per
cent, and the rate among the most advantaged type is 14.7 per cent. The difference is 11.9
percentage points (p < 0.01). We find that the difference in covariates explains the 74.3 per
cent (=8.8 percentage points) of the observed difference (p < 0.01). The detailed decomposition
reveals that the difference in maternal education is the largest contributor, explaining the 46.9
per cent of the explained difference (=4.1 percentage points) (p < 0.01).
1.5.3 Heterogeneity between male and female children
Although the difference in the physical developmental process between male and female children
is taken account of when calculating the HAZ, WAZ and WHZ scores, the degree of inequality
and its determinants can differ between them. Wamani et al. (2007) report that in sub-Saharan
Africa male children under five years of age are more likely to become stunted than female chil-
dren, and that boys have a steeper socio-economic gradient of under-nutrition. In this section,
we explore the heterogeneity of the determinants between boys and girls. We split the sam-
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Table 1.5: Decomposition results: India, Cambodia, Myanmar and East Timor
India Cambodia
Estimates SEs Contr (%) Estimates SEs Contr (%)
Probability
Least advantaged type 0.648*** 0.003 0.489*** 0.011
Most advantaged type 0.451*** 0.004 0.377*** 0.011
Overall decomposition
Observed difference 0.196*** 0.005 0.112*** 0.015
Explained part 0.190*** 0.004 96.688 0.132*** 0.013 117.738
Unexplained part 0.007*** 0.003 3.312 -0.020*** 0.007 -17.738
Detailed decomposition
Maternal health 0.034*** 0.002 17.810 0.013*** 0.002 9.852
Maternal education 0.028*** 0.004 14.800 -0.001 0.004 -0.993
Paternal education 0.009*** 0.003 4.884 0.001 0.003 0.690
Demography -0.007*** 0.002 -3.949 -0.017* 0.009 -12.860
Housing 0.024*** 0.004 12.682 0.005 0.010 3.431
Affluence 0.054*** 0.006 28.675 0.057*** 0.017 43.454
Sanitation 0.023*** 0.004 12.363 0.042*** 0.012 32.232
Parental occupation 0.012*** 0.003 6.292 0.021 0.017 15.857
Media exposure 0.012*** 0.005 6.450 0.011 0.010 8.352
Myanmar East Timor
Estimates SEs Contr (%) Estimates SEs Contr (%)
Probability
Least advantaged type 0.426*** 0.013 0.756*** 0.005
Most advantaged type 0.225*** 0.015 0.657*** 0.007
Overall decomposition
Observed difference 0.201*** 0.021 0.099*** 0.009
Explained part 0.178*** 0.016 88.719 0.093*** 0.009 93.628
Unexplained part 0.023* 0.013 11.281 0.006** 0.003 6.372
Detailed decomposition
Maternal health 0.017*** 0.003 9.681 0.009*** 0.001 9.699
Maternal education -0.006 0.005 -3.241 0.008** 0.004 8.756
Paternal education 0.023*** 0.007 12.874 -0.004** 0.002 -4.487
Demography -0.005 0.012 -2.538 0.009** 0.004 9.255
Housing 0.022* 0.012 12.594 0.006 0.005 6.318
Affluence 0.082*** 0.018 46.058 0.026*** 0.009 28.627
Sanitation 0.016 0.010 8.724 0.020*** 0.005 21.644
Parental occupation 0.008 0.007 4.613 0.018* 0.010 18.962
Media exposure 0.020** 0.010 11.219 0.001 0.006 1.233
Contribution (Contr) of the explained and unexplained part is the one to the observed difference.
Contribution (Contr) of the individual category is the one to the explained part.
Standard errors (SEs) are obtained by bootstrap with 5,000 repetitions.
*p < 0.10,**p < 0.05,***p < 0.01.
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Table 1.6: Decomposition results: Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan
Estimates SEs Contr (%) Estimates SEs Contr (%)
Probability
Least advantaged type 0.385*** 0.007 0.265*** 0.021
Most advantaged type 0.322*** 0.008 0.147*** 0.013
Overall decomposition
Observed difference 0.063*** 0.010 0.119*** 0.025
Explained part 0.063*** 0.010 100.776 0.088*** 0.021 74.319
Unexplained part 0.000 0.002 -0.776 0.030*** 0.012 25.681
Detailed decomposition
Maternal health 0.002** 0.001 2.416 -0.001 0.001 -1.223
Maternal education 0.001*** 0.000 1.204 0.041*** 0.008 46.920
Paternal education -0.001 0.001 -2.224 -0.005 0.005 -5.553
Demography 0.002 0.003 2.480 0.014 0.010 16.165
Housing 0.001 0.003 2.206 0.015 0.014 16.832
Affluence 0.010*** 0.003 15.309 -0.004 0.006 -4.078
Sanitation 0.002 0.003 3.454 0.028 0.023 31.799
Parental occupation 0.047*** 0.011 75.105 0.002 0.005 2.282
Media exposure 0.000 0.002 0.050 -0.003*** 0.001 -3.190
Contribution (Contr) of the explained and unexplained part is the one to the observed difference.
Contribution (Contr) of the individual category is the one to the explained part.
Standard errors (SEs) are obtained by bootstrap with 5,000 repetitions.
*p < 0.10,**p < 0.05,***p < 0.01.
ple and implement the decomposition analysis for each subsample. Figure 1.4 illustrates the
malnutrition rates of each cluster, from which we redefine the most advantaged types and the
least advantaged types, and explore the factors that are strongly associated with the observed
between-type disparity in the malnutrition rate.
Tables 1.7 and 1.8 present the decomposition results for boys and girls respectively. In Bangladesh,
Pakistan, India, Cambodia, Myanmar, East Timor and Tajikistan, we find that the subsample
analysis shows very similar results to the main results of the entire sample analysis and we do
not find substantial heterogeneity between boys and girls. On the other hand, in Nepal, Maldives
and Kyrgyzstan, we find notable differences in terms of the proportion of the explained part and
the largest determinants. In this subsection, we discuss the results obtained from these three
countries.
First in Nepal, compared with the main result, the result of the boys’ sample shows that a much
larger proportion of the explained part is contributed by the difference in maternal education
(p < 0.01). While in the entire sample analysis its relative contribution is 28.5 per cent, here it
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Figure 1.4: Malnutrition rates of boys and girls across clusters



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































is 57.2 per cent. In the result of the girls’ sample, on the other hand, we find that the largest
contributor is the difference in demographic factors (p < 0.01) and the difference in maternal
education does not show a significant contribution.
Next, in Maldives, we find interesting heterogeneities between boys and girls. In the boys’
sample, the malnutrition rate of the least advantaged type is 39.8 per cent, whilst that of the
most advantaged type is 29.4 per cent. The observed between-type difference is 10.5 percentage
points and it is statistically significant (p < 0.01). The explained part accounts for the 87.7
per cent (=9.2 percentage points) of the observed difference (p < 0.01). Looking at the detailed
decomposition results, we find a much larger contribution of the difference in parental occupation
types (p < 0.05) than that observed in the entire sample analysis. On the other hand in the
girls’ sample, we do not find a statistically significant between-type difference in malnutrition
rate, which suggests that the significant difference found in the entire sample is mainly due to
the between-type difference of the boys.
In Kyrgyzstan, we find a few notable differences between boys and girls in terms of the pro-
portion of the explained part and its main contributors. For boys, the malnutrition rates for
the least advantaged type and the most advantaged type are 31.0 per cent and 16.2 per cent,
respectively. The difference is 14.8 percentage points (p < 0.01). The difference in the observed
covariate distributions accounts for the 82.3 per cent (12.2 percentage points) of the observed
difference in malnutrition rate. This relative contribution is larger than the contribution of 74.3
per cent which is estimated in the entire sample analysis. The largest contribution is made by
the difference in sanitary condition, but its large standard error makes it statistically insignif-
icant. The difference in maternal education makes the largest significant contribution (p < 0.01).
In the girls’ sample in Kyrgyzstan, the malnutrition rate of the least advantaged type is 22.7
per cent, whilst that of the most advantaged type is 13.2 per cent. The observed between-type
difference is 9.5 percentage points and it is statistically significant (p < 0.01). The explained part
accounts for only 84.7 per cent (=8.0 percentage points) of the observed difference, which is also
larger than the contribution of 74.3 per cent which is estimated in the entire sample analysis.
The largest contribution is made by the difference in maternal education (p < 0.01), which is



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.6 Discussion and conclusion
Health inequality among children is not merely an infringement of various social equalities. Given
that health is one of the most important elements of human capital (Johnson and Schoeni, 2011),
it can be a substantial future obstacle for the sound, inclusive social and economic development
of a country. This study explores the inequality of opportunity in child nutritional status in ten
developing countries in Asia, where a high proportion of children still remain vulnerable to food
insecurity and suffer malnutrition. As determinants of child health inequality are often multidi-
mensional and mutually related, this study considers various aspects of circumstances that are
totally beyond the control of children. We partition child observations into distinct types defined
by a data-driven clustering method. This study clarifies the sources of unfair inequality in child
malnutrition which could not be captured by an unidimensional indicator of socioeconomic sta-
tus. Then, in order to better understand what aspects of circumstances are strongly associated
with the between-type disparity in malnutrition rate, we decompose the observed disparity into
its contributing factors with a non-linear decomposition method. The latest DHS data allows us
to compare the results across countries. Although the decomposition results in this study do not
necessarily reflect the causal relationships, the descriptive association can be equally important
from a policymaking perspective.
Our decomposition analysis elucidates the important factors that are associated with the in-
equality in child nutritional status across the country. First, we find strong evidence of the
existence of inequality of opportunity in child nutritional status in all ten countries. The largest
between-type disparity in malnutrition rate is observed in Pakistan as 21.7 percentage points.
The decomposition results show that in eight countries, the difference in household affluence
shows the significant contribution and that in five of the countries, the difference in household
affluence exhibits the largest contribution to the observed disparity in malnutrition rate. This is
consistent with a variety of literature which reports that children from poorer households tend
to be vulnerable to food insecurity and to have higher mortality rates (Chalasani, 2012; Black
et al., 2013; Huda et al., 2017).
The difference in maternal health shows a significant contribution in Bangladesh, Nepal, Pak-
istan, India, Cambodia, Myanmar, East Timor and Tajikistan, where we find the significantly
larger maternal BMI among the most advantaged type. The difference in demographic factors
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show significant contributions in Nepal, Maldives and East Timor. In Nepal and East Timor,
the difference in the maternal age at birth made the largest contribution, while in Maldives the
difference in the proportion of households living in urban areas made the largest contribution
(Table 1.A.2).
The difference in housing characteristics shows a significant contribution in Pakistan, Maldives
and India. In Maldives, the difference in number of rooms is the main contributor. In Pak-
istan and India, where children in the least advantaged type tend to live in poorer houses, the
difference in the materials of housing make large contributions (Table 1.A.2). The difference
in sanitary condition, which is known as a leading cause of diarrhoea and intestinal parasites
(Konteh, 2009), exhibits a significant contribution in Nepal, India, Cambodia and East Timor,
where a much lower proportion of households among the least advantaged type have access to
piped water, own a flushing toilet, and treat water for drinking. In these four countries, the
between-type difference in the proportion of households with a flushing toilet makes the largest
contribution (Table 1.A.2).
In Nepal, Pakistan, India and Myanmar, the difference in maternal exposure to the media
significantly explains the observed difference. In these countries, the differences in frequency
of watching TV and reading a newspaper made the largest contributions (Table 1.A.2). The
difference in the frequency of listening to radio did not show a significant contribution at the
five per cent level in these countries. These findings suggest the existence of a gap in knowledge
about childrearing that could be obtained by being exposed to the TV and newspaper.
In addition, the difference in maternal educational backgrounds significantly explains the ob-
served disparity in Pakistan, India, East Timor, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. On the other
hand, the difference in paternal educational backgrounds shows a significant contribution to
the observed disparity in Bangladesh, Pakistan, India and Myanmar. In all the countries except
Bangladesh and Myanmar, the contributions made by paternal education are significantly smaller
than those made by maternal education (p < 0.05). This can be attributed to the observations
that, in most Asian countries, mothers play a major role in raising children. Protecting children
from mothers with a less advantaged educational background is significant and enhancing the
“health-related literacy” among mothers should be considered. Moreover, enhancing educational
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opportunities for children could lessen the inequality in nutritional status for future generations.
The difference in parental occupation types show a significant contribution in India and Tajik-
istan. In these countries, among the least advantaged type, the proportion of parents working
as manual workers or farmers is significantly higher and the proportion of parents working as
professional workers is significantly lower than among the most advantaged type. In India, the
between-type difference in the proportion of fathers working as farmers shows the largest signif-
icant contribution. In Tajikistan, the larger proportion of non-manual workers among fathers of
the most advantaged type makes the largest significant contribution. These findings imply that
the inequality in child nutritional status is significantly and strongly associated with paternal
occupation-related socio-economic status.
Overall, all the evidence from this study suggests that priority should be given to protecting chil-
dren from marginalised households to mitigate the inequality in child health. To promote child
health among poor households, conditional cash transfer programmes, which transfer money to
households contingent on investments in human capital, have been implemented globally (Handa
and Davis, 2006).11 In Asia, some countries have launched conditional cash transfer programmes
(Rawlings and Rubio, 2005), but the number of countries which introduced these programmes
is still limited in the region.12 Given the reported improvement in nutritional status of children
from poor households in a number of Latin American countries (Behrman and Hoddinott, 2005;
Gertler, 2004; Maluccio and Flores, 2005; Attanasio et al., 2005), governments in Asian countries
might also wish to assess the possibility of introducing the conditional cash transfer programme.
Moreover, as food insecurity is a key risk factor for child malnutrition, encouraging social move-
ment to promote affordable food could also be beneficial (Capone et al., 2014; Baig-Ansari et al.,
2006). The food assistance programmes undertaken across the world show higher returns for
very young children in poor households (Lentz and Barrett, 2013). The in-kind food assistance
programme targeting poor households could be an alternative option to the conditional cash
transfer programmes. While the conditional cash transfer programmes, which allow households
to choose more diverse diets, tend to result in the increased consumption of nutritionally rich
11The most famous examples are Progresa/Oportunidades in Mexico and Bolsa Escola in Brazil.
12In Asia, Indonesia introduced a conditional cash transfer programme called the PKH (Program Keluarga
Harapan) in 2007. In India and Nepal, similar programmes were introduced for pregnant women in order to
promote institutional delivery, both in 2005.
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foods such as animal-source foods, vegetables and fruits, in-kind food and community vouchers
allow agencies to target specific nutrition interventions such as vitamin-fortified oils (Meyer and
TANGO International Inc., 2012).
Providing education about nutrition to mothers with limited educational backgrounds appears
to be equally important (Bryce et al., 2008). The success of nutrition education in terms of
reducing malnutrition has been reported in Pakistan (Khan et al., 2013). Policymakers should
ensure that children can equally enjoy better health and affordable healthcare access, irrespective
of parental occupations. Once we take into account the intergenerational benefits, the potential
benefit of early intervention would be exponential (Black and Hurley, 2014).
Finally, it is worth discussing a limitation and some potential extensions to this study. First,
thanks to the detailed DHS information, we are able to consider multidimensional aspects of
household and parental socio-economic status, but the circumstance factors beyond the con-
trol of children are without doubt much more complex (Currie and Vogl, 2013). For example,
health inequality starts even at the prenatal stage (Dipietro et al., 1999; Kramer, 1987; Almond,
2006) and genetic factors are one such circumstance factor. However, such information is rarely
available in large-scale general-purpose surveys. Moreover, in some countries, institutional in-
equalities, such as the Caste system in India, are also likely to play a considerable role in creating
health inequality (Van de Poel and Speybroeck, 2009). In this study, in order to make the re-
sults comparable across countries, we did not consider country-specific factors, but including
more detailed country-specific circumstance factors could possibly allow us to define finer types
in a single-country study.
Second, if there were some large-scale natural disasters and epidemic shocks around the time
of data collection, the between-type gap may have reflected their heterogeneous effects. How-
ever, the main goal of this study is to describe in detail the existing inequality of opportunity in
child malnutrition. Hence, the heterogeneous effects of these shocks, if any, are also incorporated
as a part of the inequality associated with the circumstance factors. Third, as this study involves
cross-sectional analysis, we did not discuss the trends of health inequality over time. Exploring
the trend of health inequality and changes in the contributing factors for each country with
the multiple waves of the DHS data would be a promising research topic and complement the
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findings of this study.
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1.A Appendix
Table 1.A.1: Descriptive statistics
BGD NPL PAK MDV IND KHM MMR TLS TJK KGZ
mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean
Child malnutrition 0.48 0.41 0.54 0.32 0.55 0.43 0.36 0.72 0.36 0.21
Mother BMI 21.62 21.36 23.70 24.10 21.32 22.08 22.69 20.51 23.16 23.93
Maternal education years 2.72 1.99 1.80 3.81 2.88 2.95 2.89 3.57 5.05 5.32
Paternal education years 2.64 2.66 2.80 3.60 3.40 3.23 3.05 2.52 5.39 5.54
Demography 0.03 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
Housing 0.02 -0.09 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.22 0.01 -0.02 0.16
Affluence -0.02 -0.08 -0.01 0.18 -0.05 -0.05 -0.23 -0.01 0.03 0.03
Sanitation -0.07 -0.23 -0.15 -0.00 -0.15 -0.21 0.03 -0.02 -0.16 -0.24
Occupation 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.00 1.50 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 0.01
Media exposure -0.02 -0.12 -0.01 0.03 -0.17 -0.11 -0.11 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04
Mother age at birth 25.58 25.77 28.86 28.22 27.31 28.57 30.67 31.33 27.51 28.45
Family size 6.05 7.45 11.56 10.21 6.45 5.85 6.74 8.14 10.16 6.81
Number of children 1.34 1.63 2.79 2.06 1.74 1.53 1.58 2.22 2.64 1.85
Urban 0.32 0.58 0.45 0.14 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.26 0.25
Natural floors 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Rudimentary floors 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.66 0.63 0.03 0.21 0.26
Finished floors 0.31 0.29 0.42 0.99 0.49 0.26 0.30 0.34 0.49 0.69
Natural walls 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.21 0.16 0.07 0.65 0.11 0.19
Rudimentary walls 0.09 0.52 0.20 0.00 0.12 0.14 0.65 0.03 0.32 0.37
Finished walls 0.79 0.41 0.66 0.93 0.67 0.70 0.27 0.31 0.57 0.40
Natural roofs 0.02 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.30 0.23 0.04 0.00
Rudimentary roofs 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Finished roofs 0.98 0.88 0.42 1.00 0.63 0.93 0.68 0.75 0.90 0.99
Number of rooms 2.32 2.92 2.78 3.67 2.01 1.64 1.83 2.76 3.33 2.45
Radio 0.03 0.28 0.19 0.90 0.09 0.34 0.29 0.36 0.24 0.36
TV 0.43 0.47 0.64 0.99 0.59 0.62 0.54 0.20 0.97 0.99
Refrigerator 0.20 0.11 0.48 0.88 0.26 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.47 0.73
Bicycle 0.25 0.44 0.29 0.55 0.47 0.53 0.35 0.12 0.26 0.27
Electricity 0.62 0.89 0.95 1.00 0.86 0.56 0.56 0.36 0.99 1.00
Car 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.18 0.06 0.02 0.45 0.55
Mobile phone 0.90 0.97 0.90 0.99 0.92 0.88 0.68 0.44 0.95 0.99
Safe fuel 0.13 0.18 0.40 0.92 0.31 0.18 0.16 0.01 0.65 0.64
Motorcycle 0.08 0.18 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.72 0.54 0.12 0.02 0.02
Piped water 0.06 0.26 0.32 0.09 0.26 0.15 0.12 0.18 0.39 0.45
Flushing toilet 0.18 0.73 0.73 0.97 0.45 0.53 0.40 0.35 0.13 0.08
Water treatment 0.10 0.17 0.08 0.51 0.38 0.65 0.74 0.87 0.81 0.52
Mother professional worker 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.13
Mother manual worker 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.24 0.02 0.11 0.03
Mother non-manual worker 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.04 0.22 0.16 0.08 0.04 0.05
Mother farmer 0.15 0.48 0.07 0.01 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.30 0.02 0.03
Father professional worker 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.16 0.14 0.16
Father manual worker 0.34 0.41 0.47 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.56 0.06 0.52 0.40
Father non-manual worker 0.23 0.33 0.27 0.30 0.23 0.14 0.08 0.16 0.28 0.11
Father farmer 0.24 0.17 0.12 0.22 0.32 0.46 0.27 0.61 0.03 0.31
Watch TV less than once a week 0.09 0.24 0.21 0.01 0.08 0.16 0.19 0.09 0.13 0.07
Watch TV once a week 0.50 0.40 0.46 0.97 0.61 0.53 0.52 0.30 0.81 0.92
Read newspaper less than once a week 0.09 0.20 0.20 0.35 0.15 0.17 0.25 0.17 0.19 0.27
Read newspaper once a week 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.26 0.18 0.06 0.12 0.17 0.26 0.43
Listen to radio less than once a week 0.02 0.31 0.15 0.08 0.06 0.25 0.20 0.14 0.15 0.19
Listen to radio once a week 0.02 0.26 0.04 0.81 0.09 0.24 0.20 0.31 0.23 0.30
Observations 6988 3759 4807 3521 40200 4332 5616 10968 8800 5483
BGD: Bangladesh; NPL: Nepal; PAK: Pakistan; MDV: Maldides; IND: India














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean
Child malnutrition 0.57 0.39 0.45 0.37 0.63 0.42 0.35 0.30 0.65 0.45
Mother BMI 20.61 22.74 21.27 21.50 22.85 24.75 24.36 23.89 20.18 22.43
Maternal education years 2.06 3.44 0.53 3.98 0.21 3.77 6.67 3.42 1.45 4.27
Paternal education years 1.75 3.62 2.22 3.26 2.00 3.80 4.19 3.49 2.37 4.40
Demography 0.08 -0.02 0.02 -0.07 0.00 -0.12 0.01 0.07 0.15 -0.15
Housing -0.50 0.59 -0.12 -0.05 0.72 -0.91 -0.04 -0.01 -0.91 0.76
Affluence -0.97 1.02 -0.13 -0.01 -0.78 0.93 -0.06 0.34 -1.18 1.05
Sanitation -0.57 0.49 -0.38 -0.02 -0.64 0.46 -0.84 1.35 -1.10 0.78
Occupation 0.59 -0.64 0.04 -0.01 -0.21 0.23 -0.84 1.35 2.44 0.59
Media exposure -0.64 0.66 -0.11 -0.12 -0.51 0.61 -0.02 0.03 -0.79 0.43
Mother age at birth 25.98 25.14 26.99 24.09 29.43 28.17 28.70 27.34 27.58 27.05
Family size 5.88 6.22 7.44 7.45 11.79 11.26 10.24 10.25 6.48 6.42
Number of children 1.38 1.30 1.69 1.55 2.94 2.61 2.10 2.04 1.88 1.61
Urban 0.17 0.48 0.54 0.62 0.30 0.64 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.39
Natural floors 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.04
Rudimentary floors 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.07
Finished floors 0.09 0.55 0.28 0.30 0.22 0.67 0.99 0.99 0.22 0.75
Natural walls 0.17 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.08
Rudimentary walls 0.13 0.04 0.52 0.52 0.31 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.08
Finished walls 0.68 0.91 0.42 0.41 0.46 0.90 0.93 0.92 0.50 0.83
Natural roofs 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.03
Rudimentary roofs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.39 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.04
Finished roofs 0.96 1.00 0.88 0.89 0.40 0.44 1.00 0.99 0.49 0.76
Number of rooms 2.03 2.64 2.82 3.05 2.57 3.04 3.42 3.84 1.73 2.27
Radio 0.02 0.05 0.25 0.33 0.16 0.23 0.92 0.89 0.05 0.13
TV 0.17 0.72 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.84 0.98 0.99 0.30 0.87
Refrigerator 0.02 0.40 0.10 0.12 0.27 0.74 0.82 0.93 0.04 0.48
Bicycle 0.24 0.25 0.45 0.43 0.28 0.29 0.56 0.49 0.51 0.44
Electricity 0.39 0.87 0.88 0.91 0.92 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.73 0.98
Car 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.17 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.12
Mobile phone 0.83 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.84 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.86 0.98
Safe fuel 0.02 0.26 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.66 0.89 0.95 0.07 0.54
Motorcycle 0.03 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.28 0.55 0.25 0.50 0.17 0.56
Piped water 0.01 0.11 0.23 0.29 0.24 0.41 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.42
Flushing toilet 0.05 0.32 0.68 0.81 0.58 0.93 0.95 0.99 0.19 0.71
Water treatment 0.03 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.03 0.13 0.49 0.48 0.21 0.55
Mother professional worker 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.19 0.00 0.03
Mother manual worker 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.21 0.04 0.06 0.04
Mother non-manual worker 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.19 0.03 0.04
Mother farmer 0.22 0.06 0.47 0.49 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.23 0.04
Father professional worker 0.02 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.18 0.09 0.27 0.02 0.12
Father manual worker 0.16 0.53 0.40 0.42 0.54 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.34 0.31
Father non-manual worker 0.21 0.26 0.31 0.35 0.21 0.35 0.04 0.71 0.12 0.33
Father farmer 0.42 0.04 0.19 0.15 0.17 0.07 0.37 0.00 0.48 0.17
Watch TV less than once a week 0.14 0.03 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.16 0.02 0.01 0.13 0.04
Watch TV once a week 0.22 0.81 0.38 0.42 0.28 0.69 0.97 0.97 0.33 0.88
Read newspaper less than once a week 0.04 0.15 0.18 0.23 0.05 0.38 0.38 0.31 0.08 0.22
Read newspaper once a week 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.20 0.34 0.03 0.32
Listen to radio less than once a week 0.01 0.03 0.28 0.36 0.11 0.19 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.06
Listen to radio once a week 0.01 0.04 0.23 0.29 0.03 0.05 0.84 0.77 0.05 0.12
Observations 3665 3323 2172 1587 2657 2150 960 1361 19782 20418
L adv: Least advantaged type; M adv: Most advantaged type
BGD: Bangladesh; NPL: Nepal; PAK: Pakistan; MDV: Maldives; IND: India
KHM: Cambodia; MMR: Myanmar; TLS: East Timor; TJK: Tajikistan; KGZ: Kyrgyzstan
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mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean
Child malnutrition 0.49 0.38 0.43 0.23 0.76 0.66 0.38 0.32 0.27 0.15
Mother BMI 21.67 22.46 22.24 24.10 20.16 21.06 22.91 23.43 23.94 23.59
Maternal education years 2.47 3.39 1.09 2.63 2.55 5.18 5.00 5.11 4.78 2.47
Paternal education years 2.78 3.64 1.24 3.35 2.16 3.10 5.56 5.21 4.84 6.14
Demography -0.17 0.24 0.00 0.20 0.01 0.08 0.18 -0.17 -0.90 -0.01
Housing -0.87 0.68 -1.04 1.61 -0.53 0.85 -0.23 0.20 -1.02 0.24
Affluence -1.08 0.89 -1.10 2.00 -0.76 1.17 -0.16 0.24 0.28 -0.02
Sanitation -0.98 0.51 0.24 -2.83 -1.03 1.57 -0.38 0.09 3.56 -0.59
Occupation -1.34 1.26 -0.39 -0.21 -1.03 1.57 -1.19 1.34 -0.27 0.02
Media exposure -0.52 0.27 -0.40 0.56 -0.40 0.49 -0.21 0.09 0.32 0.24
Mother age at birth 28.61 28.53 31.35 30.81 32.08 30.15 27.28 27.77 29.93 28.29
Family size 5.51 6.17 6.64 7.15 8.06 8.26 10.50 9.77 5.66 6.62
Number of children 1.55 1.51 1.68 1.41 2.20 2.24 2.73 2.53 1.67 1.77
Urban 0.06 0.47 0.11 0.75 0.10 0.39 0.17 0.37 0.81 0.19
Natural floors 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rudimentary floors 0.85 0.49 0.71 0.32 0.04 0.02 0.21 0.22 0.06 0.25
Finished floors 0.06 0.45 0.17 0.64 0.20 0.57 0.43 0.56 0.93 0.71
Natural walls 0.27 0.06 0.12 0.00 0.77 0.47 0.12 0.10 0.00 0.21
Rudimentary walls 0.13 0.14 0.74 0.32 0.04 0.03 0.38 0.25 0.06 0.44
Finished walls 0.58 0.80 0.13 0.67 0.19 0.50 0.50 0.65 0.53 0.33
Natural roofs 0.12 0.01 0.50 0.02 0.31 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00
Rudimentary roofs 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00
Finished roofs 0.87 0.98 0.47 0.98 0.67 0.88 0.91 0.89 0.93 1.00
Number of rooms 1.33 1.93 1.63 2.45 2.61 2.98 3.35 3.30 2.09 2.41
Radio 0.26 0.42 0.23 0.33 0.29 0.47 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.36
TV 0.37 0.85 0.33 0.95 0.06 0.43 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.99
Refrigerator 0.00 0.21 0.03 0.56 0.01 0.13 0.37 0.59 0.90 0.74
Bicycle 0.46 0.59 0.27 0.58 0.05 0.22 0.24 0.29 0.15 0.25
Electricity 0.26 0.83 0.39 0.96 0.18 0.64 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99
Car 0.14 0.22 0.02 0.26 0.00 0.06 0.41 0.50 0.65 0.57
Mobile phone 0.80 0.95 0.49 0.98 0.27 0.72 0.94 0.97 1.00 0.99
Safe fuel 0.02 0.33 0.05 0.60 0.00 0.03 0.60 0.70 0.99 0.63
Motorcycle 0.58 0.84 0.38 0.68 0.03 0.27 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02
Piped water 0.03 0.26 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.27 0.30 0.49 0.99 0.37
Flushing toilet 0.25 0.78 0.25 0.71 0.21 0.58 0.07 0.20 0.85 0.00
Water treatment 0.61 0.69 0.74 0.18 0.85 0.90 0.81 0.82 0.55 0.50
Mother professional worker 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.16 0.16
Mother manual worker 0.06 0.22 0.31 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.09 0.02 0.03
Mother non-manual worker 0.05 0.38 0.09 0.29 0.05 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.13 0.07
Mother farmer 0.67 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.41 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03
Father professional worker 0.01 0.16 0.05 0.20 0.01 0.39 0.00 0.29 0.40 0.15
Father manual worker 0.09 0.49 0.69 0.50 0.01 0.15 0.98 0.00 0.37 0.39
Father non-manual worker 0.02 0.26 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.59 0.20 0.13
Father farmer 0.88 0.07 0.18 0.06 0.97 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.31
Watch TV less than once a week 0.20 0.12 0.21 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.00 0.00
Watch TV once a week 0.30 0.75 0.32 0.84 0.14 0.55 0.78 0.85 0.98 0.99
Read newspaper less than once a week 0.09 0.23 0.14 0.32 0.13 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.28 0.29
Read newspaper once a week 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.33 0.10 0.28 0.22 0.31 0.50 0.51
Listen to radio less than once a week 0.25 0.25 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.22
Listen to radio once a week 0.18 0.30 0.14 0.21 0.20 0.48 0.20 0.27 0.40 0.32
Observations 2077 2255 1525 763 6708 4260 4663 4137 475 737
L adv: Least advantaged type; M adv: Most advantaged type
BGD: Bangladesh; NPL: Nepal; PAK: Pakistan; MDV: Maldives; IND: India
KHM: Cambodia; MMR: Myanmar; TLS: East Timor; TJK: Tajikistan; KGZ: Kyrgyzstan
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Chapter 2
A Copula-based Measure of Inequality of Opportunity: With an
Application to Health Inequality in Body Mass in Indonesia
Abstract
Inequality of opportunity (IOP) is an illegitimate form of inequality whereby causes are not attributable
to individual choices. Non-parametric and parametric methods have been widely used to measure IOP,
but each of them tends to have a significant technical concern when the sources of inequality are not
categorical and multi-dimensional, and when a severe specification error is suspected respectively. This
paper introduces an alternative approach to measuring ex-post IOP using copulas which model various
structures of dependence between efforts, factors for which individuals are responsible, and circumstances,
factors beyond individual’s control. Semi-parametric estimation of the outcome distribution and flexible
modelling of the dependence structure between efforts and circumstances help to overcome the concerns
in the existing methods. The method is applied to measuring inequality in the body mass index (BMI),
attributable to its intergenerational transmission from parents to their adult offspring in Indonesia. A
21-year gap between the first wave and the last wave of the Indonesian Family Life Survey is exploited
to estimate the relationship between parental BMI when offspring are below 15 years old and the BMI
of grown-up offspring. The results show that 15.1 per cent of the overall variance in grown-up children’s
BMI is associated with intergenerational BMI transmission.
JEL codes: I14, I18
Keywords: inequality of opportunity, copulas, intergenerational mobilities of BMI, Indonesia
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2.1 Introduction
There is a large volume of literature on the measurement of inequality of opportunity (IOP).
From the viewpoint of responsibility sensitive egalitarianism (Dworkin, 1981a,b; Cohen, 2011;
Arneson, 1989; Roemer, 1996), not all kinds of inequalities are ethically objectionable, and two
types of inequality can be defined. One is legitimate inequality, in which differences in outcomes
are attributable to individual responsibility, and the other is illegitimate inequality, in which
outcome differences cannot be attributed to individual responsibility. A typical example of the
former is differences in body mass across individuals with different lifestyles, caused, for instance,
by dietary choices and daily exercise habits. Such inequality is considered morally ‘fair’, because
the difference in the consequential health outcome is the result of an individual’s freedom of
choice. On the other hand, illegitimate inequality is typically exemplified by different mortality
rates across different backgrounds, such as genetics, parental social class and race, and inequality
attributable to factors beyond the scope of individual control is viewed as ‘unfair’. This distinc-
tion suggests that equality in outcomes is not always the most equitable or justifiable situation,
because it could fail to hold people accountable for things for which they should be held partially
responsible. In other words, the unobjectionable situation for responsibility-sensitive egalitarians
is not a perfectly equal distribution of the outcome per se but a distribution in which differences
in the outcomes, due to individuals’ voluntary choices, remain, and any disparity owing to cir-
cumstances beyond their control is appropriately compensated. The question of ‘inequality of
what’ supports the equality of opportunity (EOP) concept, which is achieved when all people,
regardless of their circumstances, have the same chances of achieving an outcome. In this sense,
EOP is popularly formulated in the ‘level-the-playing-field’ metaphor (Roemer, 1996; Rosa Dias
and Jones, 2007).
In the literature on EOP, Roemer (1996, 1998, 2002) established a seminal framework in which
all the factors influencing individual attainment can be sorted into effort factors and circum-
stance factors. Effort factors are those for which individuals are held partially responsible, while
circumstance factors are those that are beyond an individual’s control and are sources of unjusti-
fiable inequality. In the context of health, effort factors typically include lifestyle choices such as
diet, smoking, alcohol consumption, exercise and so forth, and disparities that arise unavoidably
are typically considered neutral. Circumstances, on the other hand, are typified by race, family
socioeconomic and biological background and so on. As Roemer (1996) argues, effort factors are
59
not necessarily independent of circumstance factors, as some of the former can be more or less
influenced by some of the latter. A typical example is that smoking behaviours are more or less
affected by parents’ smoking behaviours and socio-economic status. Such effects are assumed to
be a part of circumstances in the Roemer framework.1
As described above, we can define conceptually both legitimate and illegitimate inequality. The
question, however, is how we should measure overall illegitimate inequality. This paper proposes
a new method for measuring IOP. The key features of the proposed method are twofold: first,
copula functions model a structure of dependence between efforts and circumstances, making
it possible to express simply the hypothetical outcome distribution in a situation where EOP
is achieved. Second, the proposed method generates a hypothetical outcome from the semi-
parametrically estimated outcome distribution function, without relying on a linear functional
form of the outcome.
This paper illustrates the application of the proposed method to the measurement of IOP in
relation to individuals’ body mass in Indonesia. This application measures the inequality in
body mass index (BMI) of early adults aged between 20 and 35, with respect to the intergen-
erational transmission of BMI from their parents. The results show that 15.1 per cent of the
overall variance is associated with the IOP. Last of all, the estimated results are compared with
the ones estimated by the traditional parametric method.
2.2 Related literature
The idea of EOP embodies two fundamental principles. The reward principle demands that in-
equalities, due to different levels of effort, should be considered acceptable, and the compensation
principle claims that inequalities, due to circumstances, should be eliminated. The compensation
principle has two approaches, namely the ex-ante approach and the ex-post approach (Fleurbaey
and Peragine, 2013; Pignataro, 2012; Li Donni et al., 2014). The ex-ante approach promotes
equality of outcomes among those facing the same circumstances, by making their average out-
comes as equal as possible. Ex-ante EOP is achieved when the set of opportunities is the same
for all people, irrespective of their circumstances. The ex-post approach, on the other hand, en-
1On the other hand, from the viewpoint of Swift (2005), circumstances only include past variables that are
independent of efforts (Jusot et al., 2013). Jusot et al. (2013) discuss whether these differences in normative
principles matter empirically.
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courages the compensation of inequality caused by different circumstantial factors among those
exerting the same level of effort. When the outcome does not vary across people with different
circumstances at any given effort level, ex-post EOP is achieved.2
At the stage of testing the existence of the IOP, the ex-ante and ex-post compensation ap-
proaches can be divided further into two approaches, namely a non-parametric method and a
parametric method. The non-parametric method defines types, i.e. a set of people with the same
circumstances, and tranches, i.e. a set of people exerting the same efforts. An ex-ante non-
parametric approach typically tests the existence of IOP by applying the stochastic dominance
test for outcome distributions across different types defined by parental socio-economic status,
etc. (e.g. Peragine and Serlenga, 2007; Lefranc et al., 2008, 2009; Aaberge et al., 2011). An
ex-post non-parametric approach measures between-type inequality among those who belong to
the same tranche. Checchi and Peragine (2010) proposed non-parametric ways to measure IOP
from the ex-ante and ex-post perspectives.
The advantage of the non-parametric method is that it does not make any assumptions about the
functional form of the outcome variable. However, the precision of the estimation deteriorates
as the number of circumstance factors becomes large, because the exponentially growing number
of types often leads to very few observations in each type and unreliably imprecise estimates.
Besides, as the number of effort variables increases, the number of possible tranches that needs
to be considered is also exponentially growing. The situation becomes even worse when circum-
stance and effort variables are continuous. When circumstance variables are continuous, discrete
types can be still defined, but continuous information of circumstance variables tend to be lost
and full information of circumstances are not exploited.3
On the other hand, the parametric method allows us to define finer categories of types, rely-
ing on a functional form assumption of the outcome variable. The parametric method mostly
2However, it is known that the ex-ante and the ex-post approaches are logically incompatible in a general
setting in which circumstances and efforts are not additively separable in the outcome function (Fleurbaey and
Peragine, 2013). This stems from incompatibility between the reward principle and the compensation principle in
a general setting. For further discussion, see, for example, Ferreira and Peragine (2015).
3Li Donni et al. (2015) proposed a way to define endogenously finite types with a latent class approach and
deal with the multidimensionality of circumstances. O’Neill et al. (1999) proposed a method to deal with the
continuity of circumstance variables, using kernel estimation. Aizawa (2019) used the clustering approach to taking
into account the multidimensionality of circumstances. These studies implicitly take into account unobservable
circumstances.
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employs a regression-based approach, and the measurement of IOP is implemented through two
steps. The first step estimates a conditional mean function of the outcome variable and obtains
estimates of the effects of circumstances and efforts, following which the parametric approach
constructs a counterfactual outcome distribution by suppressing the valuations of circumstances.
The second stage indirectly measures the IOP by comparing the inequality level between the
observed distribution and the derived hypothetical distribution. This indirect approach is based
on the spirit of fairness gap proposed by Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009).4
In contrast to the non-parametric model, the parametric method can handle a large number
of continuous circumstance and effort variables in a multivariate regression model. Bourguignon
et al. (2007), for example, first construct a linear structural model, as shown in equation (2.1).

Yi = α+ βCCi + βEEi + ε
Y
i




where Yi is an outcome variable. Ei and Ci are efforts and circumstances, respectively. ε
Y
i
and εEi are error terms. When we compute the hypothetical outcome in which the variation
of circumstances is suppressed, one needs to take into account the indirect effect of C on E.
To address this matter, Bourguignon et al. (2007) estimate the reduced form of the structural
equation, as shown in equation (2.2).
Yi = (α+ βEγ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ζ






i )︸ ︷︷ ︸
ξi
. (2.2)
In equation (2.2), κ = (βC + βEδ), which is the coefficient of C, reflects the direct and indirect
partial effects of C on Y . Conceptually the direct effect means the partial effect of C on Y after
controlling for E. The indirect effect is the partial impact of C on Y through E.
Finally, in order to quantify the IOP, Bourguignon et al. (2007) predict an individual outcome
under the hypothetical situation in which C is constant, and compares the Gini coefficient of the
original distribution with that in a hypothetical situation in which everybody faces the same level
circumstances. For example, when C is fixed at its sample mean level, Ci = C for all i, the hypo-
thetical individual outcome is estimated by Y EOPi = ζ̂ + κ̂C + ξ̂i. By subtracting the inequality
4For a more detailed review of the direct approach, see, for example, Ramos and Van de gaer (2016).
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level of the hypothetical distribution Y EOP from the that of the original outcome distribution
Y , the parametric method quantifies the degree of IOP. This type of indirect quantification is
based on the fairness gap approach (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009), which is widely used in
empirical studies (Pistolesi, 2008; Salehi-Isfahani et al., 2014; Belhaj Hassine, 2012).5
However, contrary to the non-parametric method, the parametric approach may suffer speci-
fication errors. In the context of health, normally there is little consensus about the functional
form of the health outcome variable. Furthermore, not all of the continuous health outcome vari-
ables can be best specified in a linear model; for example, medical care expenditure often shows
a heavily skewed distribution.6 In the presence of a significant specification error, the estimated
IOP can be biased downwards because the model cannot model satisfactorily an association
between circumstances and an outcome.7 Pistolesi (2008) proposes a semi-parametric method
which does not rely on the linearity assumption. Pistolesi (2008) estimates the conditional dis-
tributions of outcome and efforts by employing the duration model (Foresi and Peracchi, 1995),
and from the estimated conditional distribution, the author predicts the counterfactual individ-
ual hypothetical outcome level by assuming that the individual effort and the outcome in the
hypothetical situation, where variation in C is suppressed, are predicted at the same quantiles as
those in the actual distributions. This rank preservation assumption implies that while the cir-
cumstances can change the absolute values of efforts and outcomes of individuals, circumstances
do not influence the relative ranks/positions of individuals in their respective distributions.
Comprehensive reviews of empirical studies on EOP are found in Pignataro (2012); Ramos
and Van de gaer (2012, 2016); Ferreira and Peragine (2015); and Roemer and Trannoy (2016).
Amongst them, Roemer and Trannoy (2016) present a detailed discussion on the broad concept of
EOP, while Ramos and Van de gaer (2016) provide a concise, recent review of the methodologies
from the viewpoint of both ex-ante and ex-post approaches. For the health context, Fleurbaey
5The fairness gap approach is normatively consistent with the ex-post approach. The other direct quantification
method, which calculates the inequality after removing the effect of all legitimate variables, is called the direct
unfairness approach, and it is consistent with the ex-ante approach. For more details, see Fleurbaey and Schokkaert
(2009).
6When the nonlinear specification is appropriate, the reduced form of a structural model is rarely used; instead,
a structural recursive nonlinear model with a multivariate normality assumption of error terms is often employed
(Rosa Dias, 2010; Garćıa-Gómez et al., 2015).
7When there is a significant specification error, the outcome variation that should have been attributable
to circumstances would be captured by the error term. As the error term is not regarded as the sources of
illegitimate inequality in the Roemer framework and its contribution to the outcome is differenced-out when we
indirectly quantify the IOP using the fairness gap approach, the estimated IOP can be smaller than the IOP
estimated with the correctly-specified model.
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and Schokkaert (2012) provide extensive discussions.
This paper addresses the aforementioned shortcomings of the parametric and the non-parametric
methods by introducing a new alternative method for measuring ex-post IOP. Instead of mak-
ing a parametric assumption on the conditional expectation function of the outcome variable
– as in equation (2.1) – it imposes an assumption on its conditional distribution function as is
done in Pistolesi (2008). We use copula functions to model the dependence structure between
circumstances and efforts. Copulas capture a wide range of types of dependence structures by a
function. Then hypothetical outcomes when the variation of circumstances are suppressed will
be simulated, taking account of the estimated original dependence structure. The method rests
on the semi-parametric ex-post compensation approach.
Specifically, the proposed method has a number of advantages over the traditional approaches.
The proposed method is in particular of use when circumstance and effort variables are contin-
uous. The advantage over the non-parametric method is that circumstances and efforts do not
have to be discrete in order to define types and tranches. Therefore information from continuous
variables is fully exploited herein. Contrary to the traditional parametric method, the proposed
method does not impose a linearity assumption for the conditional mean of the outcome variable,
which allows for heterogeneous impacts of circumstances on the distribution of the outcome.
2.3 Model setting
This paper uses the following notation: Y ∈ R+ is a non-negative, measurable, interperson-
ally comparable and one-dimensional outcome variable that has a distribution FY (y). C =
(C1, ..., Cp)
′ ∈ Rp denotes the vector of circumstances, and E = (E1, ..., Eq)′ ∈ Rq stands for the
vector of efforts. X = (C ′, E′)′ ∈ Rp+q is a vector of potential determinants of Y . We consider
a general model of the form
Y = m(X, η) = m(C,E, η), (2.3)
where η is an unobservable factor. Following the Roemer framework (Roemer, 1998), we make
the following assumption on the distinction between E and C.
Assumption 1 Unambiguous responsibility-cut and measurability of efforts and circumstances:
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X can be divided unambiguously into E and C and both E and C are measurable.
This assumption states that the determinants of Y can be sorted into either E or C, but it does
not require the independence between E and C.8
FX(x), FE(e), FC(c) are joint distributions of X, efforts and circumstances, respectively. fX(x),
fE(e) and fC(c) stand for their respective joint densities. FEm(em)(m = 1, ..., q) and FCn(cn)(n =
1, ..., p) are marginal distributions of Em and Cn, and fEm(em) (m = 1, ..., q) and fCn(cn) (n =
1, ..., p) are their marginal densities. Finally, v(FY (y)), where v : FY 7→ R, is an inequality
statistic.
Applying the law of iterated expectation, the association between the outcome and its deter-










FY |E,C(y|e, c)dFE|C(e|c)dFC(c), (2.5)
where FY |X(y|x) and FY |E,C(y|e, c) are conditional distributions of the outcome, given X, and
given E and C, respectively, while FE|C(e|c) is a conditional distribution of E given C. Equation
(2.5) reflects the argument that E is influenced by C (Roemer, 1996).
2.3.1 Copulas
In general, multivariate joint distributions can be expressed by their marginal distributions and a
copula. Hence, copulas allow us to model dependence structures of variables from their marginal
distributions, and they have the property that a functional association between underlying vari-
ables is not influenced by their marginal behaviours. Sklar’s theorem states that for an n-variate
distribution function F (y1, ..., yn), the copula is a distribution function C : [0, 1]n 7→ [0, 1] that
satisfies, for all real values of y1, .., yn,
F (y1, ..., yn) = C(F1(y1), ..., Fn(yn); θ), (2.6)
8Other than efforts and circumstances, Lefranc et al. (2009) build up the model where outcomes are assumed to
be dependent not only on efforts and circumstances, but also on luck, which is a set of random factors that affect
all individuals’ decision makings. However, in this study, following the original Roemer framework, we assume
that X can be divided into E and C only. This implies that in the proposed model the random factors are included
in efforts.
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where θ ∈ Θ is a parameter vector of the copula. If F1, .., Fn are continuous, the copula can be
uniquely expressed.9 Alternatively, equation (2.6) can be expressed as
C(u1, ..., un; θ) = F (F−11 (u1), ..., F
−1
n (un)). (2.7)
Every copula has its derivative (Nelsen, 2006). For example, let C(u1, u2) be a bivariate copula.
For any u2, the partial derivative
∂C(u1,u2)
∂u1
exists for almost all u1. For such u1 and u2, the range
of its derivative is
0 ≤ ∂C(u1, u2)
∂u1
≤ 1. (2.8)
Similarly, the partial derivative ∂C(u1,u2)∂u2 exists for almost all u2.
Although a long list of copulas has been proposed in the statistical literature, we focus only
on the several examples that are frequently used in applied econometrics. Table 2.1 lists the
functions of copulas typically employed in empirical studies, their parameter ranges and the
number of parameters. First, the Product copula, which takes the simplest form, does not allow
dependences among marginal distributions and consequently does not have a dependence param-
eter. Second, the Frank copula is capable of modelling both positive and negative dependence
and is suitable for data that exhibit weak tail dependence (Trivedi and Zimmer, 2007). Third,
the Clayton copula can better capture strong left tail dependence and relatively weak right tail
dependence, but it is not suitable for negative dependence. As its dependence parameter goes
to 0, the marginal distributions become independent. Fourth, the Gumbel copula, similar to
the Clayton copula, is not able to model negative dependence, but it can better capture strong
right tail dependence and relatively weak left tail dependence. Fifth, the Joe copula also allows
only positive dependence and is appropriate to model the very strong right tail dependence and
relatively weak left tail dependence between marginals. Finally, the Gaussian copula is flexible
in the sense that it allows for equal degrees of positive and negative dependence. It can ac-
commodate at most n(n − 1)/2 parameters, which reflect pairwise correlations. The multiple
parameters of the Gaussian copula help model various dependence structures between marginals.
For more details about copulas in general, see Nelsen (2006). For their econometric applications,
9y1, .., yn need to be continuous so that copula expression is always uniquely expressed. It is agreed that while
the lack of uniqueness of copula presentation for discrete distributions is a theoretical issue, it does not inhibit
empirical application for the estimation of joint distribution functions (Trivedi and Zimmer, 2007).
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Table 2.1: Copulas
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Frank −1θ ln(1 +
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−1(un); θ) [−1, 1] n(n− 1)/2
Note: Φn(.; θ) is a multivariate normal distribution function with correlation parameters θ.
Φ(.) is a univariate normal distribution function.
see Trivedi and Zimmer (2007).
2.4 Methodology
2.4.1 Hypothetical outcome distribution
In order to measure the illegitimate inequality attributable to circumstances, we obtain a hypo-
thetical outcome distribution whereby variations of circumstances are suppressed. Let FEOPY (y)
be the hypothetical outcome distribution in which people are faced with the same circum-
stances and consequently, by definition, there exists no IOP. Therefore, v(FEOPY (y)) is viewed
as legitimate inequality according to the opportunity-egalitarian view. Next, following the
fairness gap approach (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009), we indirectly quantify the absolute
level of IOP by subtracting it from the inequality of the observed outcome distribution, ∆ =




In the hypothetical situation, everybody has the same constant circumstance, denoted as C̃,
which are called the reference values of C, such as their sample means. We make the following
assumption about the range of the reference levels.
Assumption 2 Restricted range of the reference values of C:
C̃ needs to be contained in the observed support of C.
This assumption states that the reference values need to be set between the maximum and the
minimum C, which guarantees that marginal distributions FCn(c̃n) (n = 1, ..., p) lie between 0
and 1. This assumption is essential in modelling the joint distribution of E and C, when C is
evaluated at C̃. This assumption corresponds to the common support assumption used in the
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parametric method that requires that C̃ should be in the support of C.
Next, exploiting the property of copulas that a functional association between underlying vari-
ables is not influenced by their marginal behaviours, we assume that the dependence structure
between efforts and circumstances does not change when we manipulate the marginal distribution
of C.
Assumption 3 Stability of dependence structure:
The original copula functional form and its parameter vector θ are stable when the marginal
distributions of circumstances are manipulated.
This assumption states that original functional associations between underlying variables are not
influenced by the manipulations of their marginal distributions. The important point to note is
that it does not require that the distribution of E is unaffected when we manipulate the distri-
bution of C. In contrast, this assumption ensures that the effect of C on E will be considered
through the estimated copula function when we construct the hypothetical distribution of Y . In
the parametric case, this assumption corresponds to the exogeneity assumption requiring that C
is independent of εE in equation (2.1).
Under the assumptions above, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 The actual outcome distribution and the hypothetical outcome distribution can










FY |E,C(y|e, c = c̃)Ψ(e, c = c̃)dFE(e), (2.10)




c(FE1 (e1),...,FEq (eq),FC1 (c1),...,FCp (cp);θ)
ce(FE1 (e1),...,FEq (eq);θe)cc(FC1 (c1),...,FCp (cp);θc)
is a weighting factor.
c(FE1(e1), ..., FEq(eq), FC1(c1), ..., FCp(cp); θ), ce(FE1(e1), ..., FEq(eq); θe) and
cc(FC1(c1), ..., FCp(cp); θc) are copula density functions.
Proof of the proposition is provided in the Appendix.
The weighting factor, Ψ(e, c) =
dFE|C
dFE
, in equation (2.9) is basically a ratio between the con-
ditional effort distribution given circumstances and the unconditional effort distribution. The
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use of weighting factor to estimate a counterfactual distribution was firstly proposed by DiNardo
et al. (1996) in the context of the income inequality analysis. Intuitively, Ψ(e, c = c̃) in equation
(2.10) re-weights the observations so that the weighted observations will have the distribution of
E that would be realised when the variation of C is suppressed. In other words, the indirect im-
pact of levelling the circumstances on efforts are taken into consideration through this weighting
factor. Therefore, Ψ(e, c = c̃) makes sure that FEOPY (y) is the hypothetical outcome distribution
after taking account of the original dependence structure between E and C.
Based on the spirits of fairness-gap measurement approach (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009),
inequality due to circumstances is then indirectly measured by calculating the difference between
inequality of the original outcome distribution and that of the hypothetical outcome distribution,
i.e. ∆ = v(FY (y)) − v(FEOPY (y)). As discussed above, v(FEOPY (y)) can be seen as legitimate
inequality attributable to the different levels of efforts, and ∆ can be regarded as the contribution
of specific circumstances to overall inequality (Ferreira and Gignoux, 2011; Trannoy et al., 2010).
This method does not make a functional form assumption about the conditional mean of outcome,
which implies that we are not assuming that efforts and circumstances are additively separable
in the outcome function. It is known that the size of estimated IOP can vary according to the
reference values of circumstances when outcomes are not additively separable into efforts and
circumstances (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009, 2012).10 Certainly, the set of the mean values
of circumstances, i.e. C̃ = C, is a common choice in the empirical literature, but there is some
arbitrariness left. It is recommended to calculate IOP by setting various reference values and
then taking their average as part of a sensitivity analysis (Ramos and Van de gaer, 2012).
2.4.2 Estimation











F̂Y |E,C(y|e = ei, c = c̃)Ψ̂(e = ei, c = c̃). (2.11)
10This means that when the additive separability of E and C in the outcome is imposed, the choice of reference
values does not make a difference.
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For the derivation of the hypothetical distribution of Y , we first need to estimate FY |E,C(y|e, c),
the conditional distribution function and the weighting factor.
Estimation of the conditional distribution function
First, the conditional distribution function, FY |E,C(y|e, c), is estimated by employing the distri-
butional regression method (Foresi and Peracchi, 1995; Chernozhukov et al., 2013).11 The basic
idea behind the distributional regression is to model directly the conditional distribution of Y ,
given E and C, through a family of binary response models in the event that the dependent
variable yi exceeds each threshold of Y , which we denote as q
j
Y (j = 1, ..., J).
12 In essence, the
distributional regression estimates the consistent conditional distribution by approximating it by
a bunch of step functions.
The conditional distribution of Y at the jth threshold is given by
FY |E,C(q
j
Y |e, c) = P (y ≤ q
j
Y |e, c) = Λ(α
j + e′βjE + c
′βjC + I(e, c)
′βjEC), (2.12)
where Λ(.) is a strictly increasing link function13, and I(e, c)i is a vector of two-way interaction
terms between E and C. Equation (2.12) is estimated by making an assumption on Λ(.). The






)′ are allowed to vary with the threshold of Y . For
example, if we assume that the link function is a standard normal distribution function, αj , βjE ,
βjC and β
j
EC are estimated by running a probit regression of a dummy variable 1{yi ≤ q
j
Y } on
a constant term, Ei, Ci, and interaction terms between E and C. For the probit version, the


















ibC + I(e, c)
′
ibEC)) +




ibC + I(e, c)
′
ibEC))], (2.13)
11Alternatively, the quantile regression method can be employed (Machado and Mata, 2005; Melly, 2005).
12For example, the empirical application of this study uses the 100 thresholds which are uniformly chosen from
the 0.001th and 0.999th quantiles of Y .
13In practice, a logistic, probit or identity distribution function is often used.
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where 1(.) is an indicator function and Φ(.) is a normal distribution function. Estimating the
coefficients for every j = 1, ..., J and interpolating these estimated points, we can construct an
approximately continuous conditional distribution function of Y (Chernozhukov et al., 2013).14
Estimation of the weighting factor
Next, our estimation of the weighting factor, Ψ(e, c) =
c(FE1 (e1),...,FEq (eq),FC1 (c1),...,FCp (cp);θ)
ce(FE1 (e1),...,FEq (eq);θe)cc(FC1 (c1),...,FCp (cp);θc)
,
requires estimations of (i) the copula function of C and E, (ii) the copula function of E and (iii)
the copula function of C.
Two-step sequential likelihood estimation is employed to estimate a copula. This separates
the estimation of the marginals from that of the dependence parameter(s), and produces con-
sistent estimates of the dependence parameter(s) (Trivedi and Zimmer, 2007). For example, in
order to model the joint distribution of E and C, the first step estimates univariate marginal









i=1 1(cni ≤ cn) for
n = 1, ..., p.
The second step then estimates the dependence parameter(s), using the estimated marginal
distributions from the first step. It is essential to select an appropriate copula for modelling a
joint distribution. If dependence structures were known a priori, it would be easier to choose an
appropriate copula, but such information is seldom available in advance. The selection of the
copula tends to be a posterior consideration, and so it is important to estimate several copulas
and compare their performances.
The dependence parameters are estimated by employing the maximum likelihood method from
the marginal distributions with parametric assumptions of each copula function (Trivedi and
Zimmer, 2007). An appropriate copula is the one which can best capture the dependence struc-
tures of the data. Maximised likelihood values, Akaike information criteria (AIC) and Bayesian
information criteria (BIC) provide guidance on the selection.15 The AIC and BIC select the best
14It is known that the estimated conditional function may be non-monotonic in the sense that qjY > q
k
Y does not
necessarily lead to F̂Y |E,C(q
j
Y ) > F̂Y |E,C(q
k
Y ). In such a case, the estimated distribution function cannot be directly
inverted. To deal with this potential non-monotonicity, following Chernozhukov et al. (2010), we re-arrange the
estimated conditional distribution so that the re-arranged distribution function satisfies monotonicity.
15AIC = −2 ∗ ln(likelihood) + 2 ∗K and BIC = −2 ∗ ln(likelihood) + K ∗ ln(K), where K is the number of
parameters of a copula function.
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model, taking account of the trade-off between the bias due to misspecification and the sample
variation resulting from over-fitting (Stone, 1977). The parameter estimator is given by




ln c(F̂E1(e1i), ..., F̂Eq(eqi), F̂C1(c1i), ..., F̂Cp(cpi); θ), (2.14)
where c(.) is the likelihood function of a specific copula. Likewise, the copula functions of E and
C are estimated respectively by




ln ce(F̂E1(e1i), ..., F̂Eq(eqi); θe) (2.15)




ln cc(F̂C1(c1i), ..., F̂Cp(cpi); θc). (2.16)
Then we obtain an estimate of Ψ(e, c).




2.4.3 Direct and indirect effects
As discussed in the introduction, some observed efforts may depend on circumstances, it is there-
fore insightful to decompose ∆ = v(FY (y))− v(FEOPY (y)) further into two parts: a direct effect
and an indirect effect, following Bourguignon et al. (2007), Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) and Pis-
tolesi (2008). The direct effect is the illegitimate inequality attributable solely to the distribution
of circumstances in the absence of any interplay between efforts and circumstances, while the
indirect effect is the counterpart which is caused by the dependence of efforts on circumstances.
We prepare for the counterfactual distribution of Y , denoted as FEOP,directY (y), which would
be realised when the variation of circumstances are suppressed while the variation of efforts are
unaffected. When manipulating the marginal distributions of each element of circumstances does
not affect the joint or marginal distributions of efforts, the hypothetical outcome distribution
16Noting that the statistical property that as the random variable U = FEOPY (y), is uniformly distributed on














F̂Y |E,C(y|e = ei, c = c̃)Ψ̂(e = ei, c = ci). (2.17)
Note that the weighting factor in equation (2.17) is a function of both E and C. ci in the
weighting factor is the observed circumstances before its manipulation, not the fixed reference
value. Intuitively, different from the weighting factor in equation (2.10), i.e. Ψ̂(e = ei, c = c̃),
the weighting factor in equation (2.17), i.e. Ψ̂(e = ei, c = ci), does not take into consideration
the indirect pathway by which C influences E when we suppress the variation of C. Hence,
F̂EOP,directY (y) is the hypothetical outcome distribution with circumstances fixed at the reference
level and with original efforts unaffected by our levelling circumstances.
Finally, in the fairness-gap spirits (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009), ∆̂direct = v(F̂Y (y)) −
v(F̂EOP,directY (y)) yields the direct effect. Subtracting this from the total IOP measurement
gives the indirect effect, i.e. ∆̂indirect = ∆̂− ∆̂direct.
2.5 Empirical application: Ex-post IOP in intergenerational trans-
mission of body mass in Indonesia
2.5.1 Background and motivation
This section illustrates the proposed copula-based measurement approach through its application
to the intergenerational transmission of the body mass index (BMI) in Indonesia. The growing
number of overweight and obese people is a major public health issue in both developed and de-
veloping countries (Kelly et al., 2008). According to World Health Organization (2015), 39 per
cent of the adult population in the world were overweight and around 13 per cent of them were
obese in 2014. A higher BMI is a leading risk factor in chronic diseases such as cardiovascular dis-
ease, stroke, diabetes and musculoskeletal disorders (Ng et al., 2014). As well as over-nutrition,
low- and middle-income countries are faced with the persistence of under-nutrition and the con-
sequences of being underweight, which is also associated with elevated morbidity and mortality
(Strauss and Thomas, 2007; Waaler, 1984). These two forms of malnutrition are one of the major
public health issues in low- and middle-income countries.
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The existence of the intergenerational transmission of BMI is increasingly recognised interna-
tionally and parental over- and under-nutritions are strong significant predictors of those of their
offspring (Dolton and Xiao, 2015; Freeman et al., 2012; Yan, 2015; Brown and Roberts, 2013;
Costa-Font and Gil, 2013; Li et al., 2009; Whitaker et al., 1997). Dolton and Xiao (2017) estimate
intergenerational elasticity across six countries17 with substantially different economic develop-
ment and finds that intergenerational elasticity is very similar across these nations and relatively
constant. Intergenerational BMI transmission is a result of both genetic inheritance and family
environment (Frayling et al., 2007; Bouchard, 2009; Burke et al., 2001; Brown and Roberts, 2013;
Martin, 2008; Salsberry and Reagan, 2007), and a significant correlation is found to persist even
after children have grown up (Abrevaya and Tang, 2011; Reynolds et al., 2007; Laitinen et al.,
2001). Given the medical evidence that extreme BMI can have detrimental effects on health
(Forouzanfar et al., 2015; Ng et al., 2014; Jung, 1997; Waaler, 1984), the large intergenerational
transmission of BMI would be against the ideal of equal opportunities in relation to good health.
This analysis focuses on the BMI of grown-up children aged between 20 and 35 and the BMI of
their parents in their childhood and adolescence.
While there is epidemiological evidence that parental BMI is important determinants of BMI in
their offspring, it seems also quite true that the current BMI of offspring is largely due to their
own current lifestyles, revolving around matters such as dietary choices and daily exercise. The
responsibility-cut demarcation in this application is based on the following normative criteria.
First, from the viewpoint of children, they obviously cannot choose their parents, and therefore
the adiposity of their parents in their childhood and adolescence is beyond their responsibility
or control. Second, it seems reasonable to think that, after they reach adulthood, they should
be held responsible for the lifestyle they choose.
The goal of this application is to measure the ex-post IOP in BMI associated with its inter-
generational transmission among grown children aged between 20 and 35 in Indonesia. As 15 is
the age of majority in Indonesia, i.e. the recognised threshold of adulthood,18 this application
assumes that the BMI of their parents when they were children or adolescents aged below 15
are illegitimate causes of inequality. Hence, we treat only parental BMI as circumstances herein
17The United Kingdom, the United States, China, Indonesia, Spain and Mexico
18http://www.youthpolicy.org/factsheets/country/indonesia/ (accessed 18/07/2017)
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and aim to quantify the inequality attributable solely to parental BMI, which implies that all
the other factors are treated as efforts in this study. However, it is noteworthy that treating
the other factors as efforts does not decrease the usefulness of the method at all. In general,
the demarcation between efforts and circumstance varies, depending on the context of research,
and the flexibility of normative judgement regarding the demarcation is indeed an advantage of
the EOP research framework (Schokkaert, 2015). We admit that the inherent determinants of
BMI can be enormous, and parental BMI are just a subset of conceivable circumstances for their
offspring. Furthermore, it is true that the BMI of offspring can also be influenced by socioeco-
nomic characteristics, family environments, peer pressure from school mates and so forth, which
can also be potentially regarded as circumstances in the sense that they are not controllable by
respondents. In this sense, the inequality attributable to the intergenerational transmission can
also be interpreted as the fraction of the entire IOP.
The study of Indonesia is of interest not only from the viewpoints of public health but also
economic perspectives. Indonesia has the largest population in Southeast Asia and the fourth
largest population in the World (United Nations, 2016). As in other developing countries in
Southeast Asia, Indonesia has been showing high economic growth and a strong increase in
overweight and obese people. It has been reported that obesity has increased rapidly across all
Indonesian population groups including rural and low-income people (Aizawa and Helble, 2017;
Aizawa, 2018b; Roemling and Qaim, 2012). Although the prevalence rate of being underweight
has been exhibiting a decline, under-nutrition has not yet entirely disappeared (Witoelar et al.,
2009; Oddo et al., 2012; Vaezghasemi et al., 2014, 2016; Hanandita and Tampubolon, 2015; Doak
et al., 2005; Roemling and Qaim, 2013). Studying Indonesia provides a good case study in South-
east Asia, which is currently experiencing strong economic growth, a rapid increase in obesity
and persistent under-nutrition, especially among the poor.
2.5.2 Data
The Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS)
The Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) is a large-scale, ongoing longitudinal survey and was
designed and implemented by the RAND Corporation, launched first in 1993/94. It currently
has five waves (as of 2018), the latest of which was completed in 2014. The survey questions
are very extensive, covering a household’s economy, education, employment and a wide range of
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health conditions. The sample is representative of people living in 13 of the 27 provinces in the
country, where about 83 per cent of the total population resides.19 The high re-contact rates of
each wave are one of the strengths of the IFLS20, which helps to lessen the potential risk of bias
owing to non-random attrition. In fact, its re-contact rates are as high as, or higher than, most
longitudinal surveys available in the United States and Europe (Strauss et al., 2016).
Outcome variable
The health outcome of interest is the BMI of grown-up children aged between 20 and 35. From
measurements of the heights and weights of the respondents, BMI was calculated, which is defined
as an individual’s weight divided by their height squared and expressed internationally in units
of kg/m2. Hence, BMI conveys cardinal information about body mass. Information on heights
and weights in the IFLS was based on actual measurements, and therefore it was less likely to be
subject to measurement errors such as under-reporting of weights and over-reporting of heights
(Gorber et al., 2007), which substantially enhances the credibility of the result.21
Circumstance variables
Circumstance variables in this application are parental BMI when respondents were below 15
years old. This study exploits the panel structure of the IFLS to obtain them, i.e. the 21-year
gap between the first wave (completed in 1993/94) and the last wave (completed in 2014) of the
IFLS allows us to obtain that information (Figure 2.1). The high re-contact rates in the IFLS
make this possible. Parental BMI in 1993/94 may well be recognised as circumstances affecting
the BMI of their adult offspring in 2014.
The fundamental reason not to use contemporaneous parents’ BMI as circumstances is that
they are not necessarily uncontrollable by grown-up offspring. For instance, it is quite likely
that grown-up sons/daughters encourage their overweight/obese parents to try to participate in
physical activities to lose weight. It is also likely that grown-up children play important roles
19Four provinces on Sumatra (North Sumatra, West Sumatra, South Sumatra and Lampung), all five of the
Javanese provinces (DKI Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, DI Yogyakarta and East Java) and four provinces
covering the remaining major island groups (Bali, West Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi)
are included (Strauss et al., 2016).
20For example, the re-contact rate in the latest wave among the households interviewed in the first wave was
reported at 92.0 per cent. Among the households interviewed in the first wave, 86.9 per cent were involved in all
five waves.
21In the survey, heights were measured using a Seca plastic height board and weight measurements were taken
using Seca floor-model scales developed in collaboration with UNICEF. The floor-model scales have a digital
readout and are accurate to the nearest 0.1 kg.
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Figure 2.1: BMI of grown-up children and parental BMI in the IFLS
Note: The outcome variable (Y) in this application is the BMI of grown-up children aged between 20 and 35
years. The circumstance variables (C) are parental BMI when offspring were below 15 years old, which is
obtained from the data in the first wave of the IFLS. The effort variables (E) are lifestyles of grown-up children,
of which information is obtained from the last wave of the IFLS.
in the choice of daily meals for their parents. In these cases, parental BMI in 2014 may not be
undoubtedly viewed as circumstances for grown-up children. On the other hand, before offspring
become mature, they are by far less likely to influence parents’ BMI and it is plausible to regard
them as exogenous for children.
In the Roemer framework, a part of E is dependent on C. It is highly probable that fam-
ily environments in childhood shape children’s weight-related behaviours and life-long beliefs
throughout their development. Especially before children grow up, their parents play an im-
portant role in choosing foods, preparing meals and monitoring children’s use of time. These
parental controls could influence weight-related behaviours, values and preferences, even after
children reach adulthood (Wardle et al., 2001; Fisher et al., 2002; Fogelholm et al., 1999; Birch
and Davison, 2001; Davison and Birch, 2002). In this sense, parts of the lifestyles in adulthood
are dependent on parental behaviours during development. Following the Roemer framework,
such influences are treated as parts of circumstances, and their contributions to the IOP are
captured as the indirect effect.
Effort variables
The set of effort variables used in this analysis is composed of the following five categories: 1)
education, 2) long-term household affluence, 3) food expenditure and choices, 4) exercise and 5)
smoking. First, years of education completed by the respondents are included in the model. As
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variables reflecting the households’ affluence, logarithmic family-size adjusted household wealth22
is used. The advantage of using wealth over income is that the former, as a stock of income,
is suitable as an indicator reflecting the long-term living standards of households. In addition,
wealth is less susceptible to temporary economic shocks and seasonal events such as drought,
which is important for the analysis of developing countries in which agriculture plays an impor-
tant role.
Next, as measurements of food expenditure and choices, the logarithmic amount of family-size
adjusted total expenditure on food is used.23 The proportion of expenditure spent on prepared
foods outside the home to total food expenditure is used in this study, in order to capture the
different food choices made by the household. Increasing the consumption of foods prepared out-
side the home, including meals at restaurants, is considered one of the main factors contributing
to excess body fat. In the case of the United States, the rise in the share of food budget spent
on foods prepared away from the home versus total food expenditure is reported as being part of
the reason for an increase in obesity (McCrory et al., 1999). Moreover, the analysis also includes
the share of food expenditure spent on staple foods,24 which is important, because developing
Asian countries are experiencing a rapid change in diet, known as the ‘nutrition transition’ (Pop-
kin, 2001; Popkin and Du, 2003; Popkin and Gordon-Larsen, 2004; Popkin et al., 2006). As in
traditional Indonesian cultures, unprocessed staples have played a major role (Roemling and
Qaim, 2012), a lower share of staple food could be considered to indicate the lesser importance
of traditional cuisine in diet choice.
Furthermore, this study uses information about daily vigorous and moderate physical activi-
ties. In the IFLS, vigorous activities are defined as those that make one breathe much harder
than normal and may include heavy lifting, digging, ploughing, aerobics, fast cycling and cy-
cling with a load. Moderate activities make one breathe somewhat harder than normal and may
include carrying light loads, cycling at a regular pace or mopping the floor. For both vigorous
22Wealth is defined as the aggregated total value of the following various assets, which are commonly found in
typical Indonesian households: House and land occupied by a household; Other house/building (including land);
Land (not used for farming); Poultry; Livestock/fish pond; Hard stem plant not used for farming, or a non-
farm business; Vehicles (cars, boats, bicycles, motorbikes); Household appliances (radio, tape recorder, television,
fridge, sewing or washing machine, video and CD player, cell phone, etc.); Savings/certificates of deposits/stocks;
Receivables; Jewellery; Household furniture and utensils.
23In the survey, the reporting of food expenditure information was done according to the household unit. This
study assumes that household members share expenditure on an equal basis.
24Hulled, uncooked rice, sago/flour, cassava, tapioca and other staple foods.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
count mean sd p50 min max
BMI 4564 23.21 4.38 22.40 13.95 43.39
Father’s BMI in 1993 4564 21.17 2.74 20.71 13.93 33.71
Mother’s BMI in 1993 4564 21.97 3.41 21.44 12.07 33.91
Education years 4564 11.16 3.45 12.00 0.00 16.00
ln(Wealth) 4564 16.51 1.84 16.66 0.00 20.91
ln(Food expenditure) 4564 12.04 0.60 12.03 9.82 14.49
Prepared food ratio 4564 0.15 0.19 0.07 0.00 1.00
Staple food ratio 4564 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.00 0.94
Vigorous activity 4564 2.43 5.86 0.00 0.00 28.00
Moderate activity 4564 5.79 7.41 3.00 0.00 28.00
Eating frequency 4564 0.17 1.28 -0.11 -1.45 9.11
sd=Standard deviation; p50=Median
and moderate physical activities, work that takes fewer than ten minutes is not counted as an
exercise. The intensity of these exercises is calculated by the time spent and the frequency of
the respective activity.25 Finally, the index of frequency of eating unhealthy foods in a week26,
which is obtained by the principal component analysis using the first principal component, is
included.
Sample selection
After dropping the outliers27 and deleting observations with missing values, the sample size
becomes 4,564.28 The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test fails to reject the equality of the offspring’s
BMI distribution of the complete observations and that of the incomplete observations which are
deleted due to missing values. The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2.2. Figure 2.2 shows
the estimated density and cumulative distribution functions. The parametric Shapiro-Francia
test and the non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test reject the normality of BMI (p < 0.01).
25The variable is the product of the time they usually spend in a day (1 is given, if they did no exercise; 2 is
given to less than 30 minutes’ exercise; 3 is given to exercises between 30 minutes and 4 hours; 4 is given, if it is
more than 4 hours) and the days on which they do this in a week. The lowest value is zero (no exercise in a week)
and the highest is 28 (more than 4 hours and 7 days a week).
26Unhealthy foods considered herein are instant noodles, fast foods, soft drinks, fried snacks and sweet snacks.
27Some observations show extremely high or low BMI, which seems biologically impossible. Observations from
the top 0.1 per cent or bottom 0.1 per cent of BMI of respondents and parental BMI are dropped from the sample
as possible outliers.
28The original sample size is 14,774 of which 12,129 observations have information of respondent’s BMI and
7,575 observations had an interview in the first wave. 23 observations are deleted as possible outliers and 2,297
observations with missing values of either efforts or circumstances are deleted.
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First, we implement a regression analysis to understand better the association between the BMI
of children and that of their parents. We focus predominantly on the effects of parental BMI
here. Table 2.3 shows the results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and uncon-
ditional quantile regressions.29 The OLS estimation result in the first column illustrates that
both maternal and paternal BMI in 1993 had significant associations with the BMI of their
child/children in 2014 (p < 0.01). We cannot find a significant difference in their coefficient sizes
at the 5 per cent level.
Figure 2.3 illustrates their heterogeneous effects at the different points of distribution. The uncon-
ditional quantile regression results reveal that the impacts of parental BMI on their child/children’s
BMI vary across the distribution. That is to say, the parental BMI are more relevant around the
middle and the right tail of the offspring’s BMI distribution, which is suggestive of the nonlinear
relations between them. The existence of heterogeneous effects across the distribution is in line
29The unconditional quantile regression was proposed by Firpo et al. (2009), and a brief explanation is available
in the Appendix.
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Note: We estimate the marginal effect of parental BMI when offspring were children on the quantiles of BMI of
grown-up children. Estimated coefficients of respective circumstance variables by the unconditional quantile
regression are plotted. Efforts variables are controlled for (Not shown here).
with previous literature (Dolton and Xiao, 2015, 2017; Classen, 2010). Again, the differences in
the paternal and maternal BMI’ coefficient sizes are not significant at the 5 per cent level for
every estimated quantile point.
Measurement of inequality of opportunity
Table 2.4 presents the maximised log-likelihood values, AIC and BIC of the copula estimations.
For the estimation of the copula function for E and C and that of E, we fail to obtain results for
the Frank copula, because its log-likelihood values did not converge during the estimation. For
the copula function estimation of C, the Clayton copula did not converge. Failure of convergence
could be an indication of inconsistency between the data properties and the copula restriction on
the dependence parameter (Trivedi and Zimmer, 2007). Among the others, the Gaussian copula,
which can have multiple dependence parameters, shows the highest likelihoods and the lowest
AIC and BIC in the estimations of the joint distribution of E and C and that of E, dominating
the other copulas in terms of fitting to the data. The Gumbel copula shows the highest likeli-
hood and the lowest AIC and BIC for the estimation of the joint distribution of C, which implies






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.4: Maximised log-likelihood, AIC and BIC of the copula estimations
Copula Frank Clayton Gumbel Joe Gaussian
Joint distribution of E and C
Log likelihood NA 204.569 59.098 7.666 1970.634
AIC NA −407.139 −116.197 −13.332 −3851.268
BIC NA −409.139 −118.197 −15.332 −3769.969
Joint distribution of E
Log likelihood NA 145.601 14.721 0.011 1664.229
AIC NA −289.202 −27.442 1.977 −3238.458
BIC NA −291.202 −29.442 −0.023 −3157.158
Joint distribution of C
Log likelihood 143.909 NA 158.932 131.828 154.536
AIC −285.818 NA −315.864 −261.657 −307.073
BIC −287.818 NA −317.864 −263.657 −309.073
Note: NA means that a likelihood function did not converge. AIC: Akaike information criteria. BIC: Bayesian
information criteria.
Gaussian copula and the Gumbel copula to model the respective joint distributions.
In the distributional regression, we implement 100 probit estimations and 5,000 random samples
are drawn from the hypothetical health distribution. Figure 2.4 illustrates the density functions
of the offspring’s BMI under the original covariate distributions and under the hypothetical
distribution where circumstance values are set to their sample means. We find that the hypo-
thetical BMI distributions exhibit less variation, compared with the observed BMI distribution.
This perfectly makes sense because the hypothetical distributions are those distributions when
we suppress the variation of the circumstance variables. Hence, the reduction in the variation of
BMI can be interpreted as a part of the total BMI variation associated with its intergenerational
transmission (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009).
Table 2.5 summarises the main estimation results of this application. Standard errors are ob-
tained by bootstrap with 500 repetitions. Table 2.5 is composed of two sections, indicated in
the rows 1) Inequality measurement and 2) IOP percentage. The first section reports the mean,
variance (Var), coefficient of variation (CV), Gini coefficient (Gini) and Theil index (Theil) of
the originally observed health distribution and two hypothetical distributions.30 The first hypo-
thetical distribution is the one in which we take into account both direct and indirect effects of
circumstances on the outcome. The second hypothetical distribution is the one in which we only
consider their direct effects. These two hypothetical distributions reflect the inequality under

























Figure 2.4: Density functions of the hypothetical and observed BMI
EOP, where the variations in circumstances are suppressed. These inequality statistics are based
on the hypothetical situation when the reference values are set to their sample means.
The second section reports the percentage share of the IOP in relation to overall inequality.





second and third rows show the percentage share of the direct effect and the indirect effect in
relation to the IOP respectively. The result suggests that the shares of IOP in relation to overall
inequality vary, depending on the inequality statistics. With respect to the variance, for example,
the IOP accounts for around 15.1 per cent when the sample means are used as reference values.
Compared to the case of variance, we observe relatively smaller variations in the case where the
coefficient of variation, the Gini coefficient, and the Theil index are used as inequality statistics.
2.5.4 Comparison with the parametric approach
Next, we measure the IOP with the parametric approach (Bourguignon et al., 2007). Assuming
the linearity of effort factors and BMI31, we estimate the counterfactual distribution of effort
31As we include the two-way interaction terms between C and E, the parametric model does not impose the




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































factors and BMI in a situation where everybody faces a fixed parental BMI. The associated OLS
coefficient estimates are provided in Appendix 2.A.3. We do not consider the non-parametric
approach in this application study because continuous circumstance and effort variables require
a large number of observations. Possible numbers of types and tranches in this application study
are by far larger than the number of available samples, which makes it impossible to conduct the
non-parametric analysis.
Results with the parametric approach are shown in Table 2.6, where associated standard er-
rors are obtained by bootstrap with 500 repetitions. In the parametric method, we find that
11.4 per cent of the total variance is associated with the parental BMI, which is lower than the
estimates in Table 2.5. The smaller effects of parental BMI are also observed for coefficient of
variation, Gini coefficient and Theil index. The observation that estimated IOP in the parametric
model is smaller than that estimated by our semi-parametric estimation may suggest that, due
to the possible specification error in the parametric model, the association between outcome and
circumstances may not have been satisfactorily modelled, thereby resulting in the downwardly
biased IOP estimates. The second row in the second section in Table 2.6 indicates that a large
part of the IOP is due to the direct effect of parental BMI on BMI of offspring. The very small
indirect effect in the parametric method suggests that the relationships between C and E may
not have been satisfactorily modelled by a linear regression model.
2.5.5 Sensitivity analysis
We repeat estimations, using several reference values of circumstance variables, which is suggested
by Ramos and Van de gaer (2016). Table 2.7 reports the average of the inequality statistics when
the reference values are set from the 0.05th to 0.95th quantiles. Specifically, this is calculated by
averaging inequalities which are estimated when the reference values are set to the 0.05th, 0.20th,
0.35th, 0.50th, 0.65th, 0.80th and 0.95th quantiles of circumstance variables. The result suggests
that the shares of IOP in relation to overall inequality vary, depending on the reference values
of circumstances. For example, intergenerational transmission of BMI accounts for around 15.2






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.6 Discussion and conclusion
In welfare economics, two types of inequality can be defined: legitimate inequality and ille-
gitimate inequality. This distinction is based on the normative judgements as to whether the
causes of inequality are things for which an individual can be held responsible. The IOP is
the illegitimate inequality attributable to circumstances beyond the individual’s control. This
paper proposes a new methodology to measure the ex-post IOP with copulas. The copula func-
tion models dependence structures between effort and circumstance variables, following which
the hypothetical outcome distribution in a situation in which the variations of circumstances
are suppressed is derived. The proposed semi-parametric model is particularly useful when the
non-parametric method is not applicable because effort and circumstance factors are continuous
variables.
It is worth noting that, as discussed by Ferreira and Gignoux (2011), the measurement of IOP
yields only the lower limit of illegitimate inequality.32 In most cases, some of the circumstance
variables are unobservable or non-quantifiable. The real cause of illegitimate inequality can con-
sist of a far more complex set of circumstances, but only its subset is available to researchers.
In this sense, as Wagstaff and Kanbur (2015) and Kanbur and Wagstaff (2015, 2016) argue, the
importance of showing the lower limit for policymakers deserves consideration. The result of
low IOP should not be received optimistically, either, and needs to be carefully interpreted. It
seems important in implementing an empirical analysis to ask oneself how meaningful it is in
the research context to report the lower limit of illegitimate inequality. Furthermore, the actual
demarcation between efforts and circumstances is not obvious to everyone and often requires
personal normative judgement regarding distributional justice. Of course, there might not al-
ways be consensual agreement on the distinction. Judgement about which situations are unfair
can vary from place to place and from time to time (Whitehead, 1992); however, one of the
benefits of the EOP framework is that it can handle our various normative values in the model,
making it possible to discuss the upper and lower limits of illegitimate inequality (Schokkaert,
2015; Garćıa-Gómez et al., 2015). To make the most of the versatility of the framework, it is
important to state explicitly the standpoint of one’s own normative judgement on the demarca-
tion in empirical analyses.
32A notable exception is Niehues and Peichl (2014), in which the authors propose measuring the upper limit of
illegitimate inequality with longitudinal data.
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This paper applies the copula-based method in order to study the ex-post IOP in BMI distribu-
tion among Indonesian people aged between 20 and 35. The application exploits the longitudinal
nature of IFLS data and measures the inequality associated with the intergenerational transmis-
sion of BMI from parents to offspring. The circumstance variables are paternal and maternal
BMI when respondents were in their childhood and adolescence. As effort variables, various
lifestyle choices are included. The results suggest that the proportions of IOP vary, depend-
ing on the choice of inequality statistics and the choice of the reference values of circumstance
variables. Although these estimates do not necessarily reflect the causal relationship between
them, this study shows that intergenerational transmission of BMI is forming the non-negligible
part of entire BMI distribution. When the reference values are set to the sample means of the
circumstance variables, 15.1 per cent of the overall variance in the respondents’ BMI is found to
be associated with their parents’ BMI.
Last of all, it is worth discussing the limitations of this study. Most of the copulas can deal
with multiple marginal distributions, but not all of the popular copula functions can have multi-
ple dependence parameters. If a certain copula can have only a single parameter, the parameter
is supposed to capture dependences of all the possible combinations of marginal distributions.
In this case, these copulas cannot always capture the dependence structures satisfactorily. When
the X dimension is large, the practical choice of copula functions is likely to be more constrained.
In such a case, we might not be able to enjoy the full benefit of employing copulas in modelling
relations between C and E. One practical solution to deal with this issue would be to reduce
dimensions by the principal component analysis before estimating copula functions. Another so-
lution would be to consider a much wider array of copula functions which are capable of flexibly
modelling more complex multi-dimensional dependency. A more thorough exploration of further
possibilities would be our future research topic and this would expand the potential of copulas
in the study into the IOP.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Proof of proposition 1
In this proof, C and E denote the sets of circumstance and effort variables, i.e. C = (C1, ..., Cp)
















FY |E,C(y|e, c)Ψ(e, c)dFE(e)dFC(c), (2.A.1)
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where FEm(em) and FCn(cn) are marginal distribution functions of Em and Cn. fEm(em) and
fCn(cn) are their respective marginal density functions.
Substituting equation (2.A.3)-(2.A.5) into equation (2.A.2),
Ψ(e, c) =





ce(FE1 , ..., FEp ; θe)
∏q




c(FE1(e1), ..., FEp(ep), FC1(c1), ..., FCp(cp); θ)
ce(FE1(e1), ..., FEq(eq); θe)cc(FC1(c1), ..., FCp(cp); θc)
(2.A.6)
This gives equation (2.9).






FY |E,C(y|e, c)dFE|C(e|c)dFC(c = c̃) (2.A.7)
















FY |E,C(y|e, c = c̃)Ψ(e, c = c̃)dFE(e), (2.A.8)
where







fE,C(e, c = c̃)
fE(e)fC(c = c̃)
(2.A.9)
is a weighting factor. Under the assumption of Stability of dependence structure, substituting
equation (2.A.3)-(2.A.5) to equation (2.A.9),
Ψ(e, c = c̃) =
c(FE1(e1), ..., FEp(ep), FC1(c̃1), ..., FCp(c̃p); θ)
ce(FE1(e1), ..., FEq(eq); θe)cc(FC1(c̃1), ..., FCp(c̃p); θc)
(2.A.10)
The assumption of Restricted range of the reference values of C guarantees 0 ≤ FCn(c̃n) ≤ 1, for
all n = 1, ..., p.
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This gives equation (2.10).

2.A.2 Unconditional quantile regression
The unconditional quantile regression developed by Firpo et al. (2009) uses the recentred influ-
ence function (RIF) of quantiles of the outcome variable, y. Coefficients of explanatory variables
at each quantile is estimated by regressing the vector of RIF values on a set of covariates. The
difference from OLS is that the RIF regression uses the estimated RIF of quantiles as a dependent
variable. The RIF vector is obtained by the following equation:
RIF (y; qτ ) = qτ +
τ − I(y ≤ qτ )
f(qτ )
, (2.A.11)
where qτ is the τth quantile of the outcome variable of interest and f(qτ ) is the unconditional
kernel density of y at the τth quantile. I(y ≤ qτ ) is an indicator function and it becomes 1 if y
is smaller or equal to the τth quantile of the outcome distribution.
2.A.3 OLS regression results

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.A.2: OLS regression results for BMI
(1)
BMI
Father’s BMI in 1993 -0.583 (0.500)
Mother’s BMI in 1993 0.883∗∗ (0.415)
Education years 0.0252 (0.187)
ln(Wealth) 0.203 (0.315)
ln(Food expenditure) -0.676 (0.972)
Prepared food ratio -3.193 (3.282)
Staple food ratio -2.685 (4.533)
Vigorous activity -0.153 (0.0984)
Moderate activity 0.0431 (0.0766)
Eating frequency -1.360∗∗∗ (0.430)
Father’s BMI*Mother’s BMI -0.00272 (0.00617)
Father’s BMI*Education years 0.00195 (0.00776)
Father’s BMI*ln(Wealth) -0.0142 (0.0133)
Father’s BMI*ln(Food expenditure) 0.0928∗∗ (0.0410)
Father’s BMI*Prepared food ratio 0.147 (0.130)
Father’s BMI*Staple food ratio 0.133 (0.194)
Father’s BMI*Vigorous activity 0.00529 (0.00426)
Father’s BMI*Moderate activity -0.00324 (0.00324)
Father’s BMI*Eating frequency 0.0283 (0.0183)
Mother’s BMI*Education years -0.00748 (0.00609)
Mother’s BMI*ln(Wealth) 0.0112 (0.0111)
Mother’s BMI*ln(Food expenditure) -0.0531 (0.0341)
Mother’s BMI*Prepared food ratio -0.0299 (0.107)
Mother’s BMI*Staple food ratio -0.0789 (0.149)
Mother’s BMI*Vigorous activity -0.00123 (0.00354)
Mother’s BMI*Moderate activity 0.00216 (0.00255)




Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Chapter 3
Joint Impact of the Conditional Cash Transfer on Child
Nutritional Status and Household Expenditure in Indonesia
Abstract
Child malnutrition, which hampers sound human capital development, is often associated with the low
socio-economic status of poor households in developing countries. This study investigates the impact
of a conditional cash transfer programme in Indonesia, the Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH), on the
marginal and joint distributions of child nutritional status and household expenditure 26-30 months after
its implementation. The cluster-randomised control trial project conducted in Indonesia provides an
opportunity to semi-parametrically estimate the causal impacts on the dependence between them. The
results show that the PKH increases the higher quantiles of weight-for-age z-score among children aged
between 25 and 36 months. Its improvement is explained not by the rise in household expenditure due
to the PKH but by the change in the association between nutritional status and household expenditure.
Furthermore, the PKH strengthens the positive association between nutritional status and household
expenditure. For the other younger age groups, a significant improvement in nutritional status is not
observed.
JEL code: I14, I15, I18, I38




In developing countries, malnutrition is a substantial factor in the causes of death among children
aged under five. In fact, child malnutrition contributes to nearly half of all deaths in children
under five years of age, translating into the loss of approximately 3 million young lives every
year (UNICEF, 2017). Malnutrition accounts for 35 per cent of the burden of disease in children
under five (Black et al., 2008). It also impedes their sound human capital development beyond
the health domain (Hoddinott et al., 2013). The first few years of a child’s life are of enormous
importance for growth because vital development occurs in all areas in these very early stages, in-
cluding the development of the brain’s structural and functional capacity (Grantham-McGregor
et al., 2007). Mounting evidence has shown that health conditions in childhood have persistent
and continued effects on adult health, cognitive development, educational achievement and even
future income.1 Malnourished children may be at high risk of impaired health and function
throughout their lives (Martorell, 1995). As these conditions extend into adulthood and hence
the reproductive years, restricted development in childhood affects subsequent generations, per-
petuating an intergenerational vicious cycle of economic and health inequality (Black and Hurley,
2014; World Bank, 2006).
Numerous studies have revealed significant relationships between parental socio-economic status
(SES) and child health. Children in poorer households are often at a higher risk of experiencing
malnutrition (Case et al., 2002; Currie and Moretti, 2003; Currie and Vogl, 2013; Aizawa, 2019),
partly because they tend to live in dilapidated, poor and crowded houses with poor sanitary
conditions (Ahsan et al., 2017; Caulfield et al., 2004; Marmot, 1999) and with parents who of-
ten have limited educational backgrounds (Chen and Li, 2009; Currie and Moretti, 2003; Ahsan
and Maharaj, 2018; Appoh and Krekling, 2005). In contrast to adults, any health disparity
among children generally cannot be attributed to their own lifestyles for which they can be held
responsible. Clearly, children cannot choose their parents and they have no control over the
environment in which they grow up. In this sense, such health disparities among children may
well be considered inequitable.
Addressing child malnutrition is hugely important for both the resilient economic growth of
countries and for individuals because the economic costs attributable to child malnutrition are
1See for example Case and Paxson (2010); Strauss and Thomas (2007); Hoddinott et al. (2013) for a review.
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substantial. According to World Bank (2006), productivity loss due to malnutrition is estimated
to be more than 10 per cent of lifetime incomes. The Sustainable Development Goals, adopted
in 2015 by the United Nations, call for worldwide action to end all forms of malnutrition among
children under five years of age and to protect them from avoidable death (UNICEF, 2017).
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes, which transfer money to households contingent
on investments in human capital, have been some of the most adopted initiatives in the last two
decades after the success of the CCT programmes in Mexico (Progresa, renamed Oportunidades
in 2001) and Brazil (Bolsa Escola) (Handa and Davis, 2006). To date, these CCT programmes
have been launched in several countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia.2 The primary ob-
jectives of the CCTs are to mitigate short-term poverty, assist long-term well-being through in-
vestments in human capital development and break the vicious cycle of intergenerational poverty.
CCTs are expected to improve the welfare of beneficiaries through two main mechanisms: cash
transfer and conditionality. Conditionality is considered to be the main driver of behavioural
change in beneficiaries. An unconditional cash transfer (UCT), which transfers cash without any
strings attached, may be theoretically preferable to CCTs under the assumption that individual
beneficiaries are rational and fully informed and that the market is functioning perfectly (Bassett,
2008). Nevertheless, imposing conditionality is justified in situations where myopic individuals
with incomplete information undervalue the long-term benefits of human capital development
and do not fully recognise the risk of child malnutrition. CCTs are designed to help poor house-
holds with high discount rates to make better decisions. Furthermore, in the presence of market
failure such as positive externalities, individually optimal levels of human capital investment may
be lower than socially optimal investment levels; child immunisation and household investment
in sanitary conditions are typical examples. In such cases, imposing conditionality can help them
attain a socially desirable and optimal level of human capital investment (Fiszbein et al., 2009;
Adato and Hoddinott, 2007).
The main objective of this study is to estimate the impacts of the CCT pilot programme in
Indonesia on the marginal and joint distributions of child nutritional status and household ex-
penditure. We take advantage of the randomised experimental design that was implemented
2For reviews of the CCT programmes, see Rawlings and Rubio (2005).
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for the purpose of evaluating the programme. We measure the impacts on their association by
simulating the hypothetical marginal and joint distribution of health and expenditure for the
treatment group in the absence of the treatment, which is achieved by the change-in-changes
(CIC) method with an additional identification assumption regarding a copula structure control-
ling the dependence between health and expenditure (Athey and Imbens, 2006; Cañón Salazar,
2016). Estimating the hypothetical joint distribution not only makes it possible to measure the
impact on the association between child health and household expenditure but also allows us to
explore the mechanism by which the CCT affects nutritional status. We estimate how much of
the treatment effect on health is due to the change in household expenditure. We decompose
the impact on the marginal distribution of health into the part that is attributable to the rise in
expenditure (expenditure effect) and the remaining part that cannot be explained by the change
in expenditure (behavioural effect) through a re-weighting decomposition approach (DiNardo
et al., 1996). This decomposition analysis helps us disentangle the pathways by which CCTs
influence a child’s nutritional status.
3.2 The conditional cash transfer programme in Indonesia
Despite rapid and strong economic growth in Indonesia, 87 million people still remain vulnerable
to food insecurity, and the country has the fifth highest number of stunted children in the world
(FAO, IFAD and WFP, 2015). In 2007, Indonesia introduced a pilot conditional cash transfer
programme called the PKH (Program Keluarga Harapan). This initiative is aimed at very poor
households in seven provinces that were chosen based on their willingness to participate and the
extent to which they represented the country’s diversity.3 Like other CCT programmes in Latin
America, the PKH is intended to improve the welfare of poor households by providing them
with a quarterly cash transfer in order to improve the health and educational outcomes of the
participating children (Table 3.1-A).
The PKH aims to mitigate household poverty in the short term while encouraging human capital
investment by enhancing school enrolment and improving the health conditions of children and
pregnant women in the long term. The provision of subsidies, in principle, is conditional on the
fulfilment of the following conditions (Table 3.1-B): in respect of pregnant women, they must
3The provinces selected were DKI Jakarta, West Java, East Java, West Sumatra, North Sulawesi, East Nusa
Tenggara and Gorontalo.
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take iron supplements and visit an office for postnatal care; with regard to children aged under
6 years, they must complete immunisation programmes and receive regular health check-ups;
and for children aged 6-15, they must achieve 85 per cent school attendance. Field facilitators
advise the beneficiary households to comply with the conditionalities, informing them of their
rights and obligations and monitoring eligibility. If these conditionalities are not complied with,
subsequent transfer payments are reduced and, after a series of warnings, the transfers cease
altogether.4
The PKH cash benefit is transferred directly to mothers only and the amount of the cash trans-
fer is around 12 per cent of the total expenditure of the beneficiary household (World Bank,
2012). Moreover, the amount of subsidy depends on the number of children in the household
as well as their age (Table 3.1-C), and it ranges from IDR 600,000 (approximately USD 65) to
IDR 2,200,000 (approximately USD 240) per year including the fixed base cash transfer.5 IDR
1,000,000 per year is provided to households with children aged under 6 or to those with pregnant
or lactating mothers. Households with a primary school student (aged 7-12) receive IDR 800,000
per year while IDR 1,000,000 per year is awarded to households with a secondary school student
(aged 13-15). The government limited the maximum transfer to IDR 2,200,000 regardless of the
number of children in the household. There are no specific rules as to how the transferred cash
must be used. As well as the cash transfer, the PKH beneficiaries can receive in-kind benefits.
They can use maternal and infant healthcare services at district hospitals, community health
centres (puskesmas), community health posts (posyandu) and village delivery posts (polindes)
without out-of-pocket expenditure in accordance with the applicable regulations to comply with
the conditionality.
3.3 Experimental evidence of impacts of CCTs on anthropomet-
ric and nutritional outcomes
Evidence of the causal impacts of CCTs on child anthropometric measures is extremely mixed
across countries (Manley et al., 2013; Hoddinott and Bassett, 2008). In contrast to healthcare
utilisation where the majority of CCTs show positive impacts, impacts on nutrition-related
measures are more sensitive to the timing of the impact measurement and the extent of the
4However, in practice, the verification system did not begin until at least 2010 (Cahyadi et al., 2018).













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































treatment (Fiszbein et al., 2009; Leroy et al., 2009; Glassman et al., 2007). Moreover, significant
results tend to be observed only in some beneficiary subgroups (Lagarde et al., 2007). In this
section, we firstly review experimental evidence of the impacts of CCTs on child nutritional
outcomes in Latin America, where the various types of CCTs were designed, and we then review
the existing evidence in relation to the CCT in Indonesia. Programme details, major studies and
their impacts are summarised in Table 3.2.
3.3.1 Limited improvements in Honduras and Brazil
The CCTs in Honduras (Programa de Asignación Familiar) and Brazil (Bolsa Alimentação)
reveal no significant effect on child anthropometric outcomes (Morris et al., 2004; Hoddinott and
Bassett, 2008). The lack of impact on nutritional status in Honduras is in all likelihood due to
the small size of the transfer, which is less than 4 per cent of average beneficiary expenditure
and around 10 per cent of household consumption, and the infrequent distribution of the transfer
(IFPRI, 2003; Hoddinott and Bassett, 2008). In Brazil, where around 8 per cent of household
expenditure is transferred, a negative impact on the height-for-age z-score (HAZ score) for chil-
dren younger than 7 is even observed (Morris et al., 2004). Morris et al. (2004) attribute this
counterintuitive negative effect to beneficiaries perhaps misunderstanding the programme’s eligi-
bility criteria. Morris et al. (2004) argue that some beneficiaries may have had a misconception
that benefits would be discontinued if their child’s growth began to improve.
3.3.2 Significant improvements in Colombia, Mexico and Nicaragua
On the other hand, significant improvements in child nutritional outcomes have been found in
Colombia, Mexico and Nicaragua. The CCT programme in Colombia (Familias en Acción),
which transfers around 24 per cent of household expenditure, improved the HAZ score by 0.16
in respect of newborns and infants aged under 24 months (p < 0.10), translating into a 6.9 per-
centage point decrease in the probability of stunting (Attanasio et al., 2005). However, studies
do not show any impact on the nutritional status of children aged 24 months and older.
Positive impacts of the programme in Mexico (Progresa/Oportunidades) on child nutritional
status are reported by several studies (Behrman and Hoddinott, 2001; Leroy et al., 2008; Rivera
et al., 2004; Gertler, 2004; Behrman and Hoddinott, 2005; Hoddinott and Bassett, 2008). For















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































gramme for one year are taller than children from controlled areas by 0.96 cm (p < 0.01), but a
reduction in the likelihood of being stunted was not observed. Rivera et al. (2004) report an in-
crease in height by 1.1 cm (p < 0.05), after two years of exposure to the treatment, among infants
younger than 6 months at baseline living in the poorest households. Behrman and Hoddinott
(2005) also find similar results, reporting the increase in height by 1.02 cm (p < 0.10) among
children aged 12-36 months at baseline after a one-year exposure to the Progresa. The authors
argue that the main positive impact comes from the children aged 24-36 months who are given
nutritional supplements when they are underweight.6 The large transfer size, approximately
one-fifth of per capita household expenditure, and the provision of a nutritional supplement con-
tribute to the significant positive effect of Progresa/Oportunidades (World Bank, 2008; Handa
and Davis, 2006).
In Nicaragua, the CCT (Red de Protección Social) reduces the prevalence of being stunted and
underweight by 5.5 (p < 0.10) and 6.2 (p < 0.05) percentage points respectively (Maluccio and
Flores, 2005). This impressive improvement is attributed to the relatively large transfer, approx-
imately 18 per cent of average monthly household expenditure, and the programme’s wide range
of nutrition-related conditionality (Maluccio and Flores, 2005; Hoddinott and Bassett, 2008). On
the other hand, it does not lower the probability of being wasted, which is due to the very low
level of wasting at baseline (Maluccio and Flores, 2005).
Bassett (2008) argues that the size of the transfer appears to be critical in terms of nutritional
improvement. The successful CCT programmes in Mexico, Nicaragua and Colombia transfer
approximately 20 per cent of the average beneficiary expenditure, while in Honduras and Brazil,
where no significant improvement was found, the transfer is below 8 per cent of the average ben-
eficiary expenditure. Fernald et al. (2008) report that the larger transfer yields greater health
improvement in the case of Mexico. Bassett (2008) also points out that the successful CCT pro-
grammes have multiple nutrition-related conditionalities, including a micronutrient supplement
in Nicaragua and a nutritional supplement in Mexico, which could have brought about the even
larger impact on nutritional status.
6Progresa provided a nutritional supplement (called a papilla) to pregnant and lactating women, children aged
between 4 and 24 months, and children aged between 2 and 5 with any signs of malnutrition. The supplement
for children constituted 20 per cent of their daily caloric requirements and 100 per cent of their micronutrient
requirements (Rosado et al., 2000).
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3.3.3 Evidence in Indonesia
In Indonesia, while the PKH significantly improved the use of maternal and child healthcare ser-
vices (Alatas, 2011; Kusuma et al., 2017, 2016), the impacts of the PKH on nutritional status are
mixed, although they are not statistically significant; a positive impact of the PKH on the mean
weight-for-age z-score (WAZ) and a negative impact on the mean HAZ score have been reported
two years after the PKH was implemented (Alatas, 2011). Kusuma et al. (2017) estimate the
impact on children’s food consumption and nutritional outcomes. Regarding food consumption,
the authors find significant positive impacts of the PKH on the consumption of milk (p < 0.10)
and fish (p < 0.10). In respect of the nutritional outcome, they report that, for children aged
24-36 months at baseline in 2007, the PKH reduces the prevalence of wasting and severe wasting
by 6.3 percentage points (p < 0.05) and 3.7 percentage points (p < 0.10) respectively. However,
a reduction in the likelihood of being stunted is not observed (Kusuma et al., 2017).
Cahyadi et al. (2018) recently reported the continued effect on various outcomes by re-surveying
the households to measure the medium-run performance of the PKH. They show cumulative
effects on the prevalence of stunting six years after the PKH was implemented. In their six-year
follow-up survey, the prevalence of being stunted declined by approximately 9-11 percentage
points (p < 0.05) among children aged 0-60 months. On the other hand, no significant impact
was observed regarding the likelihood of being underweight. Cahyadi et al. (2018) highlight the
possible cumulative effect of the PKH on children’s height. This follow-up research suggests
that the period for which children are exposed to the treatment is also a significant factor of
nutritional improvement.
Our study’s main contributions to the literature are threefold. First, this study estimates the
treatment effect on the entire distribution of health outcomes and household expenditure, which
tends to be unexplored in the majority of empirical studies on CCTs. Certainly, estimating the
average treatment effect provides valuable information to policymakers, but a sole focus on the
average treatment effect could potentially miss important distributional effects that do not show
up as a change in means. A more thorough evaluation becomes possible by exploring the impacts
on the entire outcome distributions beyond their means. Second, this paper estimates the im-
pact of the PKH on the joint distribution of health outcomes and household expenditure, which
has not specifically been examined by the existing literature. CCT programmes are likely to,
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directly and indirectly, affect both nutritional status and households’ purchasing power through
the cash transfer and behavioural changes. Hence, they are likely to change the association
between health outcomes and household expenditure, as well as individual outcomes. Examin-
ing the impact on the joint distribution allows us to analyse whether the PKH strengthens or
weakens the association between household expenditure and health. Third, this paper aims to
disentangle the mechanism by which the PKH affects health outcomes by estimating how much
of the changes in health outcomes is driven solely by the change in the distribution of household
expenditure. This is achieved by decomposing the estimated effect on health into the part that
can be attributed to the change in household expenditure and the remaining part that cannot
be explained by it.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Randomisation design of the PKH pilot programme
The pilot PKH programme was conducted in 2007 in six provinces7 within which the richest
20 per cent of districts were excluded. The selection of eligible sub-districts was based on
certain characteristics, including the prevalence of malnutrition, the poverty rate, school drop-
outs and the availability of health and education facilities. A total of 1,085 sub-districts that
were considered “supply-side ready” were randomly selected to participate in the programme.
As a result, 769 sub-districts were included in the treatment group and the remaining 316 sub-
districts were retained as control groups. Targeted households were those classified as extremely
poor by Statistics Indonesia using both economic and asset-based poverty measurements.8
3.4.2 Sample construction
A baseline household survey in the treatment and control sub-districts was conducted between
June and August 2007 by the National Planning Agency and the World Bank. It was designed
as a cluster-randomised control trial at sub-district level. Randomising over sub-districts (not
households or villages) captures the intra-sub-district spill-over effects, while eliminating any bias
from inter-sub-district spill-over effects. Ethical approval was not necessary because this study
7They are Jakarta, West Java, East Java, North Sulawesi, East Nusa Tenggara and Gorontalo.
8Under the definition supplied by Statistics Indonesia, a very poor household is one that has less-than-poverty-
line expenditure overall, spends a large proportion of its available income on basic staple foods, cannot afford
medical treatment (except at community health clinics or other subsidised or free public health facilities) and
cannot afford sufficient new or replacement clothing.
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utilises public data without identifiable private information.9
First, 180 treatment sub-districts and 180 control sub-districts were randomly selected. Both
treatment and control samples were stratified by urban and rural classification. Within each
selected sub-district, eight villages were then randomly selected. Per village, one ward was ran-
domly selected. Next, five households per ward were randomly selected based on PKH beneficia-
ries criteria (two households with pregnant/lactating women and three households with children
aged 6 to 15) (Figure 3.1). Eventually, 14,326 households consisting of 73,563 individuals were
interviewed in the baseline survey. The distributions of household characteristics are balanced
in the baseline survey (Sparrow et al., 2008). About 75 per cent of the survey households were
located in urban areas. The same households were interviewed again in the follow-up survey
conducted between October and December 2009, allowing us to construct fully balanced panel
data to evaluate the impact of the PKH approximately 26-30 months after its implementation.
3.4.3 Nutritional status
We measure child development by a weight-for-age z-score (WAZ score) and a height-for-age
z-score (HAZ score). These scores were calculated on the basis of actual measurements of the
heights and weights of the respondents. The WAZ/HAZ scores measure the difference between
the weight/height of an individual and the median value of the “healthy” reference population
for the same sex and age, divided by the standard deviation of the reference population.10 The
WAZ and HAZ scores are commonly used as measurements of the nutritional status of children
(Glewwe et al., 2001; Case and Paxson, 2010; Caulfield et al., 2004; Pelletier et al., 1993). The
WAZ score measures short-term nutritional conditions. A low WAZ score is associated with
the condition of being underweight. Meanwhile, the HAZ score measures long-term cumulative
nutritional conditions and a low HAZ score is associated with chronic under-nutrition caused by
poor food consumption (Walker et al., 2007). Low WAZ and HAZ scores are both caused by
poor diet and often compounded by recurrent infectious diseases. The risk of death increases
with descending WAZ and HAZ scores (Black et al., 2008). A WAZ score and a HAZ score below
−2 (i.e., two standard deviations below the international reference median) are defined as the
9We use the Impact Evaluation of PNPM Generasi Program data set provided by the World Bank.
10According to World Health Organization (2006), the reference population refers to healthy and well-nourished
children in the United States. This standard captures the growth and development process of children from widely






















































indicators of being underweight and stunted respectively, while scores below −3 are defined as
the indicators of being severely underweight and severely stunted respectively.
3.4.4 Household expenditure
As a measurement of household welfare or socio-economic status, we use the logarithm of house-
hold expenditure on non-food purchases and food consumption during the last 12 months of the
interview process.11 To reflect the difference in household compositions, the equivalent house-
hold expenditure is calculated using the Oxford scale12, which assigns a weight of 1.0 to the
first household member, 0.7 to each additional adult and 0.5 to each child, then calculating
the weighted average expenditure per household member.13 Certainly, a household’s food con-
sumption is directly related to a child’s nutritional status, but non-food purchases are equally
important to their health. For example, a household’s spending on child healthcare and invest-
ment in its sanitary conditions are essential elements of better child health. The spending on
non-food purchases and food consumption can reflect both the long-term and short-term living
standards of the household. Compared with income, household expenditure is less susceptible
to seasonal events such as drought, which is significant in the analysis of developing countries
where agriculture plays an important role.
3.5 Method
3.5.1 Notation
First, g ∈ {A,B} denotes the control and treatment groups and t ∈ {1, 2} denotes the time pe-
riod. The group g = B in period t = 2 is the only group that is exposed to the treatment. In the
first period (t = 1), both groups had no treatment. H and Y denote continuous health outcomes
and expenditure. Conditional health and expenditure in group g in period t are denoted by Hgt
11Specifically, non-food includes (a) housing and household facilities, (b) miscellaneous goods and services, (c)
educational costs, (d) health costs, (e) clothing, shoes and headwear, (f) durable goods and household equipment,
(g) taxes, (h) health insurances, and (i) feasts and rituals. Food consumption measures the monetary values of the
food consumed, and this includes not only food purchased but also that which the participants produce themselves
or receive from other sources. As the survey information on food consumption relates to just one week, the total
values are multiplied by 52 (weeks) to ensure consistency with the measurement of non-food purchases.
12Also known as the OECD equivalence scale.
13As robustness checks, we calculate the equivalent expenditure by the square root scale equivalisation methods,
which divide the total household expenditure by the squared family size, and the equivalent expenditure which
divides the total expenditure by family size. However, we did not find systematic differences in the final results
across the adjustment methods. This is mainly thanks to the successful stratified data collection across household
compositions in both the control and treatment groups. The t-test and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test did not
indicate a significant difference in the household compositions between the control and treatment groups.
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and Ygt respectively. Hgt and Ygt have marginal distributions, FH,gt(h) and FY,gt(y), and their
supports are denoted by Hgt and Ygt.
Following Rubin (1974), we assume that each individual has two possible outcomes, namely
HIgt ∈ HIgt and Y Igt ∈ YIgt in the presence of the treatment and HNgt ∈ HNgt and Y Ngt ∈ YNgt in the
absence of the treatment. We can only observe one of them for each person, but never both.
That is HIgti and Y
I




gti are observed unless
g = B and t = 2.
Let FH,Y,gt be the bivariate joint distributions of (H,Y ) and let v(FH,Y,gt), v(FH,gt) and v(FY,gt)
denote the distributional summary statistics of interest. We define the treatment effects on
the joint distribution as τHY = v(F
I
H,Y,B2) − v(FNH,Y,B2) and on the marginal distributions as
τH = v(F
I
H,B2)−v(FNH,B2) and τY = v(F IY,B2)−v(FNY,B2). As we condition on whether the house-
hold resides in a treatment sub-district, not on the actual participation in the PKH programme,
in essence, the estimates reflect the intention-to-treat effect.
The fundamental identification problem with regard to the treatment impacts is that for any
individual in group g = B in time period t = 2, we cannot observe their potential outcomes in
the absence of the treatment, i.e. the outcome that a person in group g = B and time period
t = 2 would have experienced had he/she not been exposed to the treatment. The impossibility
of observing (HNB2, Y
N







we cannot identify the treatment effects without further assumptions.
3.5.2 Estimation of the counterfactual distributions by change-in-changes es-
timators
The experimental study design gives us a reliable source of identification. Athey and Imbens
(2006) propose a non-linear difference-in-differences model, which is also known as the change-
in-changes model (CIC). The CIC does not rely on functional form assumptions and can non-
parametrically estimate the entire counterfactual distribution of the outcome for the treatment
group in the post-treatment period in the absence of the treatment, i.e. FNH,B2 and F
N
Y,B2. Specif-
ically, the CIC non-parametrically estimates the change across time that happened in the control
group, and estimates the counterfactual distribution for the treatment group by assuming that
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the distribution in the treatment group would have experienced the same change without the
treatment. The CIC allows the effects of time and treatment to differ across individuals. Esti-
mation of the counterfactual distribution makes it possible to identify, in essence, the treatment
effect on any univariate functional of the outcome variable beyond its mean.
Suppose H and Y have the following general structures in the absence of the treatment:
HN = m(uH , t) (3.1)
Y N = n(uY , t), (3.2)
where m(.) and n(.) are unknown functions, and uH and uY denote the unobservable charac-
teristics of individuals for H and Y respectively. We assume uH and uY are not necessarily
independent. Equations (3.1) and (3.2) imply that the outcomes do not directly depend on the
group indicator and that all relevant unobservable characteristics in each outcome can be cap-
tured in a single index. We do not impose specific functional form assumptions.
With the CIC model, the full marginal distributions of HNB2 and Y
N















Equations (3.3) and (3.4) imply that the counterfactual distribution in the absence of the treat-
ment can be identified from the observable distributions. Assumptions used to estimate them by
the CIC are described in section 3.A.1 in the Appendix. Equations (3.3) and (3.4) can be more
intuitively interpreted, if we take their inverse as follows:














For example, equation (3.6) states that an individual at the αth quantile of the counterfactual
expenditure distribution in the treatment group (g = B) in the post-treatment period (t =
2) without the treatment would be at the FNY,A1(F
−1,N
Y,B1 (α))th quantile point of the observable
distribution in the control group (g = A) in the post-treatment period (t = 2).
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3.5.3 Extension of the CIC for the bivariate joint distribution
An additional assumption regarding the joint distribution of unobservable characteristics enables
us to measure distributional effects with multiple treatment outcomes (Cañón Salazar, 2016).
We assume the invariance of dependence structure. Specifically, this assumes that within each
group, the dependence structure of (uH , uY ) is invariant across time, i.e. (uH , uY ) ⊥ t|g. This
assumption states that the dependence structure between uH and uY can systematically vary
across the groups, but not over time within groups. This, however, does not necessarily require
that individual i should have the same values (uHi , u
Y
i ) in each period, but rather this assumption
only requires that the dependence structure of (uH , uY ) is stable across time given the group.
This assumption, though not testable, is plausible when group composition does not change over
time. The immediate implication is that the dependence of (uHB1, u
Y
B1) is assumed to be identical
to that of (uHB2, u
Y
B2). More detailed explanations are provided in section 3.A.2 in the Appendix.
The counterfactual joint distribution in group B in period t = 2 in the absence of the treat-
ment is given by:











The identification of the counterfactual joint distribution leads to the identification of the treat-
ment impact on the joint distribution. In addition, this allows us to identify the counterfactual
conditional distribution of H given Y (Cañón Salazar, 2016). We subsequently make the most
of this property in disentangling the mechanism by which the PKH affects child health by de-
composing the impact on child health into two components (see section 3.5.5).
If the invariance of dependence structure assumption fails, we cannot identify the counterfactual
joint distribution in group B in period t = 2 in the absence of the treatment. However, it does
not prevent us from estimating the impacts on the marginal distributions of health outcome and
expenditure. Certainly, as the invariance of dependence structure assumption is the one relat-
ing to the hypothetical distribution of unobservable factors in the absence of the treatment, we
cannot test it from the available data. However we did not find strong evidence against its plausi-
bility. First, we did not find any large-scale natural disaster or epidemic shock between the time
of data collection which could threaten the assumption. Second, in this study, as we use fully
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balanced panel data, both groups did not experience structural changes in their within-group
compositions.
3.5.4 Copulas
Joint distribution and copulas
In general, joint distributions can be expressed by their marginal distributions and a copula
function. Copulas allow us to model dependence structures of variables from their marginal
distributions, and they have the property that a functional association between underlying vari-
ables is not influenced by their marginal behaviours (Nelsen, 2006; Trivedi and Zimmer, 2007).
In general, applying Sklar’s theorem, there exists a copula function, C(., .), such that
FH,Y (h, y) = C(FH(h), FY (y); θ), (3.8)
where θ ∈ Θ is a parameter vector. Various copulas are proposed in the statistical literature
(Nelsen, 2006; Gudendorf and Segers, 2010) and major parametric copulas are introduced in
section 3.A.3 in the Appendix. We employ a two-step maximum likelihood estimation to esti-
mate a copula function for the joint outcome distribution. This separates the estimation of the
marginals from that of the dependence parameter(s) and produces consistent estimates of the
dependence parameter(s) (Trivedi and Zimmer, 2007). The estimation procedure is explained in
section 3.A.4 in the Appendix.
Simulation from the estimated copula
We make pseudo-random draws with the conditional sampling method, using the estimated
copula function. In essence, the conditional sampling method generates the random samples
from the multivariate joint distribution using the following three steps. Let C(v1, v2) be a




.14 The pair (v1, v2) are uniformly distributed variables from the copula function
14Every copula has its derivative (Nelsen, 2006). For any v2, the partial derivative
∂C(v1,v2)
∂v1
exists for almost all
v1. For such v1 and v2, the range of its derivative is 0 ≤ ∂C(v1,v2)∂v1 ≤ 1. Similarly, the partial derivative
∂C(v1,v2)
∂v2
exists for almost all v2.
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C(v1 + ∆v1, v2)− C(v1, v2)
∆v1
(3.9)
= Pr[V2 ≤ v2|V1 ≤ v1]. (3.10)
Third, we generate the random variables H = F̂−1H (v1) and Y = F̂
−1
Y (v2). The outcomes (H,Y )
can be considered as a set of pseudo-random sampling from the joint distribution of (H,Y ). We
generate the set of (HNB2, Y
N
B2) of which size is as large as the sample size of the treated groups
(g = B, t = 2), which allows us to calculate the distributional statistics of the counterfactual





3.5.5 Decomposition of the treatment effect on health
Estimating the counterfactual joint distribution allows us to quantify how much of the treatment
effect on the health distribution is contributed by the change in the distribution of household
expenditure. We decompose the treatment effect on the health distribution into two effects:
the expenditure effect and the behavioural effect. The expenditure effect is the part of the to-
tal effect attributable to the change in the expenditure distribution due to the treatment, and
the behavioural effect is the remaining part which is not attributable to the expenditure effect.
Hence, the behavioural effect captures the effect attributable to the changes in the association
between health and household expenditure, which is induced by the behavioural changes due to
the treatment. This decomposition exercise does not necessarily produce causal effects, but the
decomposition would help us explore the pathways by which CCTs affect child nutrition.
We decompose the total effect into the expenditure effect and the behavioural effect by adding
and subtracting counterfactual distributional statistics v(F INH,B2), as follows:
v(F IH,B2)− v(FNH,B2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total effect
= {v(F IH,B2)− v(F INH,B2)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expenditure effect
+ {v(F INH,B2)− v(FNH,B2)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Behavioural effect
. (3.11)
The distribution F INH,B2 is a counterfactual health distribution of group B in the post-treatment
period, which is composed of the conditional distribution of H with the treatment and the
marginal distribution of Y without the treatment. In other words, F INH,B2 is the health distribution
with the treatment in a situation where no one changed their expenditure patterns even in the
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presence of the treatment. Formally, applying the law of iterated expectation, F IH,B2, F
N
H,B2, and



















The expenditure effect in equation (3.11) captures the effect on the health distribution due to
the difference in the marginal expenditure distribution, i.e. the difference between F IY,B2 and
FNY,B2. The behavioural effect, which reflects the difference in the conditional distribution of
health given expenditure, i.e. the difference between F IH|Y,B2 and F
N
H|Y,B2, measures the effects
on health that are attributable to the change in the association between H and Y due to the
treatment.
To estimate the expenditure and behavioural effects, we need to estimate the counterfactual
health distribution, F INH,B2. This counterfactual health distribution can be estimated by employ-
ing the re-weighting decomposition approach (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 1996) (hereafter
denoted as “DFL weighting”). In essence, we replace the marginal distribution of Y IB2 with














where Ψ(Y ) =
dFNY,B2
dF IY,B2
in equation (3.15) is the DFL weighting factor. Intuitively, the weighting
factor re-weights the entire treated observations so that they would have the health outcome
distribution that would be realised under the marginal expenditure distribution without the
treatment.
For the implementation of the decomposition, we need to estimate the DFL weighting factor,
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f(Y |g = B, t = 2, N)
f(Y |g = B, t = 2, I)
=
Pr(Y |g = B, t = 2, N)
Pr(Y |g = B, t = 2, I)
=
Pr(Y, g = B, t = 2, N)/Pr(g = B, t = 2, N)
Pr(Y, g = B, t = 2, I)/Pr(g = B, t = 2, I)
=
Pr(N |g = B, t = 2, Y )Pr(g = B, t = 2, Y )/Pr(g = B, t = 2, N)
Pr(I|g = B, t = 2, Y )Pr(g = B, t = 2, Y )/Pr(g = B, t = 2, I)
=
Pr(N |g = B, t = 2, Y )Pr(g = B, t = 2, I)
Pr(I|g = B, t = 2, Y )Pr(g = B, t = 2, N)
=
Pr(N |g = B, t = 2, Y )Pr(I|g = B, t = 2)Pr(g = B, t = 2)
Pr(I|g = B, t = 2, Y )Pr(N |g = B, t = 2)Pr(g = B, t = 2)
=
{1− Pr(I|g = B, t = 2, Y )}Pr(I|g = B, t = 2)
Pr(I|g = B, t = 2, Y )Pr(N |g = B, t = 2)
, (3.16)
where Pr(I|g = B, t = 2, Y ) is the probability of getting the treatment in group B in period 2,
given the covariate Y , and it is estimated by the logit model. The ratio Pr(I|g=B,t=2)Pr(N |g=B,t=2) becomes
one because the identical numbers of untreated samples and treated samples are simulated with
the conditional sampling method (see section 3.5.4).
The DFL weighting is based on the assumption that the support of Y NB2 is in support of Y
I
B2,
i.e. YNB2 ∈ YIB2. This common support assumption requires the overlap in the expenditure
distributions in group B, in the sense that there is no such value of Y that is observed only in
the absence of the treatment. Although the validity of this common support assumption cannot
be tested from the observed distributions, given that the PKH is a cash transfer programme,
it is unlikely that the upper support of Y NB2 exceeds that of Y
I
B2. The failure of the common
support assumption prevents us from estimating the counterfactual health distribution with the
re-weighting factor, because such a situation makes the propensity score zero or one. Intuitively,
if the propensity score is close to zero or one, observations will get close to zero or an extremely
high weight in estimates of the contractual distribution with the DFL re-weighting approach, po-
tentially leading to an imprecise estimation. We deal with the potential lack of common support
by trimming the samples outside the top 0.1 per cent and bottom 0.1 per cent of the propensity
score (Crump et al., 2009).
3.5.6 Entropy balance weighting
Despite randomisation, pre-treatment differences across groups are expected to be present, and
controlling for the pre-treatment characteristics can increase statistical precision and help the
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identification assumptions to be satisfied (Abadie and Imbens, 2011; Abadie, 2005). We balance
the distributions of these pre-treatment variables with entropy balance weighting proposed by
Hainmueller (2012), which non-parametrically assigns weights such that the covariate distribu-
tions in the weighted data satisfy a set of moment conditions set by a researcher. Specifically,
weights are assigned to the control group so that the moments of the weighted covariate distribu-
tions in the control group match those in the treatment group. Balancing the higher moments of
the covariate distributions can further enhance the credibility of the treatment effect estimation.
The algorithm of the entropy balance weighting is provided in section 3.A.5 in the Appendix.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Sample selection
The original sample size for children aged below 36 months who construct fully balanced panel
data is 7,090 observations.15 Then, 56 observations are dropped because they do not have com-
plete information about pre-treatment individual-, household- and village-level characteristics in
either the baseline or follow-up surveys. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not indicate system-
atic differences in the distribution of HAZ score, WAZ score and household expenditure between
the dropped samples and the remaining samples, implying that dropping the observations with
missing information about pre-treatment characteristics is not likely to produce severe selection
bias. Following the previous studies in Mexico (Behrman and Hoddinott, 2005), we implement
an analysis across three age groups in the baseline: (1) 0-12 months; (2) 13-24 months; and (3)
25-36 months. Since the constructed data is fully balanced panel data, the structures of each
age group are consistent across periods, which helps identification assumptions to be satisfied.
The sample sizes of each age group are 3,020, 2,738 and 1,276 respectively.16
3.6.2 Entropy balance weighting
First, we balance the distribution of pre-treatment individual-, household- and village-level char-
acteristics for each age group by the entropy balance weighting. Specifically, as individual-
15From the initial 11,938 observations, 4,848 observations are dropped because they do not have complete
nutritional status and/or household expenditure information in either the baseline or follow-up surveys. However,
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to reject the equality in the distribution of the household- and village-level
characteristics between the dropped samples and the included samples, implying that the missing information is
random.
16As the height and weight were measured among children aged under five, children aged 25-36 months in the
baseline have fewer samples in the follow-up survey, compared with children aged 0-12 months and 13-24 months.
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and household-level characteristics, we balance the distribution of sex, residential location (ur-
ban/rural) and family size. As village-level characteristics, we balance the distribution of pop-
ulation size (divided by 1,000), ratio of farmers, Islamic population ratio, and the existence of
community health centres (puskesmas), community health facilities, birth attendants, private
clinics, government hospitals, private hospitals and drug stores. Their distributions are balanced
up to their second moments. The covariate distributions before and after the balancing are
provided in Table 3.3.
3.6.3 Copula selection of the joint distribution of health and expenditure of
the treatment group
Copula selection results are shown in Table 3.4, which presents the maximised log-likelihood val-
ues, Akaike information criteria (AIC) and Bayesian information criteria (BIC) of the maximum-
likelihood estimations. We observe the failure of convergence for some copulas, which could be
an indication of inconsistency between the data properties and the copula restriction on the
dependence parameter (Trivedi and Zimmer, 2007). For the joint distribution of the WAZ score
and expenditure, the Gaussian copula, the Student-t copula and the FGM copula show the high-
est likelihoods and the lowest AIC and BIC for children aged 0-12 months, children aged 13-24
months and children 25-36 months respectively. In the estimations of the joint distribution of
HAZ score and expenditure, the Student t copula shows the highest likelihoods and the lowest
AIC and BIC among children aged 0-12 months. The Placket copula shows the highest likeli-
hoods and the lowest AIC and BIC for children aged 13-24 months. For children aged 25-36
months, the FGM copula shows the highest likelihoods and the lowest AIC and BIC. These
selected copulas are used to simulate the counterfactual distributions of health and expenditure.
3.6.4 Impacts on the marginal distributions of WAZ score, HAZ score and
expenditure
Figure 3.2 shows the estimated cumulative distribution functions of WAZ score, HAZ score and
the household expenditure of the control group (g = A) and the treatment group (g = B) in the
post-treatment period (t = 2). In addition, Figure 3.2 illustrates the estimated counterfactual
cumulative distribution functions of the treatment group if they had not been treated. The

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4: Copula estimation
Copula WAZ score and expenditure HAZ score and expenditure
Log likelihood AIC BIC Log likelihood AIC BIC
Age 0-12 months
Clayton NA NA NA NA NA NA
Frank 0.828 0.344 −1.656 0.004 1.992 −0.008
Gumbel 0.127 1.747 −0.253 0.086 1.827 −0.173
AMH 0.854 0.291 −1.709 0.004 1.992 −0.008
Joe 0.000 2.000 0.000 0.130 1.740 −0.260
Gaussian 1.025 −0.051 −2.051 0.013 1.974 −0.026
Student-t 0.911 0.178 −1.822 0.503 0.994 −1.006
FGM 0.872 0.256 −1.744 0.004 1.992 −0.008
Plackett 0.807 0.387 −1.613 0.004 1.992 −0.008
Galambos 0.338 1.324 −0.676 0.309 1.382 −0.618
Husler Reiss 0.383 1.234 −0.766 0.328 1.343 −0.657
Tawn 0.018 1.963 −0.037 NA NA NA
Age 13-24 months
Clayton 3.009 −4.018 −6.018 NA NA NA
Frank 1.257 −0.513 −2.513 2.326 −2.651 −4.651
Gumbel 1.549 −1.098 −3.098 0.764 0.472 −1.528
AMH 1.338 −0.677 −2.677 2.315 −2.630 −4.630
Joe 0.972 0.057 −1.943 0.142 1.716 −0.284
Gaussian 1.507 −1.015 −3.015 2.242 −2.484 −4.484
Student-t 3.899 −5.799 −7.799 2.091 −2.183 −4.183
FGM 1.165 −0.330 −2.330 2.312 −2.625 −4.625
Plackett 1.306 −0.613 −2.613 2.331 −2.663 −4.663
Galambos 0.934 0.132 −1.868 0.666 0.668 −1.332
Husler Reiss 0.802 0.396 −1.604 0.659 0.682 −1.318
Tawn 1.926 −1.852 −3.852 0.830 0.341 −1.659
Age 25-36 months
Clayton 0.540 0.921 −1.079 NA NA NA
Frank 0.764 0.473 −1.527 0.109 1.782 −0.218
Gumbel 0.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.000
AMH 0.742 0.517 −1.483 0.108 1.783 −0.217
Joe 0.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.000
Gaussian 0.760 0.481 −1.519 0.090 1.821 −0.179
Student-t 0.708 0.584 −1.416 0.050 1.900 −0.100
FGM 0.819 0.362 −1.638 0.113 1.775 −0.225
Plackett 0.739 0.523 −1.477 0.108 1.785 −0.215
Galambos NA NA NA 0.012 1.975 −0.025
Husler Reiss NA NA NA 0.019 1.963 −0.037
Tawn NA NA NA NA NA NA
Note: NA means that a likelihood function did not converge. AIC: Akaike information criteria. BIC:
Bayesian information criteria.
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tribution corresponds to the quantile treatment effect. The non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test rejects the equality of the distributions (p < 0.01), but stochastic dominance of the distri-
butions of the treatment group over the counterfactual distributions is not observed in all cases.
Table 3.5 reports the impacts of the PKH programme on the mean and deciles of each outcome
distribution. Associated standard errors are obtained by bootstrap with 500 repetitions. First,
on the distribution of the WAZ score, the impact of the PKH is mixed across the age groups.
For children aged 0-12 months, increases in the WAZ score are observed in the middle and higher
percentiles of the distribution, but we did not find significant increases. For children aged 13-24
months, the impact on the WAZ score distribution shows positive signs, but it is not statistically
significant except on the 40th percentile (p < 0.10). For children aged 25-36 months, we find
a significant large positive impact on the mean (p < 0.10), the 80th (p < 0.01) and the 90th
(p < 0.05) percentiles of the distribution.
The result for children aged 25-36 months shows that the significant improvement is not observed
uniformly across the distribution. At the lower percentile of the distribution, the significant in-
crease is not found, thereby suggesting that the PKH did not work effectively among those who
most need the intervention. The null of the improvement in the lower percentile of the dis-
tribution would indicate the importance of re-designing the CCT programme with appropriate
conditionality so that the benefits would effectively reach the neediest.
Another interesting finding is that children aged 0-12 months and children aged 13-24 months
show little improvement in health. The most plausible explanation for this is that these children
are too young to get the benefit of the programme. In Indonesia, breastfeeding was almost uni-
versal with over 96 per cent of children in the country being breastfed (Beatty et al., 2017; World
Health Organization, 2010). Continued breastfeeding at least until age two is recommended in
Indonesia and the exclusive breastfeeding rate is higher among poorer mothers (Beatty et al.,
2017). Children aged 0-24 months who grew mainly through breastfeeding may have enjoyed
little benefit from the PKH.
Next, on the distribution of the HAZ score, the treatment effect on the mean and deciles of
the distribution is insignificant among all three age groups. This could be attributable to the
relatively short evaluation period, as argued by Cahyadi et al. (2018). In contrast to the WAZ
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Figure 3.2: HAZ score, WAZ score and expenditure distributions in the post-treatment period
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score, the improvement in the HAZ score requires exposure to the programme over a sustained
period of time (UNICEF, 2013; Strauss and Thomas, 1998; Waterlow et al., 1977). The distribu-
tional impacts in the medium and long term with the follow-up surveys would be worth exploring
and this would complement the findings made by Cahyadi et al. (2018).17 However, note that
treatment exposure duration in this study, i.e. for 26-30 months, is not necessarily shorter than
other experimental studies in Latin America (see Table 3.2).
Lastly, on the distribution of household expenditure, the significant positive impact is observed
on the 90th percentile of the distribution among children aged below 12 months (p < 0.10) and on
the 80th (p < 0.05) and 90th (p < 0.10) percentiles among children aged 13-24 months. Among
children aged 25-36 months, we do not observe the significant increase in household expenditure.
Table 3.5 also shows the treatment impact on the prevalence of malnutrition. A decline in
the prevalence of being underweight (WAZ < −2) is observed across all three age groups, but
it is statistically insignificant. For the prevalence of being stunted (HAZ < −2), we observe
an increase among children aged 13-24 months and children aged 25-36 months, and a decrease
among children aged below 12 months, although these changes are not statistically significant.
3.6.5 Decomposition of the treatment effect on health
Then, we decompose the treatment effect on the distribution of nutritional status in order to
estimate how much of the treatment effect is attributable to the change in the household ex-
penditure due to the PKH (equation (3.11)). Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 report the expenditure
and behavioural effects of the PKH on the marginal distributions of WAZ and HAZ scores. We
find that much larger proportions of the total effects are contributed by the behavioural effect,
which implies that the PKH impacts the marginal health distribution by directly affecting health
rather than influencing it through the change in household expenditure.
One likely explanation for the behavioural change is the knowledge transfer from healthcare
providers to beneficiary mothers through the conditionality. Previous studies in Indonesia showed
that the PKH increased healthcare use among mothers and children; for example, prenatal care,
institutional delivery, postnatal care, immunisations of children and growth-monitoring check-ups
17As of August 2019, the six-year follow-up survey data was not yet publicly available. Once the data becomes
available to the public, estimating the long-term effects would complement the findings of this study.
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Table 3.5: Treatment effect on the WAZ score, HAZ score and expenditure
WAZ score HAZ score Expenditure
Estimates SEs Estimates SEs Estimates SEs
Age 0-12 months
Mean 0.063 0.111 -0.072 0.188 0.011 0.035
10th percentile -0.092 0.135 -0.212 0.219 -0.074 0.065
20th percentile -0.030 0.113 -0.078 0.160 -0.046 0.045
30th percentile 0.067 0.107 0.091 0.190 -0.032 0.045
40th percentile 0.096 0.099 0.041 0.166 -0.030 0.042
50th percentile 0.136 0.106 0.153 0.182 -0.049 0.037
60th percentile 0.063 0.101 0.018 0.207 -0.030 0.042
70th percentile 0.104 0.140 -0.015 0.244 0.037 0.051
80th percentile 0.160 0.199 0.048 0.310 0.083 0.058
90th percentile 0.072 0.219 -0.066 0.527 0.124* 0.065
Undernutrition -0.029 0.045 -0.021 0.048
Severe undernutrition 0.009 0.024 -0.017 0.041
Age 13-24 months
Mean 0.144 0.105 0.047 0.164 0.014 0.038
10th percentile 0.200 0.138 0.089 0.305 -0.031 0.058
20th percentile 0.129 0.150 0.039 0.163 -0.003 0.051
30th percentile 0.188 0.119 -0.087 0.154 -0.055 0.058
40th percentile 0.180* 0.107 -0.059 0.159 -0.054 0.050
50th percentile 0.131 0.098 -0.073 0.175 -0.039 0.036
60th percentile 0.119 0.104 -0.039 0.153 -0.003 0.043
70th percentile 0.037 0.149 0.065 0.168 0.052 0.056
80th percentile 0.071 0.161 0.070 0.191 0.123** 0.056
90th percentile 0.084 0.236 0.277 0.335 0.125* 0.068
Undernutrition -0.071 0.044 0.020 0.051
Severe undernutrition -0.036 0.024 0.012 0.035
Age 25-36 months
Mean 0.232* 0.128 -0.137 0.222 0.033 0.054
10th percentile 0.048 0.216 -0.140 0.327 -0.004 0.092
20th percentile 0.152 0.161 -0.214 0.231 -0.036 0.092
30th percentile 0.074 0.169 -0.050 0.209 0.011 0.061
40th percentile 0.119 0.135 -0.108 0.200 0.041 0.066
50th percentile 0.127 0.132 -0.073 0.176 0.013 0.061
60th percentile 0.121 0.134 -0.171 0.172 0.047 0.064
70th percentile 0.222 0.137 -0.095 0.213 0.103 0.072
80th percentile 0.466*** 0.193 0.010 0.229 0.136 0.087
90th percentile 0.483** 0.236 -0.121 0.774 0.131 0.094
Undernutrition -0.034 0.055 0.028 0.056
Severe undernutrition 0.000 0.032 0.043 0.055
Note: Standard errors (SEs) are obtained by bootstrap with 500 repetitions.
Sample sizes of each age group are 3,020, 2,738 and 1,276 respectively.
Pre-treatment characteristics are balanced with entropy balance weighting.
Undernutrition is the condition of z-score being below -2.
Severe undernutrition is the condition of z-score being below -3.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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all saw significant increases (Alatas, 2011; Kusuma et al., 2017). The improvement of health-
related knowledge as a result of more frequent health clinic visits and interactions with health
professionals due to conditionality contributes to the improved WAZ score. Furthermore, pre-
vious studies also showed that the PKH changed the composition of household expenditure.
Beneficiary households increased the proportion of health expenditure to total expenditure by
two percentage points by lowering the proportions of other expenditure (Alatas, 2011). The in-
creased healthcare utilisation and the re-orientation towards higher healthcare use suggest that
the PKH enhanced the “health literacy” among beneficiaries.
3.6.6 Treatment effect on the dependence measurements
Next, we look at the treatment effect on the dependence between nutritional status and household
expenditure. The most well-known dependence concept is the Pearson correlation coefficient,
which measures linear dependence.18 We also use rank correlations as alternative measurements
of dependence; in this paper we use Spearman’s rho and Kendall’s tau.19 Both rank correlation
measurements do not depend on the functional forms of the marginal distributions (Trivedi and
Zimmer, 2007). The degree of dependence, measured by correlation coefficients, allows us to
quantify the change in dependence and the change in copula functions made by the treatment.
The difference in the dependence measurements in the presence of the treatment and those in
the absence of the treatment gives the effect of the PKH on the dependence measurements.
Table 3.8 reports the effects on the dependence measurements between expenditure and the
WAZ score and those between expenditure and the HAZ score. Without the treatment, the
dependence measurement indicates either statistically null dependence or positive dependences.
A positive dependence implies concordance between expenditure and HAZ/WAZ score; that is,
large values of household expenditure are associated with the large value of WAZ/HAZ score.
We observe that the PKH significantly increases the degrees of dependence, measured by the
three measurements, between expenditure and WAZ score among children aged 25-36 months
(p < 0.05). On the dependence between household expenditure and HAZ score, the PKH does
not show significant effects for all three age groups.
18Formerly known as the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient.
19They are defined by ρs(H,Y ) = ρ(FH(h), FY (y)) and ρτ (H,Y ) = Pr{(h1 − h2)(y1 − y2) > 0} − Pr{(h1 −
h2)(y1−y2) < 0}, where ρ(., .) is a linear correlation coefficient and (h1, y1) and (h2, y2) are two independent pairs
of random variables from FH,Y .
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Table 3.6: Decomposition of the treatment effect on the WAZ score
WAZ score Total effect Expenditure effect Behavioural effect
Estimates SEs Estimates SEs Estimates SEs
Age 0-12 months
Mean 0.063 0.111 0.000 0.006 0.063 0.111
10th percentile -0.092 0.135 0.000 0.008 -0.092 0.136
20th percentile -0.030 0.113 0.000 0.013 -0.030 0.114
30th percentile 0.067 0.107 0.000 0.010 0.067 0.109
40th percentile 0.096 0.099 0.000 0.007 0.096 0.100
50th percentile 0.136 0.106 0.000 0.008 0.136 0.106
60th percentile 0.063 0.101 0.000 0.010 0.063 0.100
70th percentile 0.104 0.140 -0.005 0.010 0.109 0.141
80th percentile 0.160 0.199 -0.010 0.010 0.170 0.202
90th percentile 0.072 0.219 0.000 0.014 0.072 0.219
Age 13-24 months
Mean 0.144 0.105 0.000 0.008 0.144 0.105
10th percentile 0.200 0.138 0.000 0.018 0.200 0.138
20th percentile 0.129 0.150 0.000 0.021 0.129 0.150
30th percentile 0.188 0.119 0.000 0.012 0.188 0.121
40th percentile 0.180* 0.107 0.000 0.008 0.180* 0.108
50th percentile 0.131 0.098 0.000 0.007 0.131 0.098
60th percentile 0.119 0.104 0.000 0.010 0.120 0.104
70th percentile 0.037 0.149 0.000 0.009 0.037 0.150
80th percentile 0.071 0.161 0.000 0.015 0.071 0.161
90th percentile 0.084 0.236 -0.010 0.015 0.094 0.235
Age 25-36 months
Mean 0.232* 0.128 0.011 0.030 0.222* 0.129
10th percentile 0.048 0.216 0.000 0.037 0.048 0.220
20th percentile 0.152 0.161 0.004 0.044 0.148 0.160
30th percentile 0.074 0.169 0.001 0.036 0.072 0.163
40th percentile 0.119 0.135 0.015 0.029 0.104 0.134
50th percentile 0.127 0.132 0.020 0.028 0.107 0.127
60th percentile 0.121 0.134 0.010 0.030 0.111 0.135
70th percentile 0.222 0.137 0.015 0.031 0.207 0.136
80th percentile 0.466*** 0.193 0.001 0.044 0.465*** 0.195
90th percentile 0.483** 0.236 -0.002 0.062 0.484** 0.233
Note: Standard errors (SEs) are obtained by bootstrap with 500 repetitions.
Sample sizes of each age group are 3,020, 2,738 and 1,276 respectively.
Pre-treatment characteristics are balanced with entropy balance weighting.
v(F IH,B2)− v(FNH,B2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total effect
= {v(F IH,B2)− v(F INH,B2)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expenditure effect
+ {v(F INH,B2)− v(FNH,B2)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Behavioural effect
.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.7: Decomposition of the treatment effect on the HAZ score
HAZ score Total effect Expenditure effect Behavioural effect
Estimates SEs Estimates SEs Estimates SEs
Age 0-12 months
Mean -0.072 0.188 0.001 0.011 -0.072 0.190
10th percentile -0.212 0.219 0.000 0.012 -0.212 0.221
20th percentile -0.078 0.160 0.000 0.021 -0.078 0.160
30th percentile 0.091 0.190 0.000 0.010 0.091 0.192
40th percentile 0.041 0.166 0.000 0.012 0.041 0.169
50th percentile 0.153 0.182 0.000 0.011 0.153 0.183
60th percentile 0.018 0.207 0.000 0.010 0.018 0.207
70th percentile -0.015 0.244 0.000 0.018 -0.015 0.246
80th percentile 0.048 0.310 -0.010 0.019 0.058 0.312
90th percentile -0.066 0.527 -0.001 0.029 -0.065 0.530
Age 13-24 months
Mean 0.047 0.164 0.001 0.010 0.046 0.164
10th percentile 0.089 0.305 0.000 0.008 0.089 0.305
20th percentile 0.039 0.163 0.000 0.013 0.039 0.162
30th percentile -0.087 0.154 0.000 0.010 -0.086 0.153
40th percentile -0.059 0.159 0.000 0.008 -0.059 0.160
50th percentile -0.073 0.175 0.000 0.015 -0.073 0.176
60th percentile -0.039 0.153 0.000 0.015 -0.039 0.156
70th percentile 0.065 0.168 0.000 0.012 0.065 0.170
80th percentile 0.070 0.191 0.000 0.009 0.070 0.192
90th percentile 0.277 0.335 -0.001 0.009 0.278 0.337
Age 25-36 months
Mean -0.137 0.222 0.013 0.033 -0.150 0.218
10th percentile -0.140 0.327 -0.001 0.037 -0.139 0.319
20th percentile -0.214 0.231 0.000 0.048 -0.213 0.226
30th percentile -0.050 0.209 0.009 0.033 -0.060 0.204
40th percentile -0.108 0.200 0.008 0.036 -0.116 0.201
50th percentile -0.073 0.176 0.009 0.038 -0.082 0.174
60th percentile -0.171 0.172 0.000 0.031 -0.171 0.170
70th percentile -0.095 0.213 0.002 0.038 -0.097 0.214
80th percentile 0.010 0.229 0.016 0.050 -0.006 0.226
90th percentile -0.121 0.774 -0.003 0.053 -0.118 0.773
Note: Standard errors (SEs) are obtained by bootstrap with 500 repetitions.
Sample sizes of each age group are 3,020, 2,738 and 1,276 respectively.
Pre-treatment characteristics are balanced with entropy balance weighting.
v(F IH,B2)− v(FNH,B2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total effect
= {v(F IH,B2)− v(F INH,B2)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expenditure effect
+ {v(F INH,B2)− v(FNH,B2)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Behavioural effect
.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.8: Treatment effect on the dependence measurements between expenditure and nutri-
tional status
WAZ score With treatment Without treatment Treatment effect
Estimates SEs Estimates SEs Estimates SEs
Age 0-12 months
Pearson’s correlation -0.002 0.057 0.071 0.047 -0.073 0.075
Kendall’s tau -0.004 0.042 0.047 0.037 -0.051 0.057
Spearman’s rho -0.007 0.063 0.071 0.054 -0.077 0.085
Age 13-24 months
Pearson’s correlation 0.008 0.053 0.060 0.064 -0.052 0.094
Kendall’s tau 0.022 0.034 0.043 0.039 -0.021 0.057
Spearman’s rho 0.032 0.051 0.063 0.057 -0.031 0.086
Age 25-36 months
Pearson’s correlation 0.114 0.071 -0.100 0.069 0.214** 0.107
Kendall’s tau 0.098** 0.045 -0.065 0.047 0.163** 0.074
Spearman’s rho 0.146** 0.068 -0.098 0.071 0.243** 0.112
HAZ score With treatment Without treatment Treatment effect
Estimates SEs Estimates SEs Estimates SEs
Age 0-12 months
Pearson’s correlation 0.017 0.064 0.011 0.061 0.006 0.087
Kendall’s tau 0.007 0.037 0.012 0.042 -0.005 0.056
Spearman’s rho 0.010 0.056 0.018 0.062 -0.008 0.082
Age 13-24 months
Pearson’s correlation 0.016 0.048 0.127*** 0.050 -0.110 0.082
Kendall’s tau 0.012 0.030 0.086*** 0.036 -0.074 0.052
Spearman’s rho 0.017 0.044 0.131*** 0.053 -0.114 0.077
Age 25-36 months
Pearson’s correlation 0.101 0.065 -0.009 0.062 0.109 0.086
Kendall’s tau 0.062 0.039 0.001 0.042 0.061 0.055
Spearman’s rho 0.097* 0.058 0.002 0.064 0.096 0.082
Note: Standard errors (SEs) are obtained by bootstrap with 500 repetitions.
Sample sizes of each age group are 3,020, 2,738 and 1,276 respectively.
Pre-treatment characteristics are balanced with entropy balance weighting.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The increase in the dependence among children aged 25-36 months is consistent with the in-
crease in their WAZ score. Given that the change in the marginal distribution of expenditure is
not statistically significant among this age group, the increase in the dependence between WAZ
score and expenditure suggests that the PKH improves the WAZ score of children in relatively
better-off households among the beneficiaries. Again, this implies the PKH does not necessarily
reach the children who most need the intervention. Improving the nutritional outcomes of chil-
dren in the poorest households is essential to achieve the ultimate goal of the CCT programme.
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3.7 Discussion and conclusion
Numerous research papers have suggested that malnutrition during the early stages of life has irre-
versible adverse impacts on the development of both cognitive and non-cognitive skills (Sánchez,
2017; Walker et al., 2011; Grantham-McGregor et al., 2007), motor development, educational
outcome (Glewwe et al., 2001) and future earnings (Smith, 2009; Johnson and Schoeni, 2011).20
Despite the country’s strong economic growth, the child malnutrition rate in Indonesia remains
high. The PKH was introduced in 2007 with the intention of improving the welfare of poor
households. Like other CCT programmes across the world, the PKH aims to change health-
related behaviours through cash transfers and multiple conditionalities.
The PKH is expected to improve child nutritional status by cash transfer and through the
associated conditionalities. As a lack of household purchasing power is one of the fundamental
causes of child malnutrition, the cash transfer would contribute to improved nutritional status
through increased quantity and quality of food consumption by overcoming budget constraints
on appropriate nutritious diets. In addition, imposing conditions related to children’s health
and monitoring compliance help poor households increase their healthcare utilisation to the de-
sired level. This study evaluates the treatment effects on the entire distribution of child health
outcomes and household expenditure and then explores the pathway through which the PKH
influences child nutritional status by estimating its impacts on the joint distribution of them.
The results show that the impact on the total household expenditure distribution is very modest
and statistically indistinguishable from zero at most parts of the distribution. The statistically
significant increase is observed only at the higher percentile of the expenditure distribution of
the households with children aged 0-12 months and 13-24 months. The PKH programme has im-
proved the WAZ score among children aged 25-36 months. Decomposition analysis shows that the
improvement of the WAZ score is not explained by the change in the household expenditure dis-
tribution, which is not surprising given that the increase in the total expenditure is not observed
among the households with children aged 25-36 months. The decomposition analysis suggests
that their improvement in WAZ score is driven by behavioural changes in beneficiary households.
20For more evidence, see for example Strauss and Thomas (2007); Almond and Currie (2011); Case et al. (2005);
Alderman et al. (2006); Blackwell et al. (2001); Portrait et al. (2017) and Victora et al. (2008).
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Overall, this study shows that the PKH did not improve the nutritional condition of those
at high risk of under-nutrition. One possible explanation is that the amount of cash transfer is
not sufficiently large. Compared with the successful CCTs in Latin America, where the trans-
ferred cash is typically above 20 per cent of average beneficiary household expenditure, the cash
transfer of the PKH is around 12 per cent of the total expenditure of beneficiary households
(World Bank, 2012). Furthermore, in contrast to the successful CCTs in Latin America, the
PKH does not have a nutrition-related conditionality such as participants taking a nutritional
supplement (Maluccio and Flores, 2005; Skoufias, 2005). In Mexico, for example, mothers must
visit a clinic at least once a month to pick up packets of supplements per eligible child if signs of
malnutrition are detected by the clinic’s personnel. Although the effectiveness of the nutrition
supplement itself is not yet fully confirmed, the Indonesian government may wish to assess the
option to introduce a nutrition-related conditionality.
Some additional complementary conditionalities related to feeding practice would potentially
enhance the effectiveness of the PKH on child health outcomes. For example, while attending
a nutritional education workshop or utilising a counselling service are included in CCT pro-
grammes in Colombia21, Brazil, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru (Bassett, 2008), the
conditionality of the PKH does not include mothers participating in nutrition counselling. Pro-
viding educational opportunities in which beneficiaries frequently get advice about child diets
from healthcare professionals could assist the nutritional improvement.
Adding the conditionality regarding hygiene and sanitation promotions would also be an op-
tion to enhance the effectiveness of the CCT programme (Hoddinott and Bassett, 2008). For
example, significant improvements in child health due to the promotion of hand-washing using
soap have been reported in India (Bhutta et al., 2008). Combining education counselling sessions
on diets, hygiene and other topics relating to child health and growth with regular growth moni-
toring would also further help to promote child growth by maximising the potential effectiveness
of the CCT (Hoddinott and Bassett, 2008).
In addition, this study provides evidence that the PKH strengthens the positive dependence
between child nutritional status and household expenditure among children aged 25-36 months.
21In Colombia, attending workshops is encouraged but not mandatory.
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In the existing literature, the impact of CCTs on the joint distribution has not been afforded
any examination, but its impact should not be completely ignored in the process of economic
policy evaluations because the rationale of the CCTs rests on social equity which requires that
everyone, regardless of their socio-economic background, should have the equal opportunity to
achieve sound human capital development (Fiszbein et al., 2009). We would like to emphasise
that the CCTs should be designed with appropriate conditionalities to ensure that their benefits
will effectively reach the neediest.
By way of conclusion, it is worth discussing a limitation and some potential extensions of this
study. First, since the respondents are not representative of the sub-district populations as they
were instead selected by means of purposive sampling, the implications of this study are not
necessarily applicable to the entire population (Deaton and Cartwright, 2018). In other words,
although we find that the PKH changes the association between nutritional status and expen-
diture among the eligible households, it is still uncertain whether it is strong enough to change
the socio-economic gradient in health in the entire population, including the non-poor ineligible
households.
Second, the effectiveness of each conditionality of the PKH is worth exploring. The PKH has
several education- and health-related conditionalities (Table 3.1-B), and careful examination
of the effectiveness of each one would contribute to a more thorough evaluation of the policy.
However, the randomisation design of the data used in this study does not provide us with the
opportunity to conduct a detailed investigation of what conditions mainly trigger the effect. The
ideal experimental design to identify the marginal contributions of each conditionality would
be a randomised controlled trial with multiple treatment groups, each of which complies with
each conditionality of the programme and a control group receiving no transfers. Exploitation
of structural modelling with multiple outcomes and a more detailed randomisation design would
promote a better understanding of the detailed causal pathways.
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3.A Appendix – Notes on methodology
3.A.1 Assumptions for the CIC
First, we assume the independence between treatment assignment and latent outcomes:
Assumption 1 Random treatment assignment
uH and uY are independent of the treatment assignment.
This is a core identification assumption which allows identification of the treatment effect pa-
rameter. In this study, as eligibility for the PKH is randomly assigned, this assumption is usually
satisfied. Next, the CIC imposes an assumption on the unobserved characteristics.
Assumption 2 Strict monotonicity (Athey and Imbens, 2006)
m(uH , t) and n(uY , t) are strictly increasing in uH ∈ UH and uY ∈ UY for t ∈ {1, 2}.
The strict monotonicity assumption requires that the higher level of u corresponds to the strictly
higher outcomes. Equations (3.1) and (3.2) with strict monotonicity imply that the outcomes of
an individual i with uji = u
j , j ∈ {H,Y } will be the same in a given period of time, regardless
of the group status. In other words, in the absence of the treatment, all differences between
the two groups in a given time period are attributable to the differences in the distribution of u
conditional on g.
In addition, the CIC makes an assumption about the distribution of uj , j ∈ {H,Y }.
Assumption 3 Time invariance within groups (Athey and Imbens, 2006)
The distribution of uj can systematically vary across the groups, but not over time within groups.
uj ⊥ t|g, j ∈ {H,Y }. (3.A.1)
Time invariance within groups is a core assumption for the CIC. Conceptually, the time in-
variance assumption in the CIC is a generalisation of the common trend assumption used in the
standard difference-in-differences method. In essence, the time invariance within groups assump-
tion requires that the population in a given group does not change over time. In our case, as
we use fully balanced panel data, group composition is preserved over time. This assumption is
required to extrapolate the distribution of uj in the second period from its distribution in the
first period. Conditional on the group, the marginal distribution of uj|g,t=1 is identical to the
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marginal distribution of uj|g,t=2 for j ∈ {H,Y }. Time invariance of the distribution of u
j , how-
ever, does not require that a particular individual i has the same realisation uji in each period.
This assumption only requires that the distribution of uj is the same across time given the group.
Lastly, the CIC makes an assumption on the support of uj .22
Assumption 4 Common support (Athey and Imbens, 2006)
The support of uj in the group B is in the support of uj in the group A.
Uj|g=B ∈ U
j
|g=A, j ∈ {H,Y }. (3.A.2)
The common support assumption implies the following four support conditions of the outcome:
HNB1 ∈ HNA1 (3.A.3)
HNB2 ∈ HNA2 (3.A.4)
YNB1 ∈ YNA1 (3.A.5)
YNB2 ∈ YNA2. (3.A.6)
The support assumption ensures that the counterfactual distributions of HNB2 and Y
N
B2 are iden-
tified at all points in the support of HNA2 and Y
N
A2.
3.A.2 Identifying the joint distribution with the extended CIC
The invariance of dependence assumption, combined with the assumptions for the CIC model,
allows us to relate the joint cumulative distribution of (HNgt , Y
N
gt ) to the joint cumulative distri-
butions of (uHgt, u
Y
gt) as follows (Cañón Salazar, 2016):
FNH,Y,gt(h, y) = Pr{m(uHgt, t) ≤ h, n(uYgt, t) ≤ y}
= Pr{uHgt ≤ m−1(h; t), uYgt ≤ n−1(y; t)}
= FUHgt ,UYgt(m
−1(h; t), n−1(y; t)), (3.A.7)





22Technically, this assumption is not the vital assumption for estimating the counterfactual distribution. This
assumption ensures that the counterfactual distribution is all identified in the support of Y jA2. Even without this
assumption, the distribution of Y N,jB2 in the support of Y
j
A2 is identified, although the distribution of Y
N,j
B2 outside
the support of Y jA2 is not identified. For details, see Corollary 3.1 of Athey and Imbens (2006).
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3.A.3 Major parametric copulas
In the statistical literature, a long list of copulas has been proposed for modelling the depen-
dence between the variables, but we focus only on the several examples that are frequently
used empirically in econometrics. A particular group of copulas which has proven useful is
the Archimedean family copulas, which are easily derived and are capable of capturing vari-
ous types of dependence structures. The Archimedean family copulas take the general form
C(v1, v2) = ψ
−1(ψ(v1) +ψ(v2)), where ψ(.) is called a generator function and its functional form
is unique to each Archimedean family copula. Product copula, Frank copula, Clayton copula,
Gumbel copula, Joe copula and Ali-Mikhail-Haq (AMH) copula are major Archimedean family
copulas.
First, the Product copula, which takes the simplest form, does not allow dependence between
marginal distributions and consequently does not have a dependence parameter. Second, the
Frank copula is capable of modelling both positive and negative dependence, and is suitable
for data that exhibit weak tail dependence (Trivedi and Zimmer, 2007). The Clayton copula
can better capture strong left tail dependence and relatively weak right tail dependence, but it
is not suitable for negative dependence. As its dependence parameter goes to 0, the marginal
distributions become independent. The Gumbel copula, similar to the Clayton copula, is not
able to model negative dependence, but it can better capture strong right tail dependence and
relatively weak left tail dependence. The Joe copula also allows only positive dependence and
is appropriate for modelling the very strong right tail dependence and relatively weak left tail
dependence between marginals. The AMH copula is suitable only for modelling the weak depen-
dence.
The elliptical family copulas are also frequently employed in the empirical literature. The el-
liptical copulas are simply the copulas with elliptically contoured distributions. The Gaussian
copula and the Student t copula are major copulas in the elliptical family. The elliptical family
copulas are flexible in the sense that they allow for positive and negative dependence. They
are suitable for the marginals with a symmetric dependence structure. A disadvantage of the
elliptical family copulas is that they do not have a closed functional form. The Student t copula
has two dependence parameters, (θ1, θ2). The first parameter governs the heaviness of the tails.
As θ1 →∞, the Student t copula becomes the Gaussian copula with parameter θ2.
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In addition, we consider the Plackett copula and the Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern (FGM) copula.
The Plackett copula can model both positive and negative dependences well. If the marginals
have relatively strong tail dependences, the Plackett copula is better at modelling them than the
Gaussian copula. The FGM copula is a perturbation of the product copula. Similar to the AMH
copula, the FGM copula is only suitable for modelling the two marginals with modest depen-
dence. If the dependence parameter θ goes to zero, the FGM copula becomes the product copula.
Finally, we consider the extreme-value copulas. A copula is called an extreme-value copula








n → C(v1, v2) as n→∞. (3.A.8)
The common extreme-value copulas are the Galambos copula, Hüsler Reiss copula and Tawn
copula.23 The extreme-value copulas are used mainly in the field of finance for modelling the
dependence structure between rare events, but they can also be used to model data with positive
dependence. Compared with the class of Archimedean family copulas, one advantage is that
they can better model the marginals with asymmetric dependence and strong tail dependence.
For more details about the extreme-value copulas, see Gudendorf and Segers (2010). Table 3.A.1
lists the functions of copulas employed in this paper, their parameter ranges and the number of
parameters.
3.A.4 Copula selection and parameter estimation
We employ maximum likelihood estimation to parametrically estimate a copula function for the
joint outcome distribution. This separates the estimation of the marginals from that of the depen-
dence parameter(s) and produces consistent estimates of the dependence parameter(s) (Trivedi
and Zimmer, 2007). The first step non-parametrically estimates univariate marginal distributions
of health and expenditure. The second step then estimates the dependence parameter(s), using
the estimated marginal distributions from the first step. It is essential to select an appropriate
copula for modelling a joint distribution. If dependence structures were known a priori, it would
be easier to choose an appropriate copula, but such information is seldom available in advance.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The selection of the copula tends to be a posterior consideration, and so it is important to esti-
mate several copulas and compare their performances. The dependence parameters are estimated
by employing the maximum likelihood method from the marginal distributions with parametric
assumptions of each copula function (Trivedi and Zimmer, 2007). An appropriate copula is the
one which can best capture the dependence structures of the data. Maximised likelihood values,
Akaike information criteria (AIC) and Bayesian information criteria (BIC) provide guidance on
the selection.24 The parameter estimator is given by




ln c(F̂H,B1(hi), F̂Y,B1(yi); θ), (3.A.9)
where c(.) is the likelihood function of a specific copula.
3.A.5 Entropy balance weighting
The entropy balancing method has a few advantages over the propensity score inverse proba-
bility weighting (PS-IPW). First, the entropy balancing method can “perfectly” balance a set
of moments of the covariate distributions between two groups, while the parametric PS-IPW
methods often fail to jointly balance all the covariate distributions in practice, partly because
of the misspecification of the propensity score. To improve the balance of some covariates, the
PS-IPW method usually needs to sacrifice the balance of the other covariates (Iacus et al., 2012).
Thanks to the perfect balancing with the entropy balancing method, manual balance checking
is no longer necessary. Hence, we do not have to go back and forth between estimating the
propensity score and manually checking the balance of the covariates (Hainmueller, 2012).
In the entropy balancing method, each observation in the control group gets a weight satis-
fying a set of balance constraints set by a researcher a priori (Hainmueller, 2012). Entropy
balancing estimates the weights directly from a potentially large set of balance constraints and
the normalisation and non-negativity constraints. The optimal weights for the control group are
chosen so that they minimise the following entropy distance metric:





24AIC = −2 ∗ ln(likelihood) + 2 ∗K and BIC = −2 ∗ ln(likelihood) + K ∗ ln(K), where K is the number of
parameters of a copula function.
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subject to the following balance and normalisation constraints:
∑
{i|control}
wicri(Xi) = mr with r ∈ {1, ..., R}, (3.A.11)
∑
{i|control}
wi = 1, and (3.A.12)
wi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ (Control). (3.A.13)
Equation (3.A.11) is a set of balance constraints. Equations (3.A.12) and (3.A.13) are the nor-
malisation constraint and the non-negativity constraint respectively. wicri(Xi) = mr in equation
(3.A.11) describes a set of R balance constraints imposed on the moments of the weighted distri-
butions of the covariates in the control group. Each balance constraint equates a certain order
moment of the weighted covariate distributions in the control group to the corresponding mo-
ment of the covariate distributions in the treatment group. As the entropy balancing can balance
the higher order moments of the distributions, the moment constraints can include not only the
mean (first moment), but also the variance (second moment), the skewness (third moment) and
beyond. For example, if we are interested in estimating the weights for balancing the r-th order
moment of a specific covariate, say Xp, we set cri(Xip) = (Xip)
r or cri(Xip) = (Xip − µp)r with
mean µp. The choice of the moment order can vary across the covariates and largely depends on
the researcher’s a priori knowledge about their distribution types. For example, if the covariates
are binary variables, the first order moment balancing is sufficient, while for the case of the vari-
ables that are normally distributed, balancing the first and second order moments is sufficient
to balance their entire distributions.
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Chapter 4
Reviewing the Existing Evidence of the Conditional Cash
Transfer in India on Maternal Healthcare through the Partial
Identification Approach
Abstract
This study re-estimates the causal impacts of a conditional cash transfer programme in India, namely the
Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY), on maternal and child healthcare use. The main goal is to provide new
evidence and to assess the validity of the identification assumptions employed in previous studies on the
JSY, through the conservative partial identification approach. We find that the average treatment effects
estimated under the conditional independence assumption lie outside the bound of the treatment effect
estimated under weaker but more credible assumptions, thereby suggesting that selection bias could not
have been fully controlled for by the observable characteristics, and that the average treatment effects
estimated in the previous studies may have been over- or under-estimated.
JEL codes: I12, I15, I18




The adequate use of healthcare services is an essential factor in successful maternal and child
health outcomes (Campbell and Graham, 2006; Chou et al., 2015; Darmstadt et al., 2009; Scott
and Ronsmans, 2009). However, women in developing countries are often faced with multiple
barriers to accessing health services, and improvements in maternal healthcare access, especially
by poor women, remain inadequate. In India, only 51.2 per cent of women access antenatal care,
and in 2014, only 38.7 per cent gave birth in a health institution (UNICEF, 2018a). In addition,
India has the highest neonatal mortality rate in the world – as of 2015, around 20 per cent (=1.2
million) of global under-five deaths occurred in the country (UNICEF, 2015, 2018b). Promoting
institutional delivery and adequate use of antenatal care is a key method in improving infant
and neonatal mortalities (Lahariya, 2009; Pathak and Mohanty, 2010; Freedman et al., 2007).
However, women’s uptake of maternal care in India has been associated strongly with wealth,
and facilitating the adequate use of maternal care among poor and marginalised women is still
a major challenge (Pathak et al., 2010; Kesterton et al., 2010).
The success of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes in Latin America has led to an
enthusiastically mirrored response in Africa and Asia, and CCT has become one of the most
adopted demand-side programmes to enhance healthcare use (Handa and Davis, 2006; Rawlings
and Rubio, 2005). CCTs influence health-seeking behaviours through financial incentives by
transferring money to households, contingent on investments in human capital such as health
and education. Interest in using financial incentives to promote maternal and child healthcare
utilisation has also spread to Southern Asia, which has low maternal healthcare use and high
neonatal mortality rates. CCT programmes intending to encourage maternity and child health-
care use have been introduced in India, Nepal and Bangladesh (Devadasan et al., 2008).1
On 12 April 2005, the Indian government launched a nationwide CCT programme called Janani
Suraksha Yojana (JSY), or the ‘Safe Motherhood Programme’, to promote institutional delivery
and the receipt of timely antenatal and postnatal care, in order to reduce infant and neonatal
mortalities (Horton, 2010; Bhutta et al., 2010). The JSY has become one of the largest cash
1Pakistan and Cambodia also introduced a voucher-type programme with the same aims as the CCTs in South
Asia (Jehan et al., 2012; Van de Poel et al., 2014).
140
transfer programmes in the world in terms of the number of beneficiaries. It provides a cash
incentive to mothers that give birth in government-approved health facilities2, and in this sense,
it has a much narrower aim than most of the CCTs in Latin America, which have multiple goals
beyond maternal and child healthcare. Funded by central government, the JSY is administered
through the National Rural Health Mission. In 2014-2015, 10.4 million women benefited from
the scheme, representing a third of all women giving birth in the country annually (Ministry of
Health and Family Welfare, 2015).
Evidence in most previous studies has largely relied on inappropriate data or potentially un-
tenable identification assumptions, in order to yield a definitive causal impact. Until now, no
study has ever tried to explore the validity of the identification assumptions employed in pre-
vious studies on the JSY. The main goal of this study is to re-estimate the causal impact of
JSY participation on maternal and child healthcare use, with weaker but more credible identi-
fication assumptions than used in previous studies. Specifically, we non-parametrically identify
the average treatment effect (ATE) by bounds. The partial identification approach abandons
point identification with strong assumptions and instead seeks causal effects with much more
credible assumptions (Manski, 1990, 1997; Manski and Pepper, 2000). In this sense, the partial
identification approach yields more conservative results.
In this study, we perform inference under a spectrum of assumptions of varying identification
power, following the approach taken by Gundersen et al. (2012, 2017); Gonzalez (2005); Gerfin
and Schellhorn (2006) and Kreider et al. (2012). Any point-estimate obtained under the conven-
tionally imposed strong assumptions should lie within the bounds, if these assumptions are valid.
In this study, we show that the causal impacts based on the assumptions employed in previous
studies are larger/smaller than the upper/lower limits of the ATE bounds, thus suggesting that
the existing evidence could have been over- or under-estimated.
4.1.2 Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY)
In the JSY scheme, women of 19 years of age and above are eligible for a cash benefit if they
have a below-the-poverty-line card issued by the government, or if they belong to a scheduled
caste or tribe. They can receive 600 Indian rupees in urban areas and 700 rupees in rural areas
2This includes public hospitals and accredited private institutions.
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Table 4.1: Differences in eligibility and cash transfer size between HPSs and LPSs
High performing states (HPSs) Low performing states (LPSs)
Eligibility
Marginalised women who gives birth in a All women who gives birth in a public facility.
public facility for their first two live births.
Women need to have a below-the-poverty-line
card or belong to a scheduled caste/tribe.
Cash transfer size
600 rupees in urban areas 1,000 rupees in urban areas
700 rupees in rural areas 1,400 rupees in rural areas
Note: This eligibility criteria and cash transfer amounts began to be applied after November 2006.
after the delivery of their first two live births in a public health facility. The JSY does not cover
the actual cost of institutional delivery and maternal healthcare. The basic JSY scheme used to
be the same across the country, but after November 2006, different eligibility criteria and cash
transfer amounts began to be applied in ten states with high levels of maternal mortality and
low levels of institutional delivery (i.e. Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya
Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Assam, Rajasthan, Odisha and Jammu and Kashmir) (Bredenkamp,
2009). In these ten low-performing states (LPSs), the JSY provides a cash incentive to all
women regardless of age, numbers of children or socio-economic status. In other words, every
woman who gives birth in a public facility is eligible to receive a cash benefit. Moreover, in
the LPSs, a higher cash incentive is provided, namely 1,000 rupees in urban areas and 1,400
rupees in rural areas.3 In other states that are classified as high-performing states (HPSs), the
original eligibility criteria, as well as the same cash incentives for pregnant mothers, continue
to be applied. The differences between HPSs and LPSs are summarised in Table 4.1. The left
panel of Figure 4.1 illustrates the HPSs and LPSs in the country, and the right panel of Figure
4.1 shows JSY participation rates among women who gave birth between 2010 and 2016 across
the states.
The JSY addresses both the demand and the supply constraints of maternal healthcare services,
i.e. it also has a supply-side component, in which community-level health workers are given
incentive payments for encouraging pregnant women to give birth in official health facilities.
Community-level health workers, known as ‘accredited social health activists’, are the first and
3This is around 8-12 paid days off from minimum wage manual labour (Joshi and Sivaram, 2014).
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Figure 4.1: State types and JSY participation rates in 2010-16
Source: Author’s calculation from the National Family Health Survey.
Note: LPS=Low-performing state; and HPS=High-performing state. The left panel illustrates the HPSs and
LPSs in the country, and the right panel shows the participation rates of the JSY across the states.
most important point of contact for pregnant women – they identify and register all pregnant
women, assist them in developing their birth plans and arrange the JSY for them. Accredited
social health activists are given additional cash incentives to encourage mothers to complete
postnatal care. Cash incentives given to health workers are intended to reduce absenteeism and
enhance their overall performance.
4.2 Related literature
4.2.1 Evidence of the impacts of the JSY on maternal healthcare use
The positive impacts of CCTs in Latin America on maternal healthcare utilisation are reported
by numerous studies (Ranganathan and Lagarde, 2012; Barber and Gertler, 2010; Morris et al.,
2004). For systematic literature reviews of the CCT programme, see Glassman et al. (2013);
Lagarde et al. (2007); Bassett (2008) and Gaarder et al. (2010). In Mexico and El Salvador,
for example, birth attendance by skilled personnel increased by 11.4 percentage points and 12.3
percentage points, respectively, (Urquieta et al., 2009; de Brauw and Peterman, 2011). However,
different from CCTs with much broader aims beyond maternal healthcare, studies on those with
narrower aims, such as the JSY, are relatively sparse. Most of the existing literature has explored
the descriptive associations between JSY receipt and healthcare use and health (Gupta et al.,
2012, 2011; Thongkong et al., 2017; Randive et al., 2014, 2013; Mukherjee and Singh, 2018; Puro-
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hit et al., 2014; Ng et al., 2014; Gopalan and Varatharajan, 2012), while studies estimating the
causal impacts of the JSY are rather limited, mainly because the rigorous randomised controlled
trial (RCT) designed for the evaluation of the programme was not conducted in India (Joshi and
Sivaram, 2014).
Lim et al. (2010) is the first seminal study to estimate the causal impact of JSY from the
observational data. Specifically, Lim et al. (2010) estimate the causal impacts on institutional
delivery, use of antenatal care, using the individual-level and district-level data. According to
their estimates with matching, the JSY increases institutional deliveries by 43.5 percentage points
and skilled birth attendance by 36.6 percentage points. In addition, they report a significant
increase in the use of antenatal care by 10.7 percentage points.
After the study by Lim et al. (2010), a number of studies extended the analysis by explor-
ing heterogeneity in the average treatment effect (ATE) across the population and estimating
the impacts on the use of various healthcare services (Carvalho et al., 2014). Major research into
the causal effects of the JSY are listed in Table 4.2. As well as the increase in maternal health-
care utilisation, reductions in neonatal mortality and increases in the use of child healthcare are
reported by Sengupta and Sinha (2018), who estimate causal impacts by employing the inverse
probability weighting regression approach. In addition, improvements in the mental health of
beneficiary mothers (Powell-Jackson et al., 2016), breastfeeding and further pregnancies (Powell-
Jackson et al., 2015; Nandi and Laxminarayan, 2016) are reported as additional – unintended –
benefits.
Most studies exploit the second and the third waves of the District Level Household and Fa-
cility Survey (DLHS-2 and DLHS-3), data for which were collected in 2002-2004 and 2007-2008.
The DLHS-2 was conducted before the JSY was launched, and DLHS-3 was conducted in the
initial stage of JSY’s implementation. Despite the introduction of JSY in 2005, its proper imple-
mentation actually started in 2007 (Das et al., 2011). Das et al. (2011) argues that in DLHS-3,
many women who gave birth before 2007 were misclassified as JSY beneficiaries, and only a
smaller proportion of women knew about the programme itself at that time. Also, during the
first few years of the implementation, many institutions were not adequately prepared for ma-
ternal and child healthcare (Gopichandran and Chetlapalli, 2012). As such, it turned out that
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the DLHS-3 was not appropriate for causal analysis, and we had to wait for new data to become
available in order to estimate the causal effect of the JSY programme.
Recently, Rahman and Pallikadavath (2017) and Rahman and Pallikadavath (2018) have re-
estimated the impact of the JSY with the latest wave of the DLHS (DLHS-4), which was imple-
mented in 2013-2014 when JSY had matured enough to be known by almost all pregnant women.
Rahman and Pallikadavath (2017) estimated the impacts of the JSY on various healthcare util-
isations with propensity score matching (PSM). Rahman and Pallikadavath (2018) additionally
estimated the impacts with the fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD), which exploits
changes of eligibility for the JSY programme with birth orders in HPSs.
4.2.2 Identification assumptions in previous studies
Most of the existing literature that uses individual-level data relies on strong assumptions in order
to point-identify the ATE. Previous studies on the JSY imposed the conditional independence
assumption (CIA), requiring that, conditional on specific observable characteristics, the selection
of the treatment is random (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).4 Methods based on the CIA do not
assume the possibility that unobserved differences between participants and non-participants are
associated with difference in outcomes. However, participation in the JSY programme is likely
to be dependent on individual unobservable characteristics that could also affect healthcare use,
such as the degree of being risk-averse. Also, participants in the JSY may be more aware of the
importance of maternal healthcare use and the potential risk of delivery at home. If the receipt
of the JSY is related to such unobservable characteristics, the approaches based on the CIA still
suffer selection bias and fail to estimate the causal impact.
Joshi and Sivaram (2014) estimated the intention-to-treat effect to deal with selection prob-
lems that had not been properly addressed, using the eligibility criteria, but we should note that
the intention-to-treat effect (ITT) is conceptually different from the treatment effects explored in
other literature (Table 4.2). The district-level difference-in-differences (DID) is employed in Lim
et al. (2010) and Powell-Jackson et al. (2015), but the effect identified with the district-level DID
is also conceptually different from the ATEs identified in other studies that rely on individual-
level data (Table 4.2). As the district-level DID exploits variations in the roll-out of the JSY, it
4A notable exception is Powell-Jackson et al. (2016), who collected their own data and exploited the fact that










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































estimates the effect of percentage point changes in the JSY coverage rate on the probability of
healthcare use, not the effect of JSY participation itself. Hence, in this study, we do not consider
the ITT or the district-level DID.
The fuzzy RDD can deal with individual unobservable characteristics, but the estimate is lo-
cal in the sense that it is the impact among those who have a value for the running variable
near the cut-off value (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). Hence, it is often difficult to extrapolate the
impact for the entire population from the estimated results for the the sub-population. Rahman
and Pallikadavath (2018) use the birth order (parity) as a running variable and exploit the gap in
the probability of participating in the programme between mothers having one and two children
and mothers having three to seven children. However, the parity itself is highly likely to be
endogenous, so the observed discontinuity in the probability of programme participation could
be invalid as an exogenous source of identification.
In contrast to the existing literature, this study takes a totally different approach. Rather than
relying on strong and yet questionable assumptions, to achieve point-identification of the causal
impact, we impose just weak but credible identification assumptions to find the bound estima-
tion of the causal effect (Manski, 1990). The partial identification approach highlights what may
be learned from the data without invoking potentially untenable assumptions (Manski, 2003,
2013). By gradually adding assumptions, we explore how much we can narrow the estimated
bounds. The partial identification approach is very useful in a situation in which a rigorous
RCT has not been implemented – and hence valid instrumental variables to deal with possible
endogeneity are not available to researchers. The partial identification approach has been applied
to various topics in microeconomics, such as labour (Lee, 2009; Gonzalez, 2005; Blundell et al.,
2007), crime (Manski, 2013; Manski and Nagin, 1998), education (Ginther, 2000; Huber et al.,
2017) and health (Gerfin and Schellhorn, 2006; Gundersen et al., 2017, 2012; Kreider et al., 2012).
The identification assumptions employed in the existing literature have not been sufficiently
justified or assessed. In this study, we first re-estimate the causal impacts of the JSY with the
DLHS-4, closely following the approaches taken by Rahman and Pallikadavath (2018), Lim et al.
(2010) and Sengupta and Sinha (2018), which all rely on the CIA. We then estimate the bounds
of ATE through the partial identification approach and compare the point-identified impacts
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with the bound-identified impacts, in order to assess the validity of the assumptions used by
their respective studies.
4.3 Data
4.3.1 District Level Household and Facility Survey (DLHS)
We use the latest wave of the District Level Household and Facility Survey (DLHS-4), which
was conducted in 2013-2014 when the JSY had been rolled out across the country and matured
somewhat (Rahman and Pallikadavath, 2017, 2018). As such, the DLHS-4 does not suffer the
data contamination problem that is found in DLHS-3 (Das et al., 2011). The DLHS-4 covers the
18 HPSs5 and three high-performing union states.6 The DLHS-4 is a representative survey only
at the district level, and it collects data only in HPSs, so this study only focuses on the HPSs.
We complement our findings in HPSs by proving additional evidence in LPSs using another
latest set of survey data, namely the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-4), in which data
were collected also from LPSs, though the sample sizes are much smaller. Results for LPSs are
discussed in section 4.A.1 in Appendix 4.A.
4.3.2 Outcomes
This study estimates the impacts on the following eight maternal and child healthcare utilisations.
First, we estimate the impacts on (1) giving birth at health institutions7, which is the primary
target outcome of the JSY programme and (2) skilled birth attendance. We also estimate the
impacts on using (3) antenatal care (ANC) at least once, (4) ANC three times or more, (5)
postnatal care (PNC) for mothers, (6) PNC for babies, (7) iron and folic acid (IFA) tablets/syrup
during pregnancy and (8) tetanus toxoid (TT) injections to prevent babies from getting tetanus
after birth.
4.3.3 Covariates for the point-identification
In order to make our results comparable as much as possible with those in the existing literature,
we control for the individual- and household-level confounding factors, closely following Rahman
and Pallikadavath (2018). As factors reflecting demographic and socio-economic characteristics,
5Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Haryana, Himachal, Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra,
Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, Tripura and West Bengal.
6Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Chandigarh and Puducherry.
7Health institution herein includes both the public and the private health sector.
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we control for below-the-poverty-line card ownership, maternal age, a residential location (ur-
ban/rural) and a birth order (parity). A Hindu dummy variable is used to reflect individual
socio-cultural backgrounds. Other religions (e.g. Islam, Christianity, Sikhism, Buddhism) are
benchmark groups. In addition, we use dummy variables for the scheduled castes and tribes.
Scheduled castes/tribes are the most socially disadvantaged groups, members of which have suf-
fered the greatest burden of social and economic segregation and deprivation (Chitnis, 1997). We
control for parental educational levels, measured by the number of education years. Household
wealth is captured through a composite index of relative standards of living.8
4.3.4 Sample selection
In this study, we focus only on women aged between 15 and 49 who gave birth in the five
years prior to the survey, so that all of those analysed in this study gave birth after the proper
implementation of the JSY. We restrict our attention to the most recent birth of each woman and
exclude women who participated in programmes for childbirth other than the JSY. The DLHS-4
has 84,266 observations. After dropping observations with missing information9, our sample size
becomes 67,595. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4.3.
4.4 Methods
4.4.1 Notations
Let Y = {0, 1} be an indicator for observed healthcare utilisation. Y becomes 1 if a woman
uses a healthcare service. D = {0, 1} is an indicator for participation in the JSY, and it equals
1 for those who participated in the JSY programme, and 0 otherwise. Following Rubin (1974),
we assume that each individual has two potential outcomes, namely Y0 in the absence of the
treatment and Y1 in the presence of the treatment. They are latent, in the sense that we
can only observe one of them for each person, but never both. What is actually observed for
8Following Rahman and Pallikadavath (2018), we derive the wealth index by applying the principal component
analysis over various household characteristics. They are cooking fuel, house type, number of dwelling rooms,
electricity, house ownership, landholding, radio, television, computer, internet, telephone, mobile phone, washing
machine, refrigerator, sewing machine, watch, bicycle, motorcycle, car, tractor, tube well, cart and air cooler.
9We dropped 27 observations because of the missing information about below-the-poverty-line card ownership.
We dropped 82 and two observations that did not have information about caste and religion, respectively. In total,
2,916 observations were then dropped because of missing information about parity. We dropped 79 observations and
13,171 observations because they did not have information about maternal and parental educational backgrounds,
respectively. We dropped eight observations with missing information about household wealth. Lastly, we dropped
386 observations with missing information about outcomes.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics for the DLHS-4
Non-participants Participants
mean mean
Institutional delivery 0.82 0.95
Skilled birth attendance 0.89 0.97
Antenatal care at least once 0.87 0.96
Antenatal care (≥ 3 times) 0.70 0.81
Postnatal care for mother 0.64 0.72
Postnatal care for baby 0.78 0.83
Iron and folic acid (IFA) supplement 0.68 0.82
Tetanus toxoid (TT) injection 0.83 0.93
Below the poverty line card 0.30 0.46
Scheduled caste 0.77 0.75
Scheduled tribe 0.16 0.19
Rural 0.56 0.67
Birth order (parity) 2.01 1.78
Hindu 0.67 0.69
Maternal age 27.23 26.05
Maternal education years 9.81 9.23





Y = DY1 + (1−D)Y0. (4.1)
The causal impact of the JSY for individual j ∈ J is Y1j − Y0j , and we are interested in the
average treatment effect (ATE), which is defined by ATE ≡ P (Y1 = 1) − P (Y0 = 1). Theo-
retically, the ATE ranges from -1 to +1 and has a width of 2. Let X be observed individual
characteristics, which determine Y and D.
Using the law of total probability, we can express P (Y1 = 1) and P (Y0 = 1) as
P (Y1 = 1) = P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)P (D = 1) + P (Y1 = 1|D = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unobservable
P (D = 0) (4.2)
P (Y0 = 1) = P (Y0 = 1|D = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unobservable
P (D = 1) + P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)P (D = 0), (4.3)
where P (Y1 = 1|D = 0) is the counterfactual probability that untreated women would use a
healthcare service under the treatment, and P (Y0 = 1|D = 1) is the counterfactual probability
that treated women would use a healthcare service if they had not been treated. P (Y1 = 1|D = 1),
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P (Y0 = 1|D = 0), P (D = 1) and P (D = 0) are immediately identifiable from the distribution of
the observed data, but P (Y1 = 1|D = 0) and P (Y0 = 1|D = 1) are unobservable, which makes
the ATE unidentifiable without further assumptions.
4.4.2 Point-identification with the independence assumption
Researchers must impose assumptions regarding P (Y1 = 1|D = 0) and P (Y0 = 1|D = 1), in order
to identify the ATE. For example, if we assume that participation in the treatment is random,
we can point-identify the ATE from the observed distribution. This assumption is called the
‘independence assumption’ and can be expressed as
P (Y1 = 1|D = 0) = P (Y1 = 1|D = 1) (4.4)
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0) = P (Y0 = 1|D = 1). (4.5)
The ATE is point-identified by ATE = P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)−P (Y0 = 1|D = 0). This independence
assumption is valid under the rigorous RCTs, without which it is usually too stringent. Another
identification assumption that is conventionally imposed in the policy evaluation literature is the
conditional independence assumption (CIA) in which participation in the treatment is assumed
to be random, conditional on the observable characteristics X. The CIA is formalised by
P (Y1 = 1|D = 0, X) = P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, X) (4.6)
P (Y0 = 1|D = 1, X) = P (Y0 = 1|D = 1, X). (4.7)
For example, evaluations with the multivariate regression approach and the propensity score
matching approach are based on this assumption (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009; Abadie and
Cattaneo, 2018). Although the CIA itself cannot be tested by the data, this assumption can
be untenable in many cases. If the decision to participate in the programme is dependent on
unobservable characteristics that can affect outcomes, the CIA fails, resulting in a biased causal
effect estimate.
In this study, we point-estimate the ATEs by (1) mean comparison between the participants and
non-participants, which we call ‘Independence’, (2) multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression, (3) propensity score matching (PSM), (4) OLS regression with inverse probability
weighting adjustment (IPW+OLS), (5) nearest neighbourhood matching (NNM), (6) entropy
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Table 4.4: Point-identification approaches and assumptions
Method Short name Assumption
Mean comparison Independence Exogenous/independent treatment assignment
Multivariate OLS Conditional independence;
linear regression Outcome linear functional-from;
Additive linearity of the treatment
status and the unobservable;
Same treatment effect for all individuals
Propensity PSM Conditional independence;
score matching Propensity score functional-form
Nearest neighbour matching NNM Conditional independence
OLS adjusted with the IPW+OLS Conditional independence
inverse probability weighting
Entropy balance weighting EBW Conditional independence
Regression discontinuity RDD Exogenous discontinuity in the probability of
design the JSY participation at birth order two
balance weighting (EBW) and (7) fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD). Their key as-
sumptions are summarised in Table 4.4.
The mean comparison between participants and non-participants rests on the independence as-
sumption, and the OLS, PSM, IPW+OLS, NNM and EBW approaches rest on the CIA. Some
also rely on functional form assumptions; for example, the OLS assumes that the treatment
variable and the error term are additively separated and the treatment effect is identical for
everyone. The PSM and IPW+OLS rely on the functional form assumption of the propensity
score. The EBW non-parametrically balances the moments of the covariate distributions, the
algorithm of which is explained in the Appendix 4.B.1.
For fuzzy RDD, we also closely follow the approach taken by Rahman and Pallikadavath (2018),
which exploits JSY eligibility, i.e. mothers who are eligible for the JSY up to their second live
birth. The eligibility change of JSY at birth order two was exploited as a source of identification.
Following Rahman and Pallikadavath (2018), we first run an OLS regression of the JSY dummy
variable on z1 = 1{parity ≤ 2}, z2 = z1 ∗ (parity− 2), z3 = (parity− 2) and the other covariates
as the first-stage OLS regression, where z1 and z2 are excluded instruments. Using the predicted
value of the JSY dummy variable, we estimate the causal impact of JSY in the second-stage OLS
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regression.
The DLHS is repeated cross-sectional data. If longitudinal data were available, we could possibly
employ the fixed effect (FE) model, which deals with the situation where individual unobservable
and time-invariant characteristics influence treatment selection. However, the FE model is less
appealing for the study on maternal healthcare, because it is not realistic to assume that the
degree of risk-aversion is time-invariable; it can change as mothers experience more childbearing.
For example, the motivation to join the JSY programme for primiparity can be different from
the one for the second or third childbirth. In this study, we do not consider the individual-level
DID approach either, mainly for two reasons. First, the JSY is a nationwide programme, which
makes it difficult to set up the control group, and second, we have gaps of more than 10 years
between data collection before and after JSY implementation; the DLHS-2 was conducted in
2002-2004. The long periods between the waves could substantially deteriorate the credibility of
common-trend assumption that is essential for the DID.
4.4.3 Partial identification assumptions
In essence, partial identification first estimates sharp bounds for P (Y1 = 1) and P (Y0 = 1) and
then constructs a sharp bound of ATE. A sharp bound is defined as the narrowest bound that can
be obtained under the maintained assumptions regarding the unobservable distribution. When
the bound of P (Yt = 1) is (LBt, UBt), the ATE bound is defined as
(LB1 − UB0) ≤ ATE ≤ (UB1 − LB0). (4.8)
Note that first, the ATE bound is conceptually different from the confidence interval of the point-
estimated ATE. The width of the ATE bound reflects the identification power of the imposed
assumptions. In addition, bound width indicates tension between the strength of assumptions
and their credibility (Manski, 2007), and it does not change when sample sizes change. On the
other hand, the width of confidence interval for the point-identified ATE reflects the uncertainty
of sampling variability, which does vary when sample sizes change. We discuss the uncertainty
of sampling variability for the ATE bound in section 4.4.5. In this study, unless otherwise indi-
cated, we use the term ‘bound’ to denote an ATE bound of partial identification, and use the
term ‘interval’ to indicate a confidence interval.
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Second, as the partial identification approach does not assume that participation in the treat-
ment is random and conditional on the covariates, there is no specific need to condition on a long
list of covariates. Hence, the partial identification approach is not susceptible to criticisms of
omitted variable bias (Manski and Nagin, 1998). Splitting the sample by a covariate to explore
heterogeneity across the population is also possible for partial identification as well, but in this
study we do not implement sample splitting.
No assumptions (Worst-case)
First, as a benchmark, we specify a range of P (Y1 = 1|D = 0) and P (Y0 = 1|D = 1) to
construct a bound for P (Y1 = 1) and P (Y0 = 1), without imposing any assumption regarding
the counterfactual probabilities. Since P (Y1 = 1|D = 0) and P (Y0 = 1|D = 1) are probabilities,
they necessarily belong to [0,1], so the bounds of P (Y1 = 1) and P (Y0 = 1) are given from
equations (4.2) and (4.3) by
P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)P (D = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
LB1
≤ P (Y1 = 1) ≤ P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)P (D = 1) + P (D = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
UB1
(4.9)
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)P (D = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
LB0
≤ P (Y0 = 1) ≤ P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)P (D = 0) + P (D = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
UB0
. (4.10)
In equation (4.9), the lower bound of P (Y1 = 1) is attained if all non-participants would have
used the healthcare had they participated in the JSY. The upper bound of P (Y1 = 1) is attained
if all non-participants would have had no healthcare had they participated in the JSY. The
bound width of P (Y1 = 1) is P (D = 0). The bounds of P (Y0 = 1) in equation (4.10) can be
interpreted in the same fashion, and bound width is P (D = 1). The sharp bound of ATE can
be obtained via equation (4.8) (Manski, 1990):
P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)P (D = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
LB1
−{P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)P (D = 0) + P (D = 1)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
UB0
≤ ATE (4.11)
≤ {P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)P (D = 1) + P (D = 0)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
UB1
−P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)P (D = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
LB0
.
This bound is the narrowest sharp band that can be inferred from the data alone, which is often
called a ‘worst-case’ bound. Note that even without any assumption about unobserved probabil-
ities, the data alone tighten the theoretical width of ATE to half, if the support of the outcome
variable is bounded (Manski, 1989). It is known that without any identification assumption,
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Table 4.5: Partial-identification assumptions
Assumption Implication
Monotone treatment Individuals do not participate in the programme that makes them
response (MTR) worse-off with respect to the outcome.
Positive/negative The treated are more/less likely to have the healthcare
monotone treatment than the non-treated both in the presence and
selection (MTS) absence of the treatment.
Monotone instrumental Eligible people are less likely to have healthcare
variable (MIV) conditional on the treatment than ineligible women.
the bound on the ATE in equation (4.11) always has a width of 1 and includes 0. Hence, with-
out additional assumptions, we cannot evaluate the sign of the treatment effect on healthcare
use. Next, we consider three assumptions: (i) the monotone treatment response (MTR), (ii) the
monotone treatment selection (MTS) and (iii) the monotone instrumental variable (MIV). The
key implications of each assumption are summarised in Table 4.5.
Monotone treatment response
Second, we assume that individuals do not select a treatment that would make them worse
off with respect to maternal and child healthcare use. This assumption is called the ‘mono-
tone treatment response’ (MTR) assumption and it implies that, ceteris paribus, response varies
monotonically with treatment (Manski, 1997).
Formally, the MTR assumes that for all individual j ∈ J , Y0j ≤ Y1j . We obtain the new
bounds for P (Y1 = 1|D = 0) and P (Y0 = 1|D = 1) as follows:
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0) ≤ P (Y1 = 1|D = 0) ≤ 1 (4.12)
0 ≤ P (Y0 = 1|D = 1) ≤ P (Y1 = 1|D = 1). (4.13)
We observe shrinkage in the counterfactual probability bounds. For P (Y1 = 1|D = 0), while the
bound of this counterfactual probability in the worst-case ranges from 0 to 1, its new range under
the MTR assumption ranges from P (Y0 = 1|D = 0) to 1. Also, the new range of P (Y0 = 1|D = 1)
under the MTR assumption runs from 0 to P (Y1 = 1|D = 1). The following bounds of P (Y1 = 1)
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and P (Y0 = 1) can be obtained from equations (4.1) and (4.3):
P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)P (D = 1) + P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)P (D = 0)
= P (Y = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Updated LB1
≤ P (Y1 = 1) (4.14)
≤ P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)P (D = 1) + P (D = 0)
and
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)P (D = 0)
≤ P (Y0 = 1) (4.15)
≤ P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)P (D = 1) + P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)P (D = 0)
= P (Y = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Updated UB0
,
where the lower bound of P (Y1 = 1) and the upper bound of P (Y0 = 1) in the worst-case scenario
are both replaced by P (Y = 1). Via equation (4.8), it follows
0 ≤ ATE ≤ {P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)P (D = 1) + P (D = 0)} − P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)P (D = 0). (4.16)
Under the MTR assumption, the lower bound of ATE becomes 0. Therefore, the MTR assump-
tion precludes a non-negative ATE and assumes away the possibility of the detrimental impact
of the JSY. In other words, the MTR assumes that the JSY programme would never decrease
the likelihood of receiving healthcare. The MTR assumption, however, leaves open the question
of whether the programme has a strong beneficial effect, a mild beneficial effect or no effect at
all (Gundersen et al., 2017).
In general, the credibility of the MTR assumption depends on the type of policy we are analysing.
As the MTR assumes the sign of the treatment effect, the MTR assumption can be admittedly
too stringent in the case where we have no clue at all regarding the sign of the ATE a priori.
However, in the context of the JSY programme, it is unlikely that a mother does not use the
healthcare service when she is treated and does use the service when she is untreated, because
the accredited social health activists, who support pregnant mothers in the JSY programme,
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encourage women to receive timely maternal and child healthcare. Furthermore, they encourage
women to undergo three antenatal cares and to give birth in a health institution. They also
assist pregnant women to obtain tetanus toxoid injections and iron/folic acid supplements. The
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare also states, in their guidelines for the implementation of
JSY, that all pregnant mothers should receive at least three ANCs. Therefore, it is reasonable
to presume that the JSY programme will not decrease healthcare use.
Monotone treatment selection
Third, we make an assumption on the selection mechanism through which women participate in
the JSY. Specifically, we make an assumption as to whether or not individuals participating in the
JSY programme are more likely to use maternal and child healthcare services on average, condi-
tional on the treatment assignment. This assumption is called the ‘monotone treatment selection’
(MTS) assumption (Manski and Pepper, 2000) and sounds similar to the MTR assumption, but
they are different, although not mutually exclusive. In contrast to the MTR assumption, which
is on individual-level potential behaviours, the MTS assumption is on expected probability. The
MTS can be regarded as the weaker version of the independence assumption, whereby equalities
in equations (4.4) and (4.5) are weakened to the point of becoming inequalities. There are two
types of MTS assumption, namely positive MTS and negative MTS, and they make different
assumptions regarding the direction of the selection bias.
(i) Positive MTS: When we assume that mothers participating in the JSY are likely to use no
fewer healthcare services on average than non-participants, conditional on treatment assignment,
this assumption is called the ‘positive MTS assumption’. It is plausible in situations where risk-
averse women are more likely to participate in the JSY and use healthcare services than women
with lower degrees thereof, and/or where women in socially and economically segregated ethnic
groups know less about the JSY. The positive MTS assumption is formalised as follows:
0 ≤ P (Y1 = 1|D = 0) ≤ P (Y1 = 1|D = 1) (4.17)
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0) ≤ P (Y0 = 1|D = 1) ≤ 1. (4.18)
Note that in equations (4.17) and (4.18), the MTS assumes only the direction of the selection
bias, and it does not assume its strength. The positive MTS assumption lowers the upper bound
of P (Y1 = 1|D = 0) in the worst-case, from 1 to P (Y1 = 1|D = 1), and raises the lower bound of
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P (Y0 = 1|D = 1) in the worst-case, from 0 to P (Y0 = 1|D = 0).
The new sharp bounds of P (Y1 = 1) and P (Y0 = 1) can then be obtained from equations
(4.2) and (4.3) as follows (Manski and Pepper, 2000):
P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)P (D = 1) ≤ P (Y1 = 1) ≤ P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Updated UB1
(4.19)
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Updated LB0
≤ P (Y0 = 1) ≤ P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)P (D = 0) + P (D = 1). (4.20)
Compared with their bounds in the worst-case scenario, the upper bound of P (Y1 = 1) has
become smaller and the lower bound of P (Y0 = 1) has become larger. The sharp bound of ATE
is given via the equation (4.8) and it is
P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)P (D = 1)− {P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)P (D = 0) + P (D = 1)}
≤ ATE (4.21)
≤ P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)− P (Y0 = 1|D = 0).
We find that, compared with the worst-case ATE bound in equation (4.11), the upper bound in
equation (4.21) has become smaller. It is easy to show that the upper bound of ATE under the
MTS assumption corresponds to the ATE estimated under the independence assumption (see
the note in the Appendix 4.B.2), which implies that the upper bound of ATE is achieved when
there exists no selection bias regarding participation in the JSY.
(ii) Negative MTS: If we anticipate that mothers who had the greater difficulty in using
healthcare services had higher motivation to participate in the JSY, or they were more strongly
encouraged by the accredited social health activists to participate in the JSY, it may be more
appropriate to assume that mothers participating in the JSY are likely to use no more health-
care services on average than non-participants. This assumption is called the ‘negative MTS
assumption’, which is formalised as follows:
P (Y1 = 1|D = 1) ≤ P (Y1 = 1|D = 0) ≤ 1 (4.22)
0 ≤ P (Y0 = 1|D = 1) ≤ P (Y0 = 1|D = 0). (4.23)
The negative MTS assumption raises the worst-case upper bound of P (Y1 = 1|D = 0) from 0
to P (Y1 = 1|D = 1) and lowers the worst-case lower bound of P (Y0 = 1|D = 1) from 1 to
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P (Y0 = 1|D = 0). The bounds of P (Y1 = 1) and P (Y0 = 1) become
P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Updated LB1
≤ P (Y1 = 1) ≤ P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)P (D = 1) + P (D = 0) (4.24)
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)P (D = 0) ≤ P (Y0 = 1) ≤ P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Updated UB0
. (4.25)
The sharp bound of ATE is given via equation (4.8) and is
P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)− P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)
≤ ATE (4.26)
≤ {P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)P (D = 1) + P (D = 0)} − P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)P (D = 0).
We find that, compared with the worst-case bound in equation (4.11), the lower bound of the
ATE in equation (4.26) has become larger. Also, this bound shows that the lower bound of ATE
under the negative MTS assumption corresponds to the ATE estimated under the independence
assumption, which implies that the lower bound of ATE is achieved only when there exists no
selection bias regarding the participation in the JSY (see the note in the Appendix 4.B.2).
In general, sources of selection bias are multiple. The ultimate direction of the selection mech-
anism is expected to vary across the outcomes, but moreover, in essence, there is no definitive
way to examine the sources of selection bias and the direction of this bias. However, we can find
a clue by comparing the size of the ATE estimated under the independence assumption and the
one estimated under the CIA. When the ATE under the independence assumption is larger than
that under the CIA, it implies the existence of positive selection bias, part of which is removed by
controlling for covariates. On the other hand, when the difference between the ATEs is negative,
it suggests the existence of negative selection bias. We infer the sign of selection bias for each
outcome, and then we impose either a positive or a negative MTS assumption accordingly.
Monotone instrumental variable
The last assumption we consider is the monotone instrumental variable (MIV) assumption (Man-
ski and Pepper, 2000), which states that the latent probability of having healthcare varies weakly
and monotonically with an observed instrument, v. Different from the standard instrumental
variable approach (Imbens and Angrist, 1994), the MIV assumption does not impose the mean
independence assumption requiring that the latent outcomes are mean-independent of the in-
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strument, namely P (Yt = 1|v = 1) = P (Yt = 1|v = 0) for t ∈ {0, 1}. The instrument v is allowed
to be dependent on the mean of the potential outcome, as long as the direction of its effect is
monotone. Hence, in this sense, the MIV is weaker than the mean independence assumption.
Also, the MIV assumption itself does not impose any assumption regarding the association be-
tween the instrument and the treatment status. Thus, the MIV assumption is not susceptible to
criticisms of weak instruments.
Following Gundersen et al. (2017, 2012)10, we use the non-eligibility status of the JSY as an
instrument. We assume that ineligible women, who tend to be richer, are more likely to use
healthcare services conditional on the treatment than eligible women. This assumption is sup-
ported by the observations in developing countries that poorer women are less likely to use
maternal healthcare services (Pathak et al., 2010; Pathak and Mohanty, 2010; Kesterton et al.,
2010; Balarajan et al., 2011). We discuss the plausibility of our MIV assumption further in
section 4.6.2.
Formally, let v be a binary instrument, and v = 1 indicates that a woman is not eligible for
the JSY. The MIV assumption imposed herein is expressed as
P (Y1 = 1|v = 0) ≤ P (Y1 = 1|v = 1) (4.27)
P (Y0 = 1|v = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Eligible women
≤ P (Y0 = 1|v = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ineligible women
. (4.28)
Note that equations (4.27) and (4.28) are the assumptions on the latent outcomes. The MTS
assumption is a special case of the MIV assumption, in which the participation status itself is
used as an instrument, i.e. v = D.
The MIV assumption gives the following sharp bounds of P (Y1 = 1) and P (Y0 = 1) in equations
10Gundersen et al. (2017, 2012) estimate the ATE bounds of food assistance programmes targeting poor house-
holds in the US on nutritional status.
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(4.29) and (4.30). Their derivations are provided in the Appendix 4.B.3.
P (v = 0)P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 0)P (D = 1|v = 0)
+P (v = 1) max{P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 0)P (D = 1|v = 0), P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 1)P (D = 1|v = 1)}
≤ P (Y1 = 1) (4.29)
≤ P (v = 0) min{P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 0)P (D = 1|v = 0) + P (D = 0|v = 0),
P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 1)P (D = 1|v = 1) + P (D = 0|v = 1)}
+P (v = 1)[P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 1)P (D = 1|v = 1) + P (D = 0|v = 1)]
and
P (v = 0)P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 0)P (D = 0|v = 0)
+P (v = 1) max{P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 0)P (D = 0|v = 0), P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 1)P (D = 0|v = 1)}
≤ P (Y0 = 1) (4.30)
≤ P (v = 0) min{P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 0)P (D = 0|v = 0) + P (D = 1|v = 0),
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 1)P (D = 0|v = 1) + P (D = 1|v = 1)}
+P (v = 1)[P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 1)P (D = 0|v = 1) + P (D = 1|v = 1)].
The sharp bound of the ATE can be obtained by equation (4.8).11 ATE bounds under the MIV
assumption, and those in the worst-case scenario, coincide if the worst-case lower and upper
bounds of P (Yt = 1|v = u) weakly increase with u; in such cases, the MIV assumption has no
identifying power, and the MIV assumption does not make the ATE bounds narrower (Manski
and Pepper, 2000; Richey, 2016).
4.4.4 Joint imposition of partial identification assumptions
We consider the case where we jointly impose the assumptions introduced so far. We add mild
assumptions one by one and see how much each additional assumption can make the ATE bound
11It is known that when we estimate the ATE bound under the MIV assumption with the sample analogue,
the estimate can suffer finite-sample bias, which in turn could potentially make the bound narrower than the true
bound (Manski and Pepper, 2009). Following Jensen’s inequality, the estimated lower bounds are potentially biased
upwards because of their maxima operators, and the estimated upper bounds are potentially biased downwards
because of their minima operators. Details are provided in the Appendix 4.B.4. To address this bias, we implement
a bootstrap-based correction proposed by Kreider and Pepper (2007). This method estimates bias by using the
bootstrap distribution and adjusting the sample analogue estimate in accordance with the estimated bias. For
example, when we have a random sample of size N , let LBN be the sample analogue estimate of the lower bound
in question. We denote Eb(LBN ) as the mean of the estimate from the bootstrap distribution of size b. Bias
is estimated as Eb(LBN ) − LBN , and the bias-corrected estimate is given by LBN − {Eb(LBN ) − LBN} =
2LBN − Eb(LBN ). We correct the bias of the upper bound in the same way. In this study, we estimate bias
with b = 100 bootstrap repetitions. The performance of this method is confirmed by Monte Carlo simulations in
Manski and Pepper (2009).
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narrower. In the context of the JSY programme, the MTR assumption is the most plausi-
ble, followed by the MTS assumption. Lastly, we add the MIV assumption, which seems the
strongest of all three assumptions. Hence, in this study we mainly consider the following two
cases: MTR+MTS and MTR+MTS+MIV.
When we jointly impose different assumptions, we derive the bounds of P (Y1 = 1) and P (Y0 = 1)
under the jointly imposed assumptions, in order to get the ATE bound. ATE bounds’ estimators
and their full derivations are in the Appendix 4.C. For the other combinations, i.e. MTR+MIV
and MTS+MIV, their estimators are also provided in the Appendix 4.D.
4.4.5 Inference of partial identification
Estimating the ATE bounds requires us to consider sampling variabilities. The ATE bounds
introduced so far concern the conclusions that could be drawn under different assumptions if
we were to observe the JSY participation status and outcomes experienced by everyone in the
population. Sampling variability, however, arises when these data are available for only a sample
of the population. We consider sample variability by constructing the confidence intervals for
the bound estimates.
A confidence interval for the bound estimate contains the parameter of interest; however, there
is no consensus on its definition, and related research is still ongoing. When we consider a con-
fidence interval in the partial identification, the question arises as to whether to construct an
interval over the region of identification (Chernozhukov et al., 2007) or over the actual parameter
of interest (Imbens and Manski, 2004).12
We obtain the confidence intervals for the estimated bounds via the method developed by Imbens
and Manski (2004). The confidence intervals defined by Imbens and Manski (2004) asymptoti-
cally cover the true parameter, namely ATE, with a fixed probability, rather than covering the
entire identification region with fixed probability.
Formally, the confidence intervals for parameter θ at the 1 − α level are defined as sets of
the parameters where we cannot reject the null hypothesis that θ is an element of the iden-
12Instead, some studies provide confidence intervals for the upper and lower ATE bounds, respectively (Ginther,
2000).
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tification set, Θ, at the α level. When the estimated lower and upper bounds are [L̂B, ÛB]
and their standard errors are σ̂LB and σ̂UB, 1 − α level confidence intervals of Imbens and
Manski (2004) are constructed as CI1−α ∈ [L̂B − cσ̂LB, ÛB + cσ̂UB], where parameter c solves
Φ(c+ (σ̂UB−σ̂LB)max{σ̂LB ,σ̂UB})− Φ(−c) = 1− α with the Newton-Raphson method. For more details, see
Imbens and Manski (2004). Confidence intervals are obtained by bootstrap with 200 repetitions.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Point-identification
We point-estimate the ATEs by: (1) Independence, (2) OLS, (3) PSM, (4) IPW+OLS, (5) NNM,
(6) EBW and (7) RDD. For these approaches (2)-(7), we use the set of covariates used in Rah-
man and Pallikadavath (2018). Logistic regression is used to estimate the propensity score.13
Table 4.6 shows the estimation results, and we observe that the JSY has positive impacts on all
outcomes (p < 0.01). When we relax the independence assumption and instead impose the CIA,
we find larger effects on institutional delivery, skilled birth attendance, PNC for mothers and
PNC for babies, and smaller effects on ANC at least once, ANC at least three times, iron and
folic acid supplement intakes and tetanus toxoid injections.
The results of the fuzzy RDD approach are shown in Table 4.6. They show the largest ATEs on
all outcomes except PNC for mothers. As is well known, the RDD estimates the ATE among
a sub-population that has been induced to participate in the treatment with the change in in-
strumental variables, and these people are often called ‘compliers’. Hence, an ATE estimated
by RDD can be different from ATEs estimated by other approaches, if compliers are very much
different from the entire sample population (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). The jumps and kinks in
the probability of participating in the programme, and the probability of using healthcare, are
shown in Figure 4.2.
4.5.2 Partial identification
Table 4.7 presents the main result of this study, and it reports changes in the bound estimates
for each outcome as we incrementally tighten the ATE bounds by adding stronger assumptions
one by one. Herein, we consider the following four cases: (1) No assumption, (2) MTR, (3)
13The result for which is available from the author upon request.
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Table 4.6: Point-estimated ATE
Estimates SEs Confidence intervals
Institutional delivery
Independence 0.126*** 0.003 (0.12, 0.132)
OLS 0.129*** 0.003 (0.123, 0.135)
PSM 0.129*** 0.003 (0.123, 0.135)
IPW+OLS 0.132*** 0.003 (0.126, 0.138)
NNM 0.122*** 0.003 (0.116, 0.128)
EBW 0.131*** 0.003 (0.125, 0.137)
RDD 0.19*** 0.037 (0.117, 0.263)
Skilled delivery attendance
Independence 0.081*** 0.002 (0.077, 0.085)
OLS 0.088*** 0.002 (0.084, 0.092)
PSM 0.088*** 0.002 (0.084, 0.092)
IPW+OLS 0.09*** 0.002 (0.086, 0.094)
NNM 0.082*** 0.002 (0.078, 0.086)
EBW 0.094*** 0.002 (0.09, 0.098)
RDD 0.134*** 0.030 (0.075, 0.193)
Antenatal care +1
Independence 0.091*** 0.002 (0.087, 0.095)
OLS 0.079*** 0.003 (0.073, 0.085)
PSM 0.078*** 0.003 (0.072, 0.084)
IPW+OLS 0.08*** 0.003 (0.074, 0.086)
NNM 0.072*** 0.003 (0.066, 0.078)
EBW 0.079*** 0.003 (0.073, 0.085)
RDD 0.139*** 0.035 (0.07, 0.208)
Antenatal care +3
Independence 0.108*** 0.004 (0.1, 0.116)
OLS 0.082*** 0.005 (0.072, 0.092)
PSM 0.07*** 0.006 (0.058, 0.082)
IPW+OLS 0.079*** 0.005 (0.069, 0.089)
NNM 0.075*** 0.006 (0.063, 0.087)
EBW 0.091*** 0.004 (0.083, 0.099)
RDD 0.129*** 0.050 (0.031, 0.227)
Postnatal care for mother
Independence 0.086*** 0.004 (0.078, 0.094)
OLS 0.105*** 0.005 (0.095, 0.115)
PSM 0.094*** 0.006 (0.082, 0.106)
IPW+OLS 0.106*** 0.005 (0.096, 0.116)
NNM 0.102*** 0.006 (0.09, 0.114)
EBW 0.106*** 0.004 (0.098, 0.114)
RDD 0.071 0.051 (-0.029, 0.171)
Postnatal care for baby
Independence 0.054*** 0.004 (0.046, 0.062)
OLS 0.076*** 0.004 (0.068, 0.084)
PSM 0.068*** 0.005 (0.058, 0.078)
IPW+OLS 0.077*** 0.004 (0.069, 0.085)
NNM 0.073*** 0.004 (0.065, 0.081)
EBW 0.071*** 0.004 (0.063, 0.079)
RDD 0.113*** 0.044 (0.027, 0.199)
Iron folic acid supplement intakes
Independence 0.14*** 0.004 (0.132, 0.148)
OLS 0.099*** 0.005 (0.089, 0.109)
PSM 0.091*** 0.006 (0.079, 0.103)
IPW+OLS 0.096*** 0.005 (0.086, 0.106)
NNM 0.085*** 0.006 (0.073, 0.097)
EBW 0.105*** 0.004 (0.097, 0.113)
RDD 0.145*** 0.051 (0.045, 0.245)
Tetanus toxoid injections
Independence 0.099*** 0.003 (0.093, 0.105)
OLS 0.088*** 0.003 (0.082, 0.094)
PSM 0.088*** 0.004 (0.08, 0.096)
IPW+OLS 0.088*** 0.003 (0.082, 0.094)
NNM 0.078*** 0.004 (0.07, 0.086)
EBW 0.09*** 0.003 (0.084, 0.096)
RDD 0.17*** 0.039 (0.094, 0.246)
Source: DLHS-4. Note: Number of observations is 67,595. The choice of covariates follows Rahman and Pallikadavath
(2018). 95% confidence intervals are shown. PSM=Propensity score matching; IPW+OLS=OLS adjusted with propensity
score inverse probability weighting; NNM=Nearest neighbour matching; and EBW=Entropy balance weighting; and
RDD=Regression discontinuity design. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 4.2: Discontinuities in the probabilities of treatment participation and healthcare use at
parity more than two
Source: DLHS-4. Note: ANC=Antenatal care; PNC=Postnatal care; IFA=Iron and folic acid; and TT=tetanus
toxoid.
MTR+MTS and (4) MTR+MTS+MIV. Table 4.7 also reports the confidence intervals for the
respective ATE bound estimates. We observe that the widths of the confidence intervals are just
slightly wider than those of the estimated ATE bounds. Compared with the widths of the bound
estimates, the additional widths due to sampling variability are very small, which is thanks to
the large sample sizes. This suggests that the identification problem is the dominant concern for
inference in relation to the impacts, and sampling variance poses a much less serious problem
for inference (Manski and Nagin, 1998).
Institutional delivery
First, for institutional delivery, in the worst-case scenario where we do not impose any assump-
tion, the lower bound is -0.650 and the upper bound is 0.350. In the worst case, the bound width
is always 1, and the bound always includes 0. This bound just ensures that the true ATE can
never be outside of this bound as long as the ATE is estimated from these data. Although this
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Table 4.7: ATE bounds
Estimates Confidence intervals
Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
Institutional delivery
No assumption −0.652 0.348 −0.654 0.351
MTR 0.000 0.348 0.000 0.351
MTR+MTS 0.126 0.348 0.122 0.351
MTR+MTS+MIV 0.262 0.331 0.255 0.335
Skilled delivery attendance
No assumption −0.702 0.298 −0.705 0.301
MTR 0.000 0.298 0.000 0.301
MTR+MTS 0.081 0.298 0.078 0.301
MTR+MTS+MIV 0.176 0.294 0.170 0.297
Antenatal care +1
No assumption −0.685 0.315 −0.688 0.319
MTR 0.000 0.315 0.000 0.319
MTR+MTS 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.095
MTR+MTS+MIV 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.050
Antenatal care +3
No assumption −0.587 0.413 −0.590 0.417
MTR 0.000 0.413 0.000 0.417
MTR+MTS 0.000 0.108 0.000 0.115
MTR+MTS+MIV 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.029
Postnatal care for mother
No assumption −0.558 0.442 −0.561 0.445
MTR 0.000 0.442 0.000 0.445
MTR+MTS 0.086 0.442 0.078 0.445
MTR+MTS+MIV 0.196 0.430 0.187 0.434
Postnatal care for baby
No assumption −0.644 0.356 −0.647 0.358
MTR 0.000 0.356 0.000 0.358
MTR+MTS 0.054 0.356 0.048 0.358
MTR+MTS+MIV 0.158 0.349 0.150 0.352
Iron folic acid supplement intakes
No assumption −0.570 0.430 −0.573 0.433
MTR 0.000 0.430 0.000 0.433
MTR+MTS 0.000 0.140 0.000 0.146
MTR+MTS+MIV 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.081
Tetanus toxoid injections
No assumption −0.664 0.336 −0.668 0.339
MTR 0.000 0.336 0.000 0.339
MTR+MTS 0.000 0.099 0.000 0.104
MTR+MTS+MIV 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.056
Source: DLHS-4. Note: Number of observations is 67,595. Note: 95% confidence intervals are calculated
following Imbens and Manski (2004) by bootstrap with 200 repetitions.
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bound has a wider negative range, it does not necessarily mean that the ATE is more likely to be
negative. Also, the centre of the bound (-0.15 in this case) is not necessarily the most probable
ATE.
When we impose the MTR assumption, it truncates the lower bound of the ATE at 0, be-
cause the MTR assumes that the ATE is non-negative. We then add the MTS assumption to
the MTR assumption. As the ATE estimated by OLS is larger than the ATE estimated by mean
comparisons, we assume the negative MTS assumption here. Negative selection bias assumes
that individual observable and unobservable characteristics are correlated with participation in
the programme and institutional delivery in the opposite directions. One possible case would be
that richer mothers who seek high-quality healthcare at private hospitals may have lower moti-
vation to participate in the JSY. Imposing the MTS assumption, we find that the lower bound
becomes even larger, from 0 to 0.126. Furthermore, adding the MIV assumption makes the ATE
bound even narrower. The lower bound has become 0.262 and the upper bound has become 0.331.
After adding the MIV assumption, we find that all point-identified ATE estimates are out-
side of the ATE bound. ATEs on institutional delivery and estimated under the CIA are smaller
than the lower ATE bound estimated under the MTR, MTS and MIV assumptions, thereby
suggesting that their maintained assumptions are not compatible with the MTR, MTS and MIV
assumptions used in the partial identification approach.14 This incompatibility occurs because
(1) the CIA is not valid, (2) functional-form assumptions are not correct and/or (3) the MTR,
MTS and MIV assumptions are not valid. The finding that the non-parametric EBW estimate is
outside of the bound implies that regardless of functional-form assumptions, the point-identified
ATE is outside of the ATE bound.
Moreover, as discussed in the previous section, the identification assumptions used for the bound
estimation are supported by empirical and observational evidence. Given that the CIA is hard
to justify for the case of the JSY, it would be reasonable to think that the incompatibility
between assumptions for the point-identification and those for the partial-identification mainly
comes from the possibly unacceptable CIA and/or functional form specification errors.15 Also,
14Strictly speaking, even without the MTR assumption, all the point-identified ATEs are found to be outside of
the bound estimates (see Figure 4.4).
15We estimated the propensity score differently with the probit and linear probability model, but we still obtained
similar results.
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we found that the ATE estimated by the fuzzy RDD is also smaller than the lower bound of
the ATE, which implies that the compliers are very much different from the other populations
and/or the assumption of discontinuity is not valid.
Skilled birth attendance
For skilled birth attendance, in the worst case, the ATE bound runs from -0.702 to 0.298. The
MTR assumption truncates the lower bound at 0. As the ATE estimated by OLS is larger
than the ATE estimated by mean comparisons, we assume the negative MTS assumption. We
speculate that most of the rich mothers who can afford to give birth in the presence of skilled
birth attendants may not have been eligible for the JSY. Adding the negative MTS assumption
raises the lower bound up to 0.081. Furthermore, adding the MIV assumption makes the band
narrower. Under the three assumptions, the lower and upper bounds become 0.176 and 0.294,
respectively.
All point-estimated ATEs are smaller than the lower limit of this ATE bound, which suggests
that they could be under-estimated under the maintained assumptions. The confidence interval
of the ATE bound under the MTR, MTS and MIV assumptions is between 0.170 and 0.297,
which does not include the point-identified ATEs.
ANC use at least once
For ANC use at least once, in the worst case, the ATE bound is from -0.685 to 0.315. The MTR
assumption makes the bound non-negative. As the ATE estimated by OLS is smaller than the
ATE estimated by mean comparisons, we add the positive MTS assumption to the MTR, which
thus implies that mothers with higher awareness of the importance of maternal healthcare may
be more likely to participate in the JSY and receive ANC. Adding the MTS assumption substan-
tially narrows the upper bound of ATE to 0.091, implying that the assumption regarding the
direction of selection bias has strong identifying power. The MIV assumption further narrows
the upper bound to 0.042.
We observe that ATEs under the independence assumption and the CIA lie beyond the up-
per limit of this ATE bound. We also observe that the ATE estimated by the RDD is outside
of this bound, thereby implying that the compliers are very much different from the entire pop-
168
ulation and/or the assumption of discontinuity is not valid. We do not observe the overlapping
of confidence intervals between point-estimated ATEs and the bound-estimated ATE.
ANC use at least three times
We also observe similar shrinkage in the ATE bound for ANC use three times and more. Its worst-
case bound ranges from -0.587 to 0.413, and the MTR assumption truncates the lower bound at
0. As the ATE estimated by OLS is smaller than the ATE estimated by mean comparisons, we
assume the positive MTS assumption, which narrows the upper bound from 0.413 to 0.108. The
MIV assumption further narrows it up to 0.014. After adding the MIV assumption, the point-
identified ATEs are again found beyond this upper bound. We do not observe the overlapping
of confidence intervals between point-estimated ATEs and the bound-estimated ATE.
PNC for mothers
For PNC for mothers, the worst-case bound is -0.558 to 0.442, and the MTR assumption makes
the lower bound non-negative. As the ATE estimated by OLS is larger than the ATE estimated
by mean comparisons, we assume the negative MTS assumption, which suggests that those moth-
ers who have greater difficulty in accessing healthcare may have been more strongly encouraged
by the accredited social health activists to join the JSY programme and/or that mothers who
can afford to receive PNC may not have been eligible for the JSY. We find that the negative
MTS has strong identifying power and succeeds in increasing the lower bound up to 0.086. The
MIV assumption contributes to further narrowing the bounds of the ATE.
Under the three assumptions, we observe that the ATE is no less than 0.193 and no larger
than 0.430. Under the three assumptions, we observe that the point-identified ATEs are all
smaller than the lower limit of the ATE bound, suggesting the possibility of under-estimating
ATEs under the CIA (Figure 4.5). The ATE under the RDD assumption lies also outside the
bound. We do not observe the overlapping of confidence intervals between point-estimated ATEs
and the bound-estimated ATE.
PNC for babies
For PNC for babies, the worst-case bound runs from -0.644 to 0.356. Along with PNC for
mothers, as the ATE estimated by OLS is larger than the ATE estimated by mean comparisons,
169
we assume the negative MTS assumption. The MTR and negative MTS assumptions raise the
lower limit of the ATE bound up to 0.054, and the MIV assumption further narrows the lower
bound to 0.158 and the upper bound to 0.349. We find that ATEs under the CIA and the RDD
assumption lie below this lower bound, thereby suggesting that they could be under-estimated.
Even when considering sampling variability, the confidence interval of the ATE bound does not
include the point-estimated ATEs.
Iron and folic acid supplement intakes
For iron and folic acid supplement intakes, we find that in the worst case, the ATE ranges from
-0.570 to 0.430. As the ATE estimated by OLS is smaller than the ATE estimated by mean
comparisons, we impose the positive MTS assumption, implying that mothers who understand
the importance of maternal healthcare are more likely to participate in the programme and receive
the supplement. The MTR assumption makes the bound non-negative, and the positive MTS
assumption substantially narrows the upper bound to 0.140. Adding the MIV assumption further
narrows the upper bound up to 0.065. We find that all point-estimated ATEs are greater than
the upper bound, thereby suggesting their over-estimation. Although the confidence interval of
the ATE bound does not include the point-identified ATEs, we observe the overlapped confidence
intervals of the ATEs point-estimated by PSM, NNM and RDD with that of the bound-estimated
ATE.
Tetanus toxoid injections
Finally, for the tetanus toxoid injections, the worst-case bound is from -0.664 to 0.336, and
the MTR assumption truncates the lower bound at 0. As for the case with iron and folic
acid supplements, as the ATE estimated by OLS is smaller than the ATE estimated by mean
comparisons, we assume the positive MTS assumption. We hypothesise that more risk-averse
mothers are more likely to join the JSY and access treatment. We observe that the positive MTS
assumption substantially contributes to narrowing the upper bound up to 0.099, and adding the
MIV assumption contributes to narrowing it further up to 0.046. We find that the point-estimated
ATEs are once again all outside of the bound, indicating the evidence of over-estimation. We




Figure 4.3 visually summarises the results presented above. The bounds shown in Figure 4.3 are
the sharp bounds under the MTR, MTS and MIV assumptions. We find that the point-identified
ATEs are below the lower ATE bound of institutional delivery, skilled birth attendance and PNC
for mothers and children. On the other hand, for ANC at least once and ANC at least three
times, the point-identified ATEs are over the upper limit of the ATE bounds. In particular, a
larger deviation from the lower bound is observed for institutional delivery. Even considering the
uncertainty of sampling variability, we do not observe the overlapping of the confidence intervals
between point-identified and partially-identified ATEs for institutional delivery, ANC at least
once, PNC for mothers and tetanus toxoid injections.
Next, we explore how each of the three assumptions contributes to estimating the ATE bounds
for each outcome. Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 illustrate the sharp ATE bounds for each outcome
estimated under the eight different combinations of assumptions. By comparing the bound
widths, we can infer the identification power of each assumption. The joint imposition of the
MTS and MIV assumptions leads to our main finding that point-estimated ATEs are outside
the bound-estimated ATEs. Interestingly, even without the MTR assumption, we could have
reached the same finding, although the estimated ATE bound can have a larger width. Another
interesting finding is that the MTR assumption is not binding in the presence of the negative
MTS assumption, because the negative MTS assumption itself made the lower limits of the ATE
bounds positive. Nevertheless, the MTR assumption significantly contributes to narrowing the
ATE bounds, unless the negative MTS assumption is imposed.
4.6 Robustness checks and further analysis
4.6.1 Robustness check: choice of covariates
As robustness checks with respect to the choice of covariates, we point-estimate ATEs again with
different covariate sets used in the previous studies and the full covariate sets, in order to see
whether the choice of covariates substantially affects our findings. Note that as an ATE bound is
unconditional on covariates, it is invariant across the covariate sets. First, we closely follow Lim
et al. (2010) and use the following covariate sets: state of residence, urban residence, below-the-
poverty-line card ownership, wealth quintile, scheduled caste, education, parity and maternal age.
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Figure 4.3: Point-estimated ATE and bound-estimated ATE under the MTR, MTS and MIV
assumptions
Source: DLHS-4. Note: The choice of covariates follows Rahman and Pallikadavath (2018).
PSM=Propensity score matching; IPW+OLS=OLS adjusted with propensity score inverse probability weighting;
NNM=Nearest neighbour matching; EBW=Entropy balance weighting; RDD=Regression discontinuity design;
ANC=Antenatal care; PNC=Postnatal care; IFA=Iron and folic acid; and TT=Tetanus toxoid. The bounds
shown here are sharp bounds estimated under the MTR, MTS and MIV assumptions. The shaded areas show
the 95% level confidence interval of the ATE bound under the MTR, MTS and MIV assumptions.
172
Figure 4.4: ATE bounds for institutional delivery, skilled birth attendance and antenatal care
Source: DLHS-4. Note: The choice of covariates follows Rahman and Pallikadavath (2018).
PSM=Propensity score matching; IPW+OLS=OLS adjusted with propensity score inverse probability weighting;
NNM=Nearest neighbour matching; EBW=Entropy balance weighting; and RDD=Regression discontinuity
design. The bounds shown are sharp bounds under the MTR, MTS and MIV assumptions. The shaded areas
show the 95% level confidence interval of the ATE bound under the MTR, MTS and MIV assumptions.
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Figure 4.5: ATE bounds for postnatal care, iron and folic acid supplement intakes and tetanus
toxoid injections
Source: DLHS-4. Note: The choice of covariates follows Rahman and Pallikadavath (2018).
PSM=Propensity score matching; IPW+OLS=OLS adjusted with propensity score inverse probability weighting;
NNM=Nearest neighbour matching; EBW=Entropy balance weighting; and RDD=Regression discontinuity
design. The bounds shown are sharp bounds under the MTR, MTS and MIV assumptions. The shaded areas
show the 95% level confidence interval of the ATE bound under the MTR, MTS and MIV assumptions.
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Next, we closely follow Sengupta and Sinha (2018), who used the following variables as de-
terminants of JSY participation and healthcare use: residence in North-Western states, urban
residence, below-the-poverty-line card ownership, number of live births, scheduled caste, sched-
uled tribe, whether pregnancy was known within three months, any previous stillbirth, any
previous miscarriage, any child who died, age at which living with a husband, age at time of
birth, ratio of male to female members in a household, being Hindu, wealth quintiles, living in
a kachcha (made of natural materials) house and maternal and paternal education dummies.16
As well as these, following Sengupta and Sinha (2018), we use the following variables that affect
healthcare use only: sex of baby, number of brothers and sisters, whether any household member
is covered by health insurance and having no toilet facility or water treatment for drinking.
Third, we control for more variables, to take account of the selection bias as best as we can
manage. We control for the following covariates: birth-year fixed effects, birth-month fixed ef-
fects, state-fixed effects, urban residence, below-the-poverty-line card ownership, number of live
births, scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, whether pregnancy was known within three months,
any previous stillbirth, any previous miscarriage, any child who died, age at which living with a
husband, age at time of birth, ratio of male to female members in a household, wealth quintiles,
maternal and paternal education levels and being Hindu. This comprehensive set of covariates is
expected to remove more effectively the selection bias attributable to measurable characteristics.
If the point-estimated ATEs estimated with this full covariate set are outside of the ATE bounds,
then it supports our finding that the CIA is implausible.
The results estimated with these three sets of covariates are shown in Table 4.8 and summarised
visually in Figure 4.6. We find that all point-identified ATEs lie outside of ATE bounds in three
sets of covariates. We reconfirm that the point-identified ATEs are likely to be over-estimated
for ANC, iron and folic acid supplement intakes and tetanus toxoid injections. Also, we observe
that the point-identified ATEs are likely to be under-estimated for institutional delivery, skilled
birth attendance and PNC. Overall, these findings are consistent with our main results in Figure
4.3, implying that regardless of the choice of covariate set, the CIA and the functional form
assumption are likely to be invalid.
16We defined the following three educational levels for mothers and fathers, respectively: 1-6 years of education,
7-12 years of education and more than 12 years of education.
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Table 4.8: Point-estimated ATE with different covariate sets
Lim et al. (2010) Sengupta et al. (2018) Full sets
Estimates SEs Estimates SEs Estimates SEs
Institutional delivery
Independence 0.432*** 0.005 0.432*** 0.005 0.432*** 0.005
OLS 0.127*** 0.003 0.131*** 0.002 0.128*** 0.003
PSM 0.124*** 0.003 0.129*** 0.003 0.127*** 0.003
IPW+OLS 0.129*** 0.003 0.131*** 0.003 0.131*** 0.003
NNM 0.122*** 0.003 0.126*** 0.003 0.12*** 0.003
EBW 0.131*** 0.003 0.139*** 0.003 0.13*** 0.003
Skilled delivery attendance
Independence 0.349*** 0.005 0.349*** 0.005 0.349*** 0.005
OLS 0.087*** 0.002 0.086*** 0.002 0.087*** 0.002
PSM 0.083*** 0.002 0.087*** 0.002 0.086*** 0.002
IPW+OLS 0.088*** 0.002 0.086*** 0.002 0.089*** 0.002
NNM 0.081*** 0.002 0.081*** 0.002 0.082*** 0.002
EBW 0.094*** 0.002 0.095*** 0.002 0.092*** 0.002
Antenatal care +1
Independence 0.105*** 0.005 0.105*** 0.005 0.105*** 0.005
OLS 0.078*** 0.003 0.089*** 0.002 0.078*** 0.003
PSM 0.075*** 0.004 0.089*** 0.003 0.074*** 0.004
IPW+OLS 0.078*** 0.003 0.087*** 0.003 0.079*** 0.003
NNM 0.074*** 0.004 0.085*** 0.003 0.075*** 0.004
EBW 0.078*** 0.003 0.092*** 0.002 0.076*** 0.003
Antenatal care +3
Independence 0.101*** 0.007 0.101*** 0.007 0.101*** 0.007
OLS 0.079*** 0.005 0.098*** 0.004 0.079*** 0.005
PSM 0.074*** 0.006 0.093*** 0.006 0.075*** 0.006
IPW+OLS 0.078*** 0.005 0.093*** 0.004 0.077*** 0.005
NNM 0.07*** 0.006 0.091*** 0.005 0.073*** 0.005
EBW 0.092*** 0.004 0.109*** 0.004 0.089*** 0.004
Postnatal care for mother
Independence 0.178*** 0.007 0.178*** 0.007 0.178*** 0.007
OLS 0.104*** 0.005 0.088*** 0.005 0.104*** 0.005
PSM 0.111*** 0.006 0.084*** 0.006 0.097*** 0.006
IPW+OLS 0.106*** 0.005 0.089*** 0.005 0.107*** 0.005
NNM 0.104*** 0.006 0.09*** 0.006 0.094*** 0.006
EBW 0.106*** 0.004 0.094*** 0.004 0.108*** 0.004
Postnatal care for baby
Independence 0.065*** 0.007 0.065*** 0.007 0.065*** 0.007
OLS 0.074*** 0.004 0.058*** 0.004 0.075*** 0.004
PSM 0.076*** 0.005 0.055*** 0.005 0.068*** 0.005
IPW+OLS 0.075*** 0.004 0.059*** 0.004 0.077*** 0.004
NNM 0.071*** 0.004 0.062*** 0.004 0.064*** 0.004
EBW 0.071*** 0.004 0.06*** 0.004 0.072*** 0.004
Iron folic acid supplement intakes
Independence 0.104*** 0.006 0.104*** 0.006 0.104*** 0.006
OLS 0.098*** 0.005 0.125*** 0.004 0.097*** 0.005
PSM 0.087*** 0.006 0.126*** 0.005 0.095*** 0.006
IPW+OLS 0.096*** 0.005 0.119*** 0.004 0.094*** 0.005
NNM 0.086*** 0.006 0.118*** 0.005 0.09*** 0.006
EBW 0.105*** 0.004 0.126*** 0.004 0.101*** 0.004
Tetanus toxoid injections
Independence 0.056*** 0.004 0.056*** 0.004 0.056*** 0.004
OLS 0.086*** 0.003 0.098*** 0.003 0.087*** 0.003
PSM 0.084*** 0.004 0.097*** 0.004 0.083*** 0.004
IPW+OLS 0.086*** 0.003 0.095*** 0.003 0.087*** 0.004
NNM 0.079*** 0.004 0.095*** 0.004 0.083*** 0.004
EBW 0.09*** 0.003 0.101*** 0.003 0.087*** 0.003
Source: DLHS-4. Note: 95% confidence intervals are shown. PSM=Propensity score matching; IPW+OLS=OLS adjusted
with the propensity score inverse probability weighting; NNM=Nearest neighbour matching; and EBW=Entropy balance
weighting. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 4.6: ATE bound and point-estimated ATE with different covariate sets
Source: DLHS-4. Note: PSM=Propensity score matching; IPW+OLS=OLS adjusted with propensity score
inverse probability weighting; NNM=Nearest neighbour matching; EBW=Entropy balance weighting;
ANC=Antenatal care; PNC=Postnatal care; IFA=Iron and folic acid; and TT=tetanus toxoid. The bounds
shown are sharp bounds estimated under the MTR, MTS and MIV assumptions. The shaded areas show the
95% level confidence interval of the ATE bound under the MTR, MTS and MIV assumptions.
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4.6.2 Robustness check: validity of the MIV assumption
Manski (2003) argues that the credibility of estimates decreases in line with the strength of the
assumptions maintained (The Law of Decreasing Credibility). We observe that the MIV assump-
tion played a key role in our finding that point-identified ATEs lie outside the bound-estimated
ATEs, and so consequently it is important to examine the credibility of the MIV assumption.
Although a large volume of literature reports that socio-economic status is negatively associated
with maternal and child healthcare use in developing countries (Pathak et al., 2010; Pathak and
Mohanty, 2010; Kesterton et al., 2010; Balarajan et al., 2011), we cannot directly test the valid-
ity of MIV assumption formalised in equations (4.27) and (4.28) in principle, because these are
assumptions on latent probabilities. Nevertheless, we can still explore the validity of equation
(4.27), using National Family Health Survey data, which were collected in 2005-2006. By focus-
ing only on women who delivered before 12 April 2005, we can observe both P (Y0 = 1|v = 0) and
P (Y0 = 1|v = 1) among women who gave birth before the introduction of the JSY. Figure 4.7
shows that P (Y0 = 1|v = 1) is larger than P (Y0 = 1|v = 0) for all outcomes (p < 0.01), indicat-
ing that in the absence of treatment, ineligible women are more likely to use healthcare services
than eligible women. This supports the validity of equation (4.27) and provides confidence in
our results.
4.7 Conclusion
In India, the CCT programme, i.e. the JSY, was introduced in 2005 and promotes the use
of maternal and child healthcare with cash incentives, in order to reduce infant and neonatal
mortalities. In contrast to other countries with CCT programmes, a rigorous RCT was not con-
ducted in India for the JSY (Joshi and Sivaram, 2014), and hence a valid instrumental variable
has not been available for researchers. Lim et al. (2010) conducted a first estimate of the causal
impacts of the JSY, and this has attracted much attention for a number of years. To date,
several studies have attempted to estimate its causal impacts on various healthcare services and
health outcomes. However, according to Das et al. (2011), the JSY was immature until 2007,
and the dataset analysed by Lim et al. (2010) and others (i.e. DLHS-3) was not reliable enough
to estimate the causal impact. The latest wave of the DLHS (DLHS-4) has become available
only recently, and Rahman and Pallikadavath (2017) and Rahman and Pallikadavath (2018) re-
estimated the causal impacts, acknowledging the potential serious errors that had occurred in
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Figure 4.7: Comparison in the mean outcomes between eligible and non-eligible mothers without
treatment
Source: National Family Health Survey (2004-05). Note: 95% confidence intervals are shown. Mean outcomes
are calculated among women in HPSs aged between 15 and 49 who delivered in the five years prior to the survey
but before 12 April 2005. The left bars show P (Y0 = 1|v = 1), and the right bars show P (Y0 = 1|v = 0).
DLHS-3.
Up until now, however, no study has ever tried to assess the validity of the identification as-
sumptions employed in previous studies. For example, Lim et al. (2010), Rahman and Pallika-
davath (2018) and Sengupta and Sinha (2018) all relied on the CIA requiring that participation
in the JSY programme could be regarded as random if we control for observable household and
individual characteristics. However, the CIA is extremely hard to justify for the case of JSY.
The utilisation of maternal and child healthcare use, and participation in the JSY, is likely to
be dependent on individual unobservable characteristics such as the degree of being risk-averse
and awareness of the importance of maternal and child healthcare. If there exist some selection
mechanisms that cannot be controlled for by the observable characteristics, the estimated ATE
under the CIA suffers selection bias, potentially resulting in flawed and conflicting conclusions
(Manski, 2013). This study assessed the validity of the identification assumptions used in pre-
vious studies and provided new evidence through a partial identification approach. The partial
identification provided herein yielded an honest and credible bound of ATE, which is valuable
when we are not confident of the conventionally imposed identification assumptions.
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If the imposed assumptions are valid, any point-estimate of ATE should lie within the ATE
bound. However, we find that ATEs under the CIA lie beyond ATE bounds, suggesting the inva-
lidity of identification assumptions and the possibility of over- or under-estimation. Especially,
we find that the point-identified ATEs are below the lower ATE bounds of institutional delivery,
skilled birth attendance and PNC for mothers and children. On the other hand, for ANC at
least once and ANC at least three times, the point-identified ATEs are over the upper limits of
the ATE bounds. For institutional delivery, the largest deviations of the point-estimated ATEs
from the lower limit of its ATE bound is observed.17 We find consistent results even when we
use different covariate sets that have been used in two other previous studies.
Overall, this study provided sufficiently strong evidence that point-estimated ATEs could have
been biased in previous studies. It re-estimated causal impacts through a partial identification
approach and showed the conservative bounds of ATEs. Also, this study quantified how much at
least the point-identified ATEs under questionable identification assumptions could be far from
the true ATE. Certainly, the ATE bounds themselves do not give definite values for the causal
impacts. We believe, however, that the honest estimation of the bounds based on the credible
assumptions could be more useful and valuable in policy-making than definitive ATE estimates
that heavily rely on unpalatable or untenable assumptions. We hope the results of this study
contribute to evaluating the JSY thoroughly.
17However, it does not necessarily mean that the actual under-estimation size for the institutional delivery is
the largest; it just means that its lower limit of potential under-estimation is the largest.
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Appendix
4.A Appendix – Additional results
4.A.1 Additional evidence in LPSs with the National Family Health Survey
(NFHS)
We complement the analysis by providing additional evidence from within LPSs with the latest
National Family Health Survey (NFHS-4) conducted in 2015-2016. In contrast to the DLHS-
4, the NFHS is nationally representative, which allows us to estimate the impacts in LPSs.
The NFHS is a nationwide household survey that provides information on health, health-related
behaviours and household socio-economic status, and it is the Indian version of the Demographic
Health Survey conducted in more than 85 low- and middle-income countries (Corsi et al., 2012).
The NFHS-4 has 19,906 female observations in LPSs.18 After dropping observations with missing
information19, our final sample size was 13,121. Descriptive statistics for the NFHS-4 are shown
in Table 4.A.1.
Point-identification in LPSs
In this subsection, we show the results for the LPSs obtained with the NFHS-4 data. In contrast
to the DLHS-4, the NFHS-4 collected data from LPSs as well as HPSs (Figure 4.1). To make
the results comparable as much as possible to those obtained from the DLHS-4 data, we use the
same covariate sets used for the DLHS-4, i.e. the covariate set used in Rahman and Pallikadavath
(2018).20 The only difference in terms of covariates is the component of household wealth. In
both datasets, wealth is created from the principal component analysis from indicators of asset
ownership, housing characteristics and water and sanitation facilities, but their components are
different. In the NLHS-4, we use wealth officially derived in collaboration with the World Bank,
and it has been shown to be a consistent proxy for household income and expenditure (Rutstein
and Staveteig, 2014; Montgomery et al., 2000).21 Although in LPSs all women are eligible for
the JSY regardless of their age, socio-economic status or number of children, we continue to use
18In the NFHS data, not all women in the samples were interviewed about their husbands’ characteristics. In
this study, we use the nationally representative female samples in which information about a woman’s husband is
also collected.
19We dropped 67 observations with missing information about the JSY status, and 68 observations that did not
have information about paternal educational background.
20We also estimate the ATEs with the covariate sets in Lim et al. (2010) and Sengupta and Sinha (2018), and
we obtain very similar results.
21The list of indicators can be downloaded from the official website (https://www.dhsprogram.com/
programming/wealth%20index/India%20DHS%202015-16/IndiaNFHS4.pdf)–Accessed in 14/02/2019–.
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Institutional delivery 0.80 1.00
Skilled birth attendance 0.82 0.99
Antenatal care at least once 0.86 0.95
Antenatal care (≥3 times) 0.76 0.87
Postnatal care for mother 0.72 0.87
Postnatal care for baby 0.35 0.48
Iron and folic acid (IFA) supplement 0.83 0.92
Tetanus toxoid (TT) injection 0.89 0.94
Below the poverty line card 0.31 0.38
Scheduled caste 0.16 0.24
Scheduled tribe 0.25 0.30
Rural 0.65 0.69
Birth order (parity) 2.18 1.90
Hindu 0.64 0.65
Maternal age 27.62 26.88
Maternal education years 3.55 3.72




the same eligibility criteria that are applied in HPSs as a monotone instrument, which makes
the results comparable with the previous results in HPSs.
Table 4.A.2 reports the ATEs estimated by: (1) Independence, (2) OLS, (3) PSM, (4) IPW+OLS,
(5) NNM and (6) EBW. All point-estimated ATEs are positive and significant (p < 0.01). We
find much larger ATEs in LPSs on institutional delivery and skilled birth attendance than ATEs
in HPSs estimated from the DLHS-4 data, which could be attributed to the observation that
in LPSs the initial outcome levels are far lower than those in HPSs. The lower initial level and
wider coverage of the programme may have led to larger ATEs (Dongre, 2012).
Partial identification in LPSs
First, we explore the direction of the selection bias. Comparing the ATE under the indepen-
dence assumption and the ATE estimated by OLS, we find that ATEs under the independence
assumption are larger than those estimated by OLS for ANC at least once, PNC for babies, iron
and folic acid supplement intakes and tetanus toxoid injections. Hence, for these outcomes, we
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Table 4.A.2: Point-estimated ATE in LPSs with the NFHS-4
Estimates SEs Confidence intervals
Institutional delivery
Independence 0.432*** 0.005 (0.422, 0.442)
OLS 0.433*** 0.004 (0.425, 0.441)
PSM 0.435*** 0.005 (0.425, 0.445)
IPW+OLS 0.433*** 0.004 (0.425, 0.441)
NNM 0.428*** 0.005 (0.418, 0.438)
EBW 0.429*** 0.005 (0.419, 0.439)
Skilled delivery attendance
Independence 0.349*** 0.005 (0.339, 0.359)
OLS 0.35*** 0.005 (0.34, 0.36)
PSM 0.35*** 0.005 (0.34, 0.36)
IPW+OLS 0.35*** 0.005 (0.34, 0.36)
NNM 0.346*** 0.005 (0.336, 0.356)
EBW 0.345*** 0.005 (0.335, 0.355)
Antenatal care +1
Independence 0.105*** 0.005 (0.095, 0.115)
OLS 0.105*** 0.005 (0.095, 0.115)
PSM 0.104*** 0.006 (0.092, 0.116)
IPW+OLS 0.105*** 0.005 (0.095, 0.115)
NNM 0.097*** 0.006 (0.085, 0.109)
EBW 0.095*** 0.005 (0.085, 0.105)
Antenatal care +3
Independence 0.101*** 0.007 (0.087, 0.115)
OLS 0.104*** 0.007 (0.09, 0.118)
PSM 0.105*** 0.008 (0.089, 0.121)
IPW+OLS 0.104*** 0.007 (0.09, 0.118)
NNM 0.093*** 0.008 (0.077, 0.109)
EBW 0.099*** 0.007 (0.085, 0.113)
Postnatal care for mother
Independence 0.178*** 0.007 (0.164, 0.192)
OLS 0.18*** 0.007 (0.166, 0.194)
PSM 0.176*** 0.008 (0.16, 0.192)
IPW+OLS 0.18*** 0.007 (0.166, 0.194)
NNM 0.178*** 0.008 (0.162, 0.194)
EBW 0.178*** 0.007 (0.164, 0.192)
Postnatal care for baby
Independence 0.065*** 0.007 (0.051, 0.079)
OLS 0.061*** 0.007 (0.047, 0.075)
PSM 0.055*** 0.008 (0.039, 0.071)
IPW+OLS 0.06*** 0.007 (0.046, 0.074)
NNM 0.058*** 0.008 (0.042, 0.074)
EBW 0.064*** 0.007 (0.05, 0.078)
Iron folic acid supplement intakes
Independence 0.104*** 0.006 (0.092, 0.116)
OLS 0.095*** 0.006 (0.083, 0.107)
PSM 0.093*** 0.007 (0.079, 0.107)
IPW+OLS 0.095*** 0.006 (0.083, 0.107)
NNM 0.086*** 0.007 (0.072, 0.1)
EBW 0.091*** 0.006 (0.079, 0.103)
Tetanus toxoid injections
Independence 0.056*** 0.004 (0.048, 0.064)
OLS 0.052*** 0.004 (0.044, 0.06)
PSM 0.052*** 0.004 (0.044, 0.06)
IPW+OLS 0.052*** 0.004 (0.044, 0.06)
NNM 0.05*** 0.004 (0.042, 0.058)
EBW 0.047*** 0.003 (0.041, 0.053)
Source: NFHS-4. Note: Number of observations is 13,121. The choice of covariates follows Rahman and
Pallikadavath (2018). PSM=Propensity score matching; IPW+OLS=OLS adjusted with propensity score inverse
probability weighting; NNM=Nearest neighbour matching; and EBW=Entropy balance weighting. *p < 0.10,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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impose the positive MTS assumption. For the other outcomes, namely institutional delivery,
skilled birth attendance, ANC three times and more and PNC for mothers, the negative MTS
assumption is imposed.
Table 4.A.3 shows the ATE bounds in LPSs estimated with the NFHS-4 data. Figure 4.A.1
visually summarises the bound-estimated ATEs and the point-estimated ATEs. Overall, we find
that the point-identified ATEs are outside of the ATE bounds for institutional delivery, skilled
birth attendance, ANC at least once, ANC three times and more and PNC for mothers. Com-
pared with the results in HPSs, deviations in the point-identified ATEs from the upper/lower
limits of ATE bounds are substantially smaller in LPSs, suggesting the lower limits of the po-
tential selection bias in LPSs. For PNC for babies, iron and folic acid supplement intakes and
tetanus toxoid injections, some of the ATEs estimated under the CIA are included within the
ATE bounds. In particular, for the iron and folic acid supplement intakes, all the point-identified
ATEs are within the bound, which is attributable to the weak identification power of the MIV as-
sumption. The additional imposition of the MIV contributes little to tightening its ATE bound.
Overall, we find that most of the ATEs under the CIA are outside the ATE bounds. The excep-
tion is the effect on the iron and folic acid supplement intakes in which all the point-identified
ATEs are inside the partially-identified ATE bound. Comparing the results in both HPSs and
LPSs, we observe that deviations from the ATE bounds are larger in HPSs. The contrast be-
tween HPSs and LPSs suggests that we are more likely to suffer larger selection bias when the
eligibility of the JSY is restricted to marginalised mothers.
4.B Appendix – Note on methodology
4.B.1 Entropy balance weighting
In the non-experimental study, wherein participation in treatment is not randomised, the pure
comparison between treated people and untreated people does not generally provide the causal
treatment effects because those who are treated can be fundamentally different from the un-
treated people with regard to their characteristics, such as the educational background. An
entropy balance weighting, developed by Hainmueller (2012), perfectly balances the moments of
the covariate distributions.
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Table 4.A.3: ATE bounds in LPSs estimated with the NFHS-4
Estimates Confidence intervals
Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
Institutional delivery
No assumption −0.319 0.681 −0.325 0.686
MTR 0.000 0.681 0.000 0.686
MTR+MTS 0.432 0.681 0.425 0.686
MTR+MTS+MIV 0.505 0.624 0.494 0.632
Skilled delivery attendance
No assumption −0.364 0.636 −0.369 0.642
MTR 0.000 0.636 0.000 0.642
MTR+MTS 0.349 0.636 0.341 0.642
MTR+MTS+MIV 0.413 0.583 0.402 0.592
Antenatal care +1
No assumption −0.487 0.513 −0.493 0.519
MTR 0.000 0.513 0.000 0.519
MTR+MTS 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.114
MTR+MTS+MIV 0.000 0.086 0.000 0.098
Antenatal care +3
No assumption −0.460 0.540 −0.466 0.547
MTR 0.000 0.540 0.000 0.547
MTR+MTS 0.101 0.540 0.089 0.547
MTR+MTS+MIV 0.130 0.500 0.114 0.510
Postnatal care for mother
No assumption −0.432 0.568 −0.437 0.574
MTR 0.000 0.568 0.000 0.574
MTR+MTS 0.178 0.568 0.167 0.574
MTR+MTS+MIV 0.219 0.521 0.205 0.531
Postnatal care for baby
No assumption −0.449 0.551 −0.455 0.557
MTR 0.000 0.551 0.000 0.557
MTR+MTS 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.075
MTR+MTS+MIV 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.069
Iron folic acid supplement intakes
No assumption −0.477 0.523 −0.483 0.529
MTR 0.000 0.523 0.000 0.529
MTR+MTS 0.000 0.104 0.000 0.114
MTR+MTS+MIV 0.000 0.103 0.000 0.114
Tetanus toxoid injections
No assumption −0.526 0.474 −0.532 0.480
MTR 0.000 0.474 0.000 0.480
MTR+MTS 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.061
MTR+MTS+MIV 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.058
Source: NFHS-4. Note: Number of observations is 13,121. 95% confidence intervals are calculated following
Imbens and Manski (2004) by bootstrap with 200 repetitions.
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Figure 4.A.1: Bound-estimated and point-estimated ATE in LPSs under the MTR, MTS and
MIV assumptions with the NFHS-4
Source: NFHS-4. Note: The choice of covariates follows Rahman and Pallikadavath (2018).
PSM=Propensity score matching; IPW+OLS=OLS adjusted with propensity score inverse probability weighting;
NNM=Nearest neighbour matching; EBW=Entropy balance weighting; ANC=Antenatal care; PNC=Postnatal
care; IFA=Iron and folic acid; and TT=tetanus toxoid. The bounds shown are sharp bounds estimated under
the MTR, MTS and MIV assumptions. The shaded areas show the 95% level confidence interval of the ATE
bound under the MTR, MTS and MIV assumptions.
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The entropy balance weighting method assigns weights such that the covariate distributions
in the weighted data satisfy a set of moment conditions set by a researcher. Specifically, weights
are assigned to the control group so that the moments of the weighted covariate distributions in
the control group match those in the treatment group. The entropy balance weighting method
has a few advantages over the propensity score weighting. Firstly, the entropy balance weighting
can “perfectly” balance a set of moments of the covariate distributions between two groups,
while the propensity score methods often fail to jointly balance all the covariate distributions in
practice partly because of the misspecification of the propensity score. In order to improve the
balance of some covariates, the propensity score method usually needs to sacrifice the balance
of the other covariates (Iacus et al., 2012). Thanks to the perfect balancing obtained with the
entropy balancing method, manual balance checking is no longer necessary. Hence, we don’t
have to go back and forth between estimating the propensity score and manually checking the
balance of the covariates (Hainmueller, 2012).
Each observation in the untreated group gets a weight satisfying a set of balance constraints
set by the researcher a priori. Entropy balancing estimates the weights directly from a set of bal-
ance constraints and the normalisation and non-negativity constraints. The optimal weights for






subject to the following balance and normalisation constraints:
∑
{i|Untreated}
wicri(Xi) = mr with r ∈ {1, ..., R}, (4.B.2)
∑
{i|Untreated}
wi = 1, and (4.B.3)
wi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ (Untreated). (4.B.4)
Equation (4.B.2) is a set of balance constraints. Equations (4.B.3) and (4.B.4) are the normal-
isation constraint and the non-negativity constraint respectively. The part wicri(Xi) = mr in
equation (4.B.2) describes a set of R balance constraints imposed on the moments of the weighted
distributions of the covariates in the control group. Each balance constraint equates a certain
order moment of the weighted covariate distributions in the control group to the corresponding
moment of the covariate distributions in the treated group. As the entropy balancing can bal-
ance the higher order moments of the distributions, the moment constraints can be not only the
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mean (first moment), but also the variance (second moment), the skewness (third moment), and
beyond them. For example, if we are interested in estimating the weights for balancing the rth
order moment of a specific covariate, say Xp, we set cri(Xip) = (Xip)
r or cri(Xip) = (Xip − µp)r
with mean µp. The choice of the moment order can vary across the covariates and largely de-
pends on the researcher’s a priori knowledge about their distribution types. For example, if the
covariates are binary variables, the first order moment balancing is sufficient, whereas in the
case of the variables that are normally distributed, balancing the first and second order moments
is sufficient to balance their entire distributions. In this study, we will balance the covariate
distributions up to their second moments.
4.B.2 MTS sharp bound and independence
This note shows why the upper bound of ATE under the positive MTS assumption corresponds
to the ATE under the independence assumption. This note is based on the explanation made
by McCarthy et al. (2015). Since the upper bound of ATE is, by definition, the difference be-
tween the upper bound of P (Y1 = 1) and the lower bound of P (Y0 = 1), we firstly discuss in
what circumstance the upper bound of P (Y1 = 1) and the lower bound of P (Y0 = 1) are attained.
Applying the law of total probability to P (Y1 = 1),
P (Y1 = 1) = P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)P (D = 1) + P (Y1 = 1|D = 0)P (D = 0)
= P (Y1 = 1|D = 1){1− P (D = 0)}+ P (Y1 = 1|D = 0)P (D = 0)
= {P (Y1 = 1|D = 0)− P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)}P (D = 0) + P (Y1 = 1|D = 1). (4.B.5)
Under the positive MTS assumption, the term in the bracket is non-positive. The upper bound
of P (Y1 = 1), which is P (Y1 = 1|D = 1), is achieved when the term in the bracket becomes 0,
where the independence assumption, i.e. P (Y1 = 1|D = 0) = P (Y1 = 1|D = 1), is satisfied.
Next, applying the law of total probability to P (Y0 = 1),
P (Y0 = 1) = P (Y0 = 1|D = 1)P (D = 1) + P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)P (D = 0)
= P (Y0 = 1|D = 1)P (D = 1) + P (Y0 = 1|D = 0){1− P (D = 1)}
= {P (Y0 = 1|D = 1)− P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)}P (D = 1) + P (Y0 = 1|D = 0), (4.B.6)
Under the positive MIS assumption, the term in the bracket is non-negative. The lower bound
of P (Y0 = 1), which is P (Y0 = 1|D = 0), is achieved when the term in the bracket becomes 0,
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where the independence assumption, i.e. P (Y0 = 1|D = 1) = P (Y0 = 1|D = 0), is satisfied.
Combined them together, the upper limit of ATE, which is P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)−P (Y0 = 1|D = 0),
is achieved when P (Yt = 1|D = 1) = P (Yt = 1|D = 0) = P (Yt = 1) holds for t ∈ {0, 1}. This
condition is indeed the independence assumption. In the same way, we can show that the lower
bound of ATE under the negative MTS assumption corresponds to the ATE estimated under
the independence assumption.
4.B.3 Derivation of the MIV bounds in equations (4.29) and (4.30)
First, for t ∈ {0, 1} and t′ 6= t, the bound of the conditional probability, P (Yt = 1|v = u) is given
from equations (4.9) and (4.10) by
P (Yt = 1|D = t, v = u)P (D = t|v = u)
≤ P (Yt = 1|v = u) (4.B.7)
≤ {P (Yt = 1|D = t, v = u)P (D = t|v = u) + P (D = t′|v = u)}.
Under the MIV assumption, for u1 ≤ u ≤ u2,
max
u1≤u
P (Yt = 1|D = t, v = u1)P (D = t|v = u1)
≤ P (Yt = 1|v = u) (4.B.8)
≤ min
u≤u2
{P (Yt = 1|D = t, v = u2)P (D = t|v = u2) + P (D = t′|v = u2)}.
Applying the law of total probability, we obtain the bounds of P (Yt = 1) as follows:
∑
u∈V
P (v = u) max
u1≤u
P (Yt = 1|D = t, v = u1)P (D = t|v = u1)




P (v = u) min
u≤u2
{P (Yt = 1|D = t, v = u2)P (D = t|v = u2) + P (D = t′|v = u2)}.
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When an instrument is binary, we can simplify this. As u, u0 and u1 take the values of 0 or 1,
P (v = 0)P (Yt = 1|D = t, v = 0)P (D = t|v = 0)
+P (v = 1) max{P (Yt = 1|D = t, v = 0)P (D = t|v = 0), P (Yt = 1|D = t, v = 1)P (D = t|v = 1)}
≤ P (Yt = 1) (4.B.10)
≤ P (v = 0) min{P (Yt = 1|D = t, v = 0)P (D = t|v = 0) + P (D = t′|v = 0),
P (Yt = 1|D = t, v = 1)P (D = t|v = 1) + P (D = t′|v = 1)}+
P (v = 1)[P (Yt = 1|D = t, v = 1)P (D = t|v = 1) + P (D = t′|v = 1)].
This leads to equations (4.29) and (4.30).
4.B.4 Finite-sample bias in the presence of maxima and minima operators
First, for t ∈ {0, 1} and t′ 6= t, we show the estimate of the lower bound of P (Yt = 1|v = u) has
an upward bias.




P̂ (Yt = 1|D = t, v = u1)P̂ (D = t|v = u1). (4.B.11)
Since a maximum operator is a convex function, by the Jensen’s inequality,
E[max
u1≤u
P̂ (Yt = 1|D = t, v = u1)P̂ (D = t|v = u1)]
≥ max
u1≤u
E[P̂ (Yt = 1|D = t, v = u1)P̂ (D = t|v = u1)]
= max
u1≤u
P̂ (Yt = 1|D = t, v = u1)P̂ (D = t|v = u1). (4.B.12)
Equality in the last holds due to the unbiasedness of P̂ (.). Hence equation (4.B.12) shows that
the estimate of the lower bound can have an upward bias.
Next, we show the estimate of the upper bound of P (Yt = 1|v = u) has a downward bias.
From equation (4.B.8), the estimated upper bound is expressed as
min
u≤u0
{P̂ (Yt = 1|D = t, v = u0)P̂ (D = t|v = u0) + P̂ (D = t′|v = u0)}. (4.B.13)
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Since a maximum operator is a concave function, by the Jensen’s inequality,
E[ min
u≤u0
{P̂ (Yt = 1|D = t, v = u0)P̂ (D = t|v = u0) + P̂ (D = t′|v = u0)}]
≤ min
u≤u0
E[{P̂ (Yt = 1|D = t, v = u0)P̂ (D = t|v = u0) + P̂ (D = t′|v = u0)}]
= min
u≤u0
{P (Yt = 1|D = t, v = u0)P (D = t|v = u0) + P (D = t′|v = u0)}. (4.B.14)
Equation (4.B.14) shows that the estimate of the upper bound can have a downward bias.
4.C Appendix – Derivations of ATE bounds under joint assump-
tions
4.C.1 MTR+MTS
We consider the case in which the MTR and MTS assumptions are jointly imposed. Imposing the
MTR assumption and the MTS assumption jointly means that we are assuming the intersection
of the bounds of P (Y1 = 1) and P (Y0 = 1) that are derived under each assumption.
(i) MTR+ Positive MTS: If we combine the MTR assumption and the positive MTS as-
sumption, the bounds of P (Y1 = 1) and P (Y0 = 1) become
P (Y = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MTR
≤ P (Y1 = 1) ≤ P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Positive MTS
(4.C.1)
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Positive MTS
≤ P (Y0 = 1) ≤ P (Y = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MTR
, (4.C.2)
where for t ∈ {0, 1} the bound of P (Yt = 1) is an intersection of the corresponding bounds under
the MTR assumption and the positive MTS assumption. The new bound of ATE is given by
0 ≤ ATE ≤ P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)− P (Y0 = 1|D = 0). (4.C.3)
The upper bound of ATE is given by the upper bound under the positive MTS assumption,
while the lower bound is 0 thanks to the MTR assumption.
(ii) MTR+ Negative MTS: The combination of the MTR assumption and the negative
MTS assumption can be obtained in the same fashion.
max{P (Y = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MTR
, P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Negative MTS
} ≤ P (Y1 = 1) ≤ P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)P (D = 1) + P (D = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Worst case
(4.C.4)
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)P (D = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Worst case
≤ P (Y0 = 1) ≤ min{P (Y = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MTR




and the ATE is given by
max{P (Y = 1), P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)} −min{P (Y = 1), P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)}
≤ ATE (4.C.6)
≤ {P (Y1 = 1|D = 1)P (D = 1) + P (D = 0)} − P (Y0 = 1|D = 0)P (D = 0),
where the upper bound corresponds to that in the worst-case.
4.C.2 MTR+MTS+MIV
We estimate the bounds under the MTR, MTS and MIV assumptions. When we impose the
MIV assumption, the sharp bounds of P (Y1 = 1) and P (Y0 = 1) cannot be expressed simply by
the intersection of the bounds estimated under each of assumption. We firstly derive the bounds
for conditional probabilities P (Y1 = 1|v = u) and P (Y0 = 1|v = u) under the three assumptions.
This is followed by the derivations of the bounds of P (Y1 = 1) and P (Y0 = 1).
(i) MTR+ positive MTS+ MIV: Under the MTR and positive MTS assumptions, the
bounds of the conditional probabilities P (Y1 = 1|v = u) and P (Y0 = 1|v = u) are give by
P (Y = 1|v = u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MTR
≤ P (Y1 = 1|v = u) ≤ P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Positive MTS
(4.C.7)
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Positive MTS
≤ P (Y0 = 1|v = u) ≤ P (Y = 1|v = u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MTR
. (4.C.8)
Under the MIV assumption, for u1 ≤ u ≤ u2,
max
u1≤u
P (Y = 1|v = u1) ≤ P (Y1 = 1|v = u) ≤ min
u≤u2
P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = u2) (4.C.9)
max
u1≤u
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u1) ≤ P (Y0 = 1|v = u) ≤ min
u≤u2
P (Y = 1|v = u2). (4.C.10)
Applying the law of total probability, we obtain the bounds of P (Y1 = 1) and P (Y0 = 1).
∑
u∈V
P (v = u) max
u1≤u
P (Y = 1|v = u1)




P (v = u) min
u≤u2





P (v = u) max
u1≤u
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u1)




P (v = u) min
u≤u2
P (Y = 1|v = u2).
When an instrument is binary, we can simplify them. As u, u0 and u1 take the values of 0 or 1,
arranging these equations lead to equations (4.C.13) and (4.C.14).
P (v = 0)P (Y = 1|v = 0) + P (v = 1) max{P (Y = 1|v = 0), P (Y = 1|v = 1)}
≤ P (Y1 = 1) (4.C.13)
≤ P (v = 0) min{P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 0), P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 1)}+ P (v = 1)P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 1)
and
P (v = 0)P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 0) + P (v = 1) max{P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 0), P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 1)}
≤ P (Y0 = 1) (4.C.14)
≤ P (v = 0) min{P (Y = 1|v = 0), P (Y = 1|v = 1)}+ P (v = 1)P (Y = 1|v = 1).
The sharp bound of the ATE can be obtained via equation (4.8).
(i) MTR+ negative MTS+ MIV: Under the MTR, negative MTS and MIV assumptions,
the bounds of the conditional probabilities P (Y1 = 1|v = u) and P (Y0 = 1|v = u) are
max{P (Y = 1|v = u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MTR
, P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Negative MTS
}
≤ P (Y1 = 1|v = u) (4.C.15)
≤ P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = u)P (D = 1|v = u) + P (D = 0|v = u)
and
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u)P (D = 0|v = u)
≤ P (Y0 = 1|v = u) (4.C.16)
≤ min{P (Y = 1|v = u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MTR




Under the MIV assumption, for u1 ≤ u ≤ u2,
max
u1≤u
max{P (Y = 1|v = u1), P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = u1)}
≤ P (Y1 = 1|v = u) (4.C.17)
≤ min
u≤u2




P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u1)P (D = 0|v = u1)
≤ P (Y0 = 1|v = u) (4.C.18)
≤ min
u≤u2
min{P (Y = 1|v = u2), P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u2)}.
Applying the law of total probability,
∑
u∈V
P (v = u) max
u1≤u
max{P (Y = 1|v = u1), P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = u1)}




P (v = u) min
u≤u2




P (v = u) max
u1≤u
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u1)P (D = 0|v = u1)




P (v = u) min
u≤u2
min{P (Y = 1|v = u2), P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u2)}.
As u, u1 and u2 take the values of 0 or 1, arranging them leads to equations (4.C.21) and
(4.C.22).
P (v = 0) max{P (Y = 1|v = 0), P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 0)}+
P (v = 1) max{P (Y = 1|v = 0), P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 0), P (Y = 1|v = 1), P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 1)}
≤ P (Y1 = 1) (4.C.21)
≤ P (v = 0) min{P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 0)P (D = 1|v = 0) + P (D = 0|v = 0),
P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 1)P (D = 1|v = 1) + P (D = 0|v = 1)}
+P (v = 1){P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 1)P (D = 1|v = 1) + P (D = 0|v = 1)}
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and
P (v = 0)P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 0)P (D = 0|v = 0)
+P (v = 1) max{P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 0)P (D = 0|v = 0), P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 1)P (D = 0|v = 1)}
≤ P (Y0 = 1) (4.C.22)
≤ P (v = 0) min{P (Y = 1|v = 0), P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 0), P (Y = 1|v = 1), P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 1)}
+P (v = 1) min{P (Y = 1|v = 1), P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 1)}.
The sharp bound of the ATE can be obtained via equation (4.8).
4.D Appendix – Derivations of ATE under the other combina-
tions of assumptions
4.D.1 MTS+MIV
(i) Positive MTS+MIV: Under the positive MTS assumption, the bounds of the conditional
probabilities P (Y1 = 1|v = u) and P (Y0 = 1|v = u) are given from equations (4.19) and (4.20)
by
P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = u)P (D = 1|v = u)
≤ P (Y1 = 1|v = u) (4.D.1)
≤ P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = u)
and
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u)
≤ P (Y0 = 1|v = u) (4.D.2)
≤ P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u)P (D = 0|v = u) + P (D = 1|v = u).
Under the MIV assumption, for u1 ≤ u ≤ u2,
max
u1≤u
P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = u1)P (D = 1|v = u1)
≤ P (Y1 = 1|v = u) (4.D.3)
≤ min
u≤u2





P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u1)
≤ P (Y0 = 1|v = u) (4.D.4)
≤ min
u≤u2
{P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u2)P (D = 0|v = u2) + P (D = 1|v = u2)}.




P (v = u) max
u1≤u
P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = u1)P (D = 1|v = u1)




P (v = u) min
u≤u2




P (v = u) max
u1≤u
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u1)




P (v = u) min
u≤u2
{P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u2)P (D = 0|v = u2) + P (D = 1|v = u2)}.
When an instrument is binary, we can simplify them. As u, u0 and u1 take the values of 0 or 1,
P (v = 0)P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 0)P (D = 1|v = 0) +
P (v = 1) max{P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 0)P (D = 1|v = 0), P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 1)P (D = 1|v = 1)}
≤ P (Y1 = 1) (4.D.7)
≤ P (v = 0) min{P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 0), P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 1)}+
P (v = 1)P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 1)
and
P (v = 0)P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 0) +
P (v = 1) max{P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 0), P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 1)}
≤ P (Y0 = 1) (4.D.8)
≤ P (v = 0) min{P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 0)P (D = 0|v = 0) + P (D = 1|v = 0),
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 1)P (D = 0|v = 1) + P (D = 1|v = 1)}+
P (v = 1){P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 1)P (D = 0|v = 1) + P (D = 1|v = 1)}.
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The sharp bound of the ATE can be obtained via equation (4.8).
(ii) Negative MTS+MIV: Under the negative MTS assumption, the bounds of the condi-
tional probabilities P (Y1 = 1|v = u) and P (Y0 = 1|v = u) are given from equations (4.24) and
(4.25) by
P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = u)
≤ P (Y1 = 1|v = u)
≤ P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = u)P (D = 1|v = u) + P (D = 0|v = u) (4.D.9)
and
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u)P (D = 0|v = u)
≤ P (Y0 = 1|v = u)
≤ P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u). (4.D.10)
Under the MIV assumption, for u1 ≤ u ≤ u2,
max
u1≤u
P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = u1)
≤ P (Y1 = 1|v = u) (4.D.11)
≤ min
u≤u2




P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u1)P (D = 0|v = u1)
≤ P (Y0 = 1|v = u) (4.D.12)
≤ min
u≤u2
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u2).




P (v = u) max
u1≤u
P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = u1)




P (v = u) min
u≤u2





P (v = u) max
u1≤u
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u1)P (D = 0|v = u1)




P (v = u) min
u≤u2
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u2).
When an instrument is binary, we can simplify them. As u, u0 and u1 take the values of 0 or 1,
P (v = 0)P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 0) +
P (v = 1) max{P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 0), P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 1)}
≤ P (Y1 = 1) (4.D.15)
≤ P (v = 0) min{P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 0)P (D = 1|v = 0) + P (D = 0|v = 0),
P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 1)P (D = 1|v = 1) + P (D = 0|v = 1)}+
P (v = 1){P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 1)P (D = 1|v = 1) + P (D = 0|v = 1)}
and
P (v = 0)P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 0)P (D = 0|v = 0) +
P (v = 1) max{P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 0)P (D = 0|v = 0), P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 1)P (D = 0|v = 1)}
≤ P (Y0 = 1) (4.D.16)
≤ P (v = 0) min{P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 0), P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 1)}+
P (v = 1)P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 1).
The sharp bound of the ATE can be obtained via equation (4.8).
4.D.2 MTR+MIV
Under the MTR assumption, the bounds of the conditional probabilities P (Y1 = 1|v = u) and
P (Y0 = 1|v = u) are given from equations (4.14) and (4.15) by
P (Y = 1|v = u)
≤ P (Y1 = 1|v = u) (4.D.17)
≤ P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = u)P (D = 1|v = u) + P (D = 0|v = u)
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and
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u)P (D = 0|v = u)
≤ P (Y0 = 1|v = u) (4.D.18)
≤ P (Y = 1|v = u).
Under the MIV assumption, for u1 ≤ u ≤ u2,
max
u1≤u
P (Y = 1|v = u1)
≤ P (Y1 = 1|v = u) (4.D.19)
≤ min
u≤u2




P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u1)P (D = 0|v = u1)
≤ P (Y0 = 1|v = u) (4.D.20)
≤ min
u≤u2
P (Y = 1|v = u2).




P (v = u) max
u1≤u
P (Y = 1|v = u1)




P (v = u) min
u≤u2




P (v = u) max
u1≤u
P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = u1)P (D = 0|v = u1)




P (v = u) min
u≤u2
P (Y = 1|v = u2).
199
When an instrument is binary, we can simplify them. As u, u0 and u1 take the values of 0 or 1,
P (v = 0)P (Y = 1|v = 0) +
P (v = 1) max{P (Y = 1|v = 0), P (Y = 1|v = 1)}
≤ P (Y1 = 1) (4.D.23)
≤ P (v = 0) min{P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 0)P (D = 1|v = 0) + P (D = 0|v = 0),
P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 1)P (D = 1|v = 1) + P (D = 0|v = 1)}
+P (v = 1){P (Y1 = 1|D = 1, v = 1)P (D = 1|v = 1) + P (D = 0|v = 1)}
and
P (v = 0)P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 0)P (D = 0|v = 0) +
P (v = 1) max{P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 0)P (D = 0|v = 0), P (Y0 = 1|D = 0, v = 1)P (D = 0|v = 1)}
≤ P (Y0 = 1) (4.D.24)
≤ P (v = 0) min{P (Y = 1|v = 0), P (Y = 1|v = 1)}+
P (v = 1)P (Y = 1|v = 1).





This thesis has contributed to an understanding of health inequality in low- and middle-income
countries in Asia. It has investigated two important topics in health economics. The first two
chapters focused on the inequality of opportunity (IOp) in health. Chapter 1 explored the ex-
ante IOp in child health in ten developing countries in Asia, i.e. Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan,
Maldives, India, Cambodia, Myanmar, East Timor, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. We observed
significant health disparities between children from households with advantaged socio-economic
status and those from households with disadvantaged socio-economic status in all ten countries.
A decomposition analysis yielded strong evidence that the observed health disparities are strongly
associated with households’ living standards and suggested that priority should be given to pro-
tecting children from marginalised households. Chapter 2 proposed a new approach to measuring
the ex-post IOp. The proposed approach employed the statistical property of copulas to model
the distributional dependency between effort and circumstance variables. Combined with the
semi-parametric distributional regression, the proposed method estimated a conditional distri-
bution function of health and then quantified the IOp. We applied the method to the inequality
in body mass in Indonesia associated with its intergenerational transmission from parents to
grown-up offspring. We found that the non-negligible proportion of overall inequality in body
mass is related to its intergenerational transmission.
The last two chapters evaluated the conditional cash transfer programmes conducted in In-
donesia and India. Chapter 3 evaluated the impacts of the Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH)
on child nutritional status and household expenditure in Indonesia. This chapter has contributed
to the existing evidence by estimating the distributional impacts and by investigating the path-
ways through which the PKH influences child health. A significant improvement in weight for
age z-score was observed only among children aged 25-36 months, and its improvement was not
explained by the rise in household expenditure due to the PKH. We investigated why health im-
provement was not observed among younger age groups and discussed how the programme could
be improved to maximise its potential on the basis of the evidence in Latin America. Chapter 4
re-visited the impact of the Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) programme in India, on maternal and
child healthcare use. In contrast to major conditional cash transfer programmes in Lain Amer-
ica, the randomised controlled trial designed for the programme evaluation was not conducted
in India. We reviewed the existing non-experimental evidence through the partial identification
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approach and assessed the validity of the identification assumptions employed in the previous
studies. The results indicated that the average treatment effects (ATEs) estimated under the
identification assumptions used in previous studies lie outside of the ATE bounds estimated
under weaker but more credible assumptions. These findings suggested that the identification
assumptions imposed in the previous studies could have been invalid and estimated treatment
effects had been over- or under-estimated because unobserved confounding factors were not fully
controlled for.
As a concluding remark, I would like to discuss future research extensions of each chapter here.
First, for chapter 1, the dynamic changes of IOp in child health across time would be worth
exploring. Asian developing countries have been experiencing strong economic growth, rapid
urbanisation and relentless globalisation, which has been substantially changing the food sys-
tems, including the processing, distribution and marketing thereof, and made more food choices
available. Furthermore, hand-in-hand with economic development comes more income, which
in turn can be spent more not only on foods but also on housing and early education, thereby
dramatically changing the lifestyles of the people. Also, diversification in family composition has
been observed by a growing middle class, with a rise in females participating in the labour force
and the advent of dual-income nuclear families. Exploring the trend of health inequality and
its changes over time would complement the cross-sectional findings of this study and foster an
understanding of health inequality dynamics in the 21st century in Asia.
Exploring the inequality in the life-course is also worth looking into, in order to better un-
derstand the mechanism by which the child health inequality takes place and evolves across the
developmental stages. Life-course perspectives on the evolution of inequalities allow us to ex-
plore the dynamic link between early-life circumstances and later consequences and to identify
the optimal timing of when circumstances and events matter the most (Ben-Shlomo and Kuh,
2002; Lynch et al., 1997; Lynch and Smith, 2005). Future research would be well served by
investigating how the trajectory of inequality in children’s development associated with early-
life circumstances diverges from early in life through to early adulthood and at what age such
inequality peaks and whether and how it changes across the developmental stages.
Next, in the applied economics, with the accumulation of big-data, how we can handle the
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high dimensional data has been widely discussed recently. Research into IOp is no exception; as
in-depth genetic information is becoming available, high dimensional data is receiving attention
these days in health economics. As genetic characteristics are totally beyond our control and any
health disparity attributable to them can be considered inequitable. Hence, ultimately tens of
thousands of genetic factors might also be considered to be non-ignorable circumstances. How-
ever, economists rarely know what genetic characteristics matter or how they are related to our
health a priori. Furthermore, too much genetic information may often build up the model which
has more circumstance variables than total sample sizes, resulting in the curse of dimensionality
in a regression analysis. At the end of chapter 2, we discussed the potential limitations of copulas
in the presence of high dimensional circumstance and effort variables. Recently, Brunori et al.
(2019) argue that estimating the IOp can be understood as a prediction problem and suggest
incorporating some of the machine learning techniques in quantifying the IOp. Exploring the
potential of the machine learning approach in the study of the IOp would be beneficial for future
research into health inequality in the era of big data.
For chapter 3, as we touched upon in the conclusion, estimating the much longer-term effects
would complement our findings. In contrast to the healthcare utilisation, it requires much longer
periods for the effect on child nutritional status to appear, in particular, increase in height. We
observed little improvement in height-for-age z-score and weight-for-age z-score among children
aged 0-12 months and children aged 13-24 months, 26-30 months after the implementation of
the PKH. Estimating even longer-term effects with further follow-up surveys would definitely
contribute to a more thorough policy evaluation. Also, evaluating effectiveness for various in-
termediate outcomes beyond household total expenditure and investigating the effects on house-
hold’s resource allocation would further enrich our understanding of the behavioural changes of
beneficiaries.
Finally, for chapter 4, another important investigation to be conducted is to explore the het-
erogeneity of the ATE bounds across the population. As is often carried out in empirical studies
with the traditional point-identification approach, testing the existence of heterogeneity is no
less important in the partial-identification approach than in the point-identification approach.
Due to space limitations, we did not implement sample-splitting in the study, but it is intriguing
to estimate the ATE bounds across states, religions and ethnicities of households and maternal
204
education levels. Through the comprehensive exploration into the heterogeneity, we can infer
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